Problems of Communism

MARCH-APRIL 1980

AFTER TITO
Steven L. Burg

East European Tensions
Ernst Kux

Soviet Muslims and the World of Islam
Alexandre Bennigsen

Book Reviews
Robert F. Miller
T. H. Rigby
Dennis J. Dunn
William Potter
John M. Starrels
Maurice D. Simon

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Problems of Communism

2

March-April 1980 VOL XXIX

Problems of Communism is a bimonthly publication providing analyses and significant information about the contemporary affairs of the Soviet Union, China, and comparable states and political movements. Views of contributors, as well as geographic boundaries and names, do not necessarily reflect the policies of the United States Government.

On all editorial matters, communications should be addressed to: The Editors, *Problems of Communism,* International Communication Agency, United States of America, 1776 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW, Washington, DC, 20547, USA. Telephone: (202) 724-9801.

On subscriptions, communications should be addressed to: The Superintendent of Documents, US Government Printing Office, Washington, DC, 20402, USA, preferably using the subscription form provided on the inside back cover of this issue. Outside the United States, please address inquiries to the Public Affairs Section, Embassy of the United States of America.

Copyright: Reproduction or republication of texts from *Problems of Communism* is permissible, and no claim of copyright is asserted. However, the Editors request that they be advised of reprint usage and that source credit be given both to the authors of individual articles and to *Problems of Communism.* Should textual items in the journal ever be subject to a claim of copyright, such claim will be clearly stated. Graphics and pictures which carry a credit line are not necessarily owned by *Problems of Communism,* and users bear responsibility for obtaining appropriate permissions.

An annual index for *Problems of Communism* appears in the November-December issue (No. 6) of each year except in the case of the first three volumes, which are covered in a combined index in the November-December issue (No. 6) of Vol. III. Material from the journal is also indexed in *ABC POL SCI, Bibliographie Internationale des Sciences Sociales* (all sections), *Current Contents, Economic Abstracts, Historical Abstracts, Index to US Government Periodicals, International Political Science Abstracts, Public Affairs Information Service, Social Sciences Index, Social Sciences Citation Index, Strategic Studies Reference Guide,* and *United States Political Science Documents.*

1 Decision-making in Yugoslavia
by Steven L. Burg

21 Growing Tensions in Eastern Europe
by Ernst Kux

38 Soviet Muslims and the World of Islam
by Alexandre Bennigsen

BOOKS

52 Whither the Soviet System?
by Robert F. Miller

57 How the Obkom Secretary Was Tempered
by T.H. Rigby

64 Religion and Nationalism in the USSR and China
by Dennis J. Dunn

68 Perception and Misperception in U.S.-Soviet Relations
by William Potter

72 GDR Foreign Policy
by John M. Starrels

76 A Window on Poland's Social Transformation
by Maurice D. Simon

Cover: Yugoslavia's President Josip Broz Tito in December 1976 on the occasion of a visit to Belgrade by Dutch Foreign Minister Max van der Stoel. Photo by Vincent Mentzel.

EDITOR
Paul A. Smith, Jr.

SENIOR EDITOR (TEXT) David E. Albright
SENIOR EDITOR (MANAGEMENT) Wayne Hall

ASSOCIATE EDITORS
Paul A. Shapiro
William E. Freeman

DESIGNER Gary Soderstrom
PRODUCTION ASSISTANT Linda Wray

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

IN THE MARCH–APRIL ISSUE OF

Problems of Communism

Articles

Decision-Making in Yugoslavia

Steven L. Burg

Since the mid-1960's, in response to Yugoslavia's long-standing ethnic and regional differences, the Yugoslav leadership has evolved a characteristic pattern of decision-making, based on interregional consultation, compromise, and consensus. This evolution has seemed to point toward continued stability in the post-Tito period. But if the rotation of officeholding in party and government at the regional level recently advocated by Tito is implemented, the stability of the post-Tito system may well be threatened. Tito's successors may therefore have to undo this last of his initiatives.

Growing Tensions in Eastern Europe

Ernst Kux

Despite the appearance of relative stability in Eastern Europe in recent years, tensions have been building there. The USSR has failed to create a genuine "socialist community" in the area, and effective cooperation in the political, military, and economic realms has proved elusive. Moreover, the domestic situations of most of the countries are now in considerable flux, with both new and revitalized old forces and tendencies in play. Thus, there is potential for major turmoil in the region.

Soviet Muslims and the World of Islam

Alexandre Bennigsen

Events in Afghanistan and Iran have altered interaction between Soviet Muslims and the greater Muslim world in ways perhaps not anticipated in the Kremlin. Since Stalin's death, Soviet leaders have made controlled use of the USSR's officially accepted Soviet Islamic leaders to foster ties with conservative Muslim states and groups. In the last two years, however, Moscow has suddenly faced the possibility that some of its 43 million Muslim subjects may see in nationalistic Muslim rebellion and revolution abroad an example for their own efforts to diminish Russian control over their lives.

* * *

Essay-reviews

Whither the Soviet System?

Robert F. Miller

Although the data base is admittedly slim, it is important to look at the sort of political system that will operate in the USSR after Brezhnev leaves power. While extremes of xenophobic reaction or technocratically inspired reform cannot be ruled out, the most likely outcome is a continuation of what one author calls "welfare-authoritarianism"—in which policies justified as advancing the welfare of the general populace and hence as legitimating the regime are arrived at through competition among various institutional interest groups within the ruling Communist elite.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

How the Obkom Secretary Was Tempered
T. H. Rigby

Recent memoir literature reveals the informal power relationships, prevalent attitudes, and standard behavior patterns of the obkom secretaries of the USSR and makes clear the importance of patron-client networks and mutual support among the Soviet elite. It is probable that many of the top Soviet leaders of the 1980's will, like their predecessors, have been "tempered" by experience as an obkom secretary. Tomorrow's Soviet leaders, then, while perhaps better educated, may not prove to be of a very different cast from today's.

Religion and Nationalism in the USSR and China
Dennis J. Dunn

Religion is a force of prime importance across the broad heartland of Eurasia, as is evidenced by the measures taken by Communist regimes to suppress it. One reason is that throughout the region, religion is strongly identified with minority nationalism. In their attempt to strengthen their hold, Communist regimes strike at religion in order to lessen the potential threat represented by minority nationalism.

Perception and Misperception in US-Soviet Relations
William Potter

Misperceptions of each other continue to bedevil relations between the United States and the Soviet Union. However, recent years have witnessed some improvements in this situation on both sides, although the relatively subtle perceptions of the United States articulated by at least some Soviet Americanists may not be widely shared in the USSR.

GDR Foreign Policy
John M. Starrels

Lacking the protective garb of the traditional nation-state and heavily dependent on the Soviet Union to ensure its survival, East Germany has nonetheless sought to establish and further its own "national" goals. Thus far, it has looked to Europe as the primary arena in which to pursue these, but the potential political and economic benefits to be derived from a more active role in the Third World may cause it to shift its focus to there in the future.

A Window on Poland's Social Transformation
Maurice D. Simon

Empirical studies conducted since the 1950's by Polish sociologists provide much useful information on many aspects of the "transformation" of Poland into a "socialist society." But there seems to be little effort—at least in the research available to outside observers—to explore systematically the relationship between changes in social structure on the one hand and politics on the other.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Decision-making in Yugoslavia

By Steven L. Burg

Both Yugoslavs and foreign observers of Yugoslav affairs have been asking "What will be after?" for the past 20 years. No one familiar with the Yugoslav scene has ever responded by asking "after *what?*" Implicit in the question itself is the recognition that President Josip Broz Tito has provided an ingredient essential to the survival of the Yugoslav state in the past, and that his death will call that survival into question.

At present, both international conditions and domestic conditions in the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) are in a state of flux, and it is difficult to predict with confidence the precise character of the post-Tito system. Any attempt to do so, however, must invariably reckon with the question whether the Yugoslav political leadership will be able, in the absence of Tito, to overcome the ethnic, regional, economic, and political differences that will continue to divide the country.

In response to past conflicts based on these differences, Tito and the rest of the Yugoslav leadership have attempted to create a political system that strikes a balance between recognition of the country's diversity of regions and peoples, on the one hand, and the degree of centralization requisite to the maintenance of a unified state, on the other. Over the years, they have wrestled with this problem in a variety of ways, including the introduction of a succession of organizational and procedural changes at various levels of party and government.

Since 1966, Yugoslavia's leaders have established a pattern of decision-making characterized by decentralization, interregional consultation, and consensus. In 1979, however, they introduced certain changes, and announced their intention to introduce other changes, that conflict with established decision-making practices. These changes represent yet another attempt by Tito to ensure political stability after he is gone. But that stability will be in the hands of his successors, and to ensure it, the post-Tito leadership may have to undo the changes initiated by Tito.

In order to appreciate fully the significance of Tito's latest changes and proposals, the current principles and practices of decision-making in Yugoslavia must be traced back to their origins in the mid-1960's, when the sporadic attempts at federalization of the 1950's and early 1960's gave way to a more lasting effort to achieve a federal solution to the problem of Yugoslavia's diversity.

Mr. Burg is Assistant Professor of Politics, Brandeis University (Waltham, MA). He has written widely on Yugoslav and Soviet politics in such journals as Survey, Publius, *and* Cahiers du monde russe et soviétique.

Emergent Decision-making Principles

During the late 1950's and early 1960's, a series of reforms partially decentralized the organization and operation of the economy and partially democratized the political system in Yugoslavia. These changes were supported by Tito and by a majority of the top political leaders of the party, the League of Communists of Yugoslavia (LCY). But they were strongly and effectively resisted by elements within both the party leadership and the rank and file who adhered to a more centralized vision of the system.

In the mid-1960's, it was not unreasonable for the leaders of this resistance to expect that a majority in the party leadership might soon support a return to more "orthodox," and therefore more acceptable, policies. That had happened several times during the previous decade when reforms had proved difficult to implement or had had undesirable unintended conse-

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The Presidency of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia meets on March 5, 1980, to discuss the country's foreign activity and efforts to affirm the principles of nonalignment in international relations. Pictured from left to right are: Josip Vrhovec, Federal Secretary for Foreign Affairs; Veselin Djuranovic, President of the Federal Executive Council (Premier); Vidoje Zarkovic and Fadilj Hodza, members of the Presidency; and Lazar Kolisevski, Vice-President of the Presidency, who presided over the meeting.

—Eastfoto.

quences. In 1966, however, the liberal majority in the party leadership responded not by retreating, but by identifying and moving against the source of resistance to its policies. In July, Aleksandar Rankovic and his closest supporters were removed from their positions in the state and party leaderships, and a series of changes that altered the organization, operation, and very character of the party was set under way.

During the period between the ouster of Rankovic and the Ninth Party Congress in March 1969, power in the party passed from the central leadership to the leaderships of the eight regional party organizations. Explicit formulas for representation of the regional organizations in central party organs were established. At first, these called for proportional representation based roughly on the size of the organizations. But proportionality was rapidly replaced by the principle of "parity," which required equal representation of the six republic organizations and "corresponding"—less numerous—representation of the two autonomous provincial organizations. After the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, the party organization in the Army was allocated representation equal to that of a provincial organization. Each regional party organization gained control over the appointment of both party cadres in its own region and its representatives in central party organs, heretofore prerogatives of the central leadership. As a result, members of the central party organs thenceforth owed their allegiance not to their colleagues at the center, but to their respective regional organizations. This dramatically reduced the independence and authority of the central party organs.[1]

During this period, the central party organs were also increased in size and required to meet less often. Even more important, however, the Presidium, the most authoritative of the central organs, came increasingly to require a consensus among the regional

[1] League of Communists of Yugoslavia (LCY), Central Committee (CC), *Peta Sednica Centralnog komiteta Saveza komunista Jugoslavije i izlaganja na sednicama CK SK u republikama* (Fifth Session of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia and Speeches at the Sessions of the CC's of the Leagues of Communists in the Republics), Belgrade, Komunist, 1966, pp. 19, 24, 26, 53; idem, *Deveta Sednica Centralnog komiteta* (Ninth Session of the Central Committee), Belgrade, Komunist, 1968, pp. 103ff.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

representatives who composed it before it could adopt any decision or take any action.[2] This made it possible for any single regional leadership to prevent the adoption of policies to which it was opposed, and established the basis for paralysis of the party leadership in the face of interregional conflict.

Other changes carried out during this period applied the same organizational and procedural principles to state institutions. However, while the changes in the party had been initiated by representatives of the developed regions, those in the state were initiated largely by representatives of the underdeveloped regions. Heretofore, the Chamber of Nationalities, the institutional locus for direct representation of the republics, provinces, and nationalities in the federal parliament (Federal Assembly), had been restricted to a largely symbolic role in the governmental process. The party leadership, intent on controlling interregional conflicts, purposely prevented the discussion of such conflicts in the Chamber because the Chamber was a public forum.[3] But by 1967, the party leadership had become preoccupied with the abovementioned internal reorganization of the party and could neither exercise such control nor resolve such conflicts. Consequently, interregional conflicts over government policy breathed new political life into the Chamber as an alternative arena for their resolution.

In 1967, constitutional amendments were adopted that reaffirmed and strengthened the role of the Chamber by increasing the range of federal decisions that required its approval. In 1968, the jurisdiction of the Chamber was expanded still further by additional amendments, which required that all federal legislation be approved by it. Although the 1967 and 1968 amendments did not alter constitutional provisions that called for majority voting by individual delegates in the Chamber, the practice of voting by regional "blocs" of delegates nevertheless developed very quickly. It was not long before informal rules of procedure required the approval of all eight regional "blocs" before the Chamber could take formal action.[4]

In the federal government, policymaking authority passed from the Federal Executive Council to the executive councils of the republics and provinces in a process that paralleled developments in the party. In 1967, the Federal Executive Council introduced the practice of holding "consultative meetings" with representatives of the regional executive councils to define the position it would adopt on "more important socioeconomic questions." As the jurisdiction of the Chamber of Nationalities expanded and as regional control over it increased, the need to secure interregional agreement before submission of draft federal legislation to the parliament also increased. Consequently, the Council soon could not take a position on "a single more significant issue" before it had been discussed and approved at a "consultative meeting" of representatives of regional governments. In 1969, this practice was formally institutionalized within the Federal Executive Council with the creation of a permanent "Coordinating Commission," composed of representatives of federal, republic, and provincial executive councils.[5] At the same time, the formula for membership on the Council as a whole was changed. Before 1969, an informal agreement had assigned three positions on the Council to each of the three largest republics and two positions to each of the three smaller ones. Now, the regional leaderships agreed that each republic would have three positions and each autonomous province one, a formula similar to that adopted for the central party organs.[6]

These changes in party and government devolved enormous power to the regional political leaderships, so that by the Ninth Party Congress in 1969 not only the organization of decision-making institutions but also the process of decision-making had been transformed:

Important decisions now no longer were made at the federal summit, but rather by direct contacts among representatives of the republics [*and provinces*] *in the form of bilateral and multilateral interpersonal visits and discussions among republic* [*and provincial*] *state and party delegations.*

This left no effective, independent central leadership in either the state or the party, except for the personal leadership exercised by President Tito. As a conse-

[2] *Deveta Sednica* . . . , pp. 116–18.

[3] See the comment by Edvard Kardelj in Firdus Dzinic, Ed., *Izborni sistem u uslovima samoupravljanja* (The Electoral System in the Conditions of Self-management), Belgrade, Institut Drustvenih Nauka, 1967, p. 334.

[4] Pavle S. Nikolic, *Savezna Skupstina u Ustavnom i Politickom Sistemu Jugoslavije* (The Federal Assembly in the Constitutional and Political System of Yugoslavia), Belgrade, Savez Udruzenja Pravnika Jugoslavije, 1969, pp. 39–40. See also Marjan Vivoda, "The Organization and Method of Work of Committees of the Federal and Republic Assemblies After the Adoption of the Constitution of the SFRY and the Constitutions of the Socialist Republics," in Borislav T. Blagojevic, Ed., *Mesto i uloga odbora i komisija predstavnickih tela* (The Place and Role of the Committees and Commissions of Representative Bodies), Belgrade, Institut za Uporedno Pravo, 1960, pp. 96–106.

[5] Nikola Stjepanovic, *Upravno Pravo u SFRJ* (Administrative Law in the SFRY), Belgrade, Privredni Pregled, 1973, p. 166.

[6] *Politika* (Belgrade), Apr. 3, 1969.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

quence, during this period Tito "all the more frequently received delegations of the republics [and provinces]" or travelled to the various regional capitals "for political discussions and in this way created a [common] platform for political decisions."[7]

Response to Domestic Conflict

This "federalization" of political power in the state and party took place in the context of rising popular nationalist sentiments among all the peoples of Yugoslavia and increasing incidents of violent interethnic conflict.[8] These tensions, in turn, strained relations between representatives of the regions in central political organs. At first, each regional leadership simply suppressed open manifestations of nationalism in its region, emphasized the significant concessions to cultural heterogeneity already made by the regime, and stressed interregional cooperation and common interests.[9] But this strategy became more difficult to maintain as nationalist attention shifted from traditional cultural concerns to the defense of regional economic interests. On these issues, nationalist pressures reinforced already existing divisions within the leadership that arose out of continuing disputes over the economic powers and policies of the federation.

All the regional leaderships more or less supported the division of political power that followed the ouster of Rankovic. Although the leaderships of the economically more developed regions generally offered the strongest backing, the leaderships of the less developed regions also gave their endorsement. Indeed, at the time of the 1968 constitutional reforms it was the Macedonian leadership that was most outspoken in its support for regional power.[10]

However, the regional leaderships found it more difficult to agree on what policies, over which each had acquired a veto, the federation would pursue. With time, the Croatian leadership grew increasingly insistent on its demands for further reform of the banking system to reduce the power of the formerly federally controlled central banks, for changes in the foreign currency exchange and foreign trade systems that would allow those who earned foreign currency to retain a greater share of it, and especially for devolution of greater control over investment decisions to the self-managing enterprises that generated investment capital.[11] Until mid-1969, the leaderships of Slovenia and Vojvodina also supported these demands, for fullfillment of such demands promised an increase in the proportion of resources that remained in the economically more developed regions for reinvestment. The leaderships of the economically less developed regions, in contrast, sought "the concentration of resources at the federal level and their redistribution to lesser developed national, or republic areas." Each side backed up its position by referring to principles embodied in the programmatic documents of the party. The former pointed to the ideological commitment to increase the scope of self-management in the economy, while the latter referred to "the principle of solidarity and help by the developed for the underdeveloped."[12]

In 1969, the growing intensity of the mutually reinforcing national, economic, and ideological conflicts that divided the regional leaderships led President Tito to attempt to limit the process of federalization and to restore some degree of central authority in the party. Despite "certain reservations" among them, Tito won the regional leaderships' approval for the creation of an Executive Bureau of the Presidium, to be composed of himself, two representatives from each republic organization, and one representative from each provincial organization. The new 15-member Executive Bureau, established at the Ninth Congress, was intended to function as a more effective integrative central organ than the full 52-member Presidium: it was smaller, it immediately enjoyed enormous prestige as the apparent institutional successor to Tito, its members did not have other responsibilities and could focus their full attention on solving divisive political problems, and it was to make its decisions as an in-

[7] Dusan Bilandzic, *Ideje i Praksa Drustvenog Razvoja Jugoslavije 1945–1973* (Ideas and Practice of the Social Development of Yugoslavia, 1945–1973), Belgrade, Komunist, 1973, p. 271.

[8] See, for example, the reports contained in *Republicko savjetovanie Saveza komunista o nekim obiljezjima politicke situacije u Bosni i Hercegovini* (Republic Consultation of the League of Communists on Certain Characteristics of the Political Situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina), Sarajevo, Oslobodjenje, 1968.

[9] Reference here, of course, is to the reaction to the Croatian "Declaration" and Serbian "Proposal" episode of 1967. See "Politics, Not Linguistics," in *Vjesnik* (Zagreb, Dalmatian edition), Mar. 19, 1967; the speech by Tito reported in ibid., Mar. 26, 1967; and League of Communists of Serbia, CC, *Aktuelna pitanja i zadaci komunista u borbi za reformu (9. Sednica CK SK Srbije)* (Current Questions and Tasks of Communists in the Struggle for Reform [Ninth Session of the CC of the League of Communists of Serbia]), Belgrade, Biblioteka Saveza komunista Srbije, 1967, pp. 19–20, 127–31.

[10] Slavko Milosavlevski, "Contribution to the Question of Further Development of the Political Organization of the Yugoslav Federation," in Ljubisa Stankov, Ed., *Karakter i funkcije federacije u procesu konstituisanja samoupravnog drustva* (Character and Functions of the Federation in the Process of Constituting a Self-managing Society), Belgrade, Institut za politicke studije VSPN, 1968, pp. 70–79.

[11] Ivan Peric, *Suvremeni Hrvatski nacionalizam* (Contemporary Croatian Nationalism), Zagreb, August Cesarec, 1976, p. 52.

[12] Ibid.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

dependent collegial body, taking into account the interests of all the regions.[13] Its creation represented an attempt to break the deadlock in the central party leadership without abandoning the organizational and procedural principles of decision-making that had evolved since 1966.

The explosive potential of the divisions that plagued the leadership was forcefully demonstrated only a few months later by the "Slovenian road-building crisis." That crisis stemmed from popular resentment that had been building up in Slovenia since the economic liberalization of 1965 over the federal government's apparent disregard of the interests of the economically advanced Slovenian republic in favor of the interests of the underdeveloped regions of the country.[14] In July 1969, a decision by the Federal Executive Council to delay the financing of certain road construction projects in Slovenia and to finance instead other projects in underdeveloped regions triggered a wave of public protest meetings in Slovenia, meetings marked by highly nationalistic and even separatist sentiments. Popular complaints that the decision had been made by illegitimate methods, and demands for its immediate reversal, were supported and reinforced by a number of Slovenian governmental bodies and social, economic, and political organizations. The strength of the protests compelled even the republic party leadership to offer at least some support to the protesters.

In short order, the conflict spread beyond the borders of the republic. The demands raised in Slovenia were seconded by the government of Croatia, another developed republic in which similar popular grievances against the federation existed, but were almost simultaneously condemned in Serbia and by the political leadership of Macedonia, an underdeveloped republic.[15]

One week later, as the conflict grew in scope and intensity, an Executive Bureau meeting, to which the country's entire party and governmental leadership was summoned, convened under Tito's chairmanship. The results of this meeting were anticlimactic. Both the substance of the Federal Executive Council's decision and the procedures by which it had been made were approved.[16]

The Slovenian party leadership then undertook action to support the decisions of the Council and to suppress nationalist discontent in the republic.[17] More important, a month later the Slovenian governmental leadership admitted that it deserved much of the blame for the crisis. It had failed, it acknowledged, to act quickly to explain and defend a decision in whose preparation its representatives had participated and to which it had agreed in advance. In explaining its failure, the Slovenian leadership observed that "political pressures make sober judgment difficult."[18]

But domestic political pressures in the form of worsening relations between the nationalities and intensifying interregional conflict over federal economic policies continued to mount in the period after the Slovenian crisis. Despite the warning signal provided by that crisis, the Croatian leadership continued to press its policy demands at the center. Now, however, it no longer received the backing of the other leaderships. Because of the "road-building crisis," for example, the Slovenian leadership had become acutely sensitive to the dangers of allowing inter-republic conflict to continue for very long, and it grew increasingly reluctant to support Croatian positions. As a result, the Croatian leadership rapidly became isolated in the central political organs of the country.[19] Unable to achieve the adoption of its positions as federal policy, it therefore acted to prevent the adoption of any other positions.

With the central political organs of the state and party stalemated, the Croatian leadership sought to achieve its objectives by launching a campaign, first, to remove those policy areas of most direct concern to it from the decision-making authority of central political organs and, second, to strengthen the role of regional representatives in all remaining areas of federal decision-making authority.[20] It was able very rapidly to achieve the latter. In April 1970, it won formal recognition by the party Presidium of the principle of unanimous decision-making "as a rule" in both state and party organs.[21] It also obtained the party's commitment to "equalization" of regional representation in all federal bodies.[22] Although these decisions were not

[13] LCY, *Deveti kongress SKJ: Stenografske beleske* (Ninth Congress of the LCY: Stenographic Record), Belgrade, Komunist, Vol. 1, 1970, pp. 49-50. "Reservations" are reported in *Politika*, Mar. 25, 1969.

[14] See the results of a public opinion poll concerning the consequences of the reform, reported in *Jugoslovensko javno mnenje 1966* (Yugoslav Public Opinion 1966), Belgrade, Institut Drustvenih Nauka, 1967, pp. 34, 36, and 39.

[15] *Politika*, July 31, 1969. See also *Borba* (Belgrade), Aug. 2, 5, and 8, 1969; and *NIN* (Belgrade), No. 969, Aug. 3, 1969.

[16] *Borba*, Aug. 9, 1969.

[17] Ibid., Sept. 3, 1969.

[18] Ibid., Sept. 6, 1969.

[19] Peric, *Suvremeni Hrvatski nacionalizam*, p. 54.

[20] A campaign launched at the famous 10th Session of the Croatian Central Committee. See Milovan Baletic and Zdravko Zidovec, Eds., *Deseta Sednica Centralnog komiteta Saveza komunista Hrvatske* (Tenth Session of the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Croatia), Zagreb, Vjesnik, 1970.

[21] LCY, Presidium, *Osma Sednica Predsednistva SKJ* (Eighth Session of the Presidium of the LCY), Belgrade, Komunist, 1970, p. 11.

[22] Ibid., p. 13.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

adopted without lengthy and serious interregional debate over the precise formulas for representation and procedures for decision-making, they were supported in the end by all the regional leaderships because the power of each was enhanced by them. Moreover, the decisions did not represent a departure from the previously established pattern of change.

Nevertheless, agreement on the precise issues requiring interregional unanimity and on the redivision of decision-making authority between the federation and the republics was more difficult to achieve. During 1970, a special working group of the party leadership, a group composed of representatives of each regional leadership and under the chairmanship of Edvard Kardelj, convened a series of closed meetings to develop proposals for implementing the principles adopted by the Presidium in April. This group generally agreed that additional constitutional reforms to transfer certain functions from the competence of the federation to the competences of the individual regions were required. The regional leaderships remained bitterly divided, however, over precisely what competences would be left to the federation and over whether each region would retain a formal veto over all federal decisions or would simply be represented in, and consulted during, the federal decision-making process.[23]

This dispute took place against the background of a continuing, and in some respects intensifying, interregional deadlock in the policymaking organs of the state and party. In an effort to break this deadlock, Tito consulted with "a few comrades from the highest leadership," and together they decided to create a collective state presidency organized on the same principles as the Executive Bureau of the party.[24] In

[23] See Kardelj's report on the work of this group in LCY, *Aktuelni problemi daljeg razvoja politickog sistema* (Current Problems of the Further Development of the Political System), Belgrade, Komunist, 1970.

[24] Ibid., p. 129.

Some of the participants at a July 1969 meeting of the Executive Bureau of the Presidium of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia: from left to right, Veljko Vlahovic, Miko Tripalo, Mijalko Todorovic, Edvard Kardelj, and Dimce Belovski.

—EUPRA.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

September 1970, in a public speech proposing the establishment of a collective presidency, Tito emphasized that it was to be composed of "the best people from the republics," but that its members were not to function as "republic advocates." Rather, the members were to function collectively as "an independent factor" that would resolve interregional conflicts in the interest of the Yugoslav community as a whole. This new collective body, he added, would relieve the party leadership of day-to-day involvement in the operation of the state. It also would serve as his institutional successor in the state, just as the Executive Bureau was to do in the party.[25]

By publicly proposing creation of a collective state presidency, Tito accelerated the pace of constitutional reform. Despite continuing differences over the precise formulas for federal decision-making, a month of intraparty discussion, debate, and compromise following Tito's speech established a tenuous consensus among the regional leaderships on the broad outlines of the reforms to be adopted.[26] This allowed the central leadership to proceed to the preparation of specific constitutional amendments for the reorganization and operation of the federation. The federal parliament's Joint Commission for constitutional questions created three "working groups" to prepare proposals concerning the immediate issues raised by the continuing interregional stalemate and by the initiative to create a collective presidency: reorganization of the organs of the federation; reformulation of relations between the federation, the republics, and the autonomous provinces; and specification of the economic functions of the federation. These groups were composed of one representative from each republic and province and one from the military. Because the military transcended regional and national divisions, its representative could legitimately represent an "all-Yugoslav" position in the deliberations of these groups. All other members were appointed by, and required to represent the positions of, their respective republics or provinces. The task of these groups was *not* to reconcile conflicts among those positions. Rather, it was simply to draft alternative formulations of constitutional amendments on the basis of those positions.

Reconciliation, or "harmonization," was to take place in another, more authoritative body created by the Joint Commission, its Coordinating Commission.[27] The Coordinating Commission was headed by Kardelj and composed of three representatives from each republic and two from each autonomous province. Its 22 members were determined by the regional leaderships themselves and consisted of individuals whose personal political authority permitted them both to represent the views of their respective regions and to reconcile these views with those of the others. They included 7 of the 15 members of the party's Executive Bureau and 13 of the 52 members of the party's Presidium.[28]

Discussions in the Coordinating Commission were highly contentious, for they focused not only on differences between constitutional formulas proposed by the regional representatives in the working groups but also on the frequently contradictory objective economic interests of the regions.[29] At certain key points in the work of the Commission, a subgroup of its members—probably the seven members from the LCY's Executive Bureau—met separately in closed sessions to resolve particularly difficult issues or to expedite the functioning of the Commission. The Commission as a whole operated on the principle of consensus. Consequently, its decisions were often the product of compromises.[30]

This commission corresponded closely in function to the commission of the same name that had been established earlier in the Federal Executive Council. It provided a highly authoritative forum for the resolution of interregional conflicts before such conflicts became subject to public discussion. Indeed, the entire organization and operation of the constitutional drafting process reinforced the decision-making pattern that had been evolving in state and party bodies since 1966, namely, the adoption of consensus as the basis for decision-making in negotiations among representatives of the regions.

The 1971 constitutional amendments that resulted from these deliberations have already been described in detail in this journal.[31] But it is important to note again that although they transferred to the republics and provinces a substantial proportion of the decision-making authority that had heretofore rested with the federation, they did not dramatically alter either the principles or existing practices of decision-making

[25] Text in ibid., pp. 5–12.

[26] See the discussion in ibid. Cf. the Serbian positions reported in *Borba*, Sept. 25, 1970; and *Politika*, Oct. 23, 1970.

[27] *Informativni Bilten Savezne Skupstine* (Belgrade; hereafter *IBSS*), No. 32, Nov. 30, 1970, pp. 26–28.

[28] Ibid., p. 27; and *Borba*, Nov. 7, 1970.

[29] See *IBSS*, No. 42, Feb. 20, 1971, pp. 2–3; and the lengthy report on the Commission's work in LCY, *Ustavne promene (sestnaesta sednica Predsednistva SKJ)* (Constitutional Changes [16th Session of the Presidium of the LCY]), Belgrade, Komunist, 1971.

[30] *IBSS*, No. 42, Feb. 20, 1971, pp. 2–3.

[31] See Paul Shoup, "The National Question in Yugoslavia," *Problems of Communism* (Washington, DC), January–February 1972, pp. 25–27.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

at the federal level. They formally established prior consultation, interregional negotiation, and "harmonization" of regional interests as the bases of decision-making, even in areas that ostensibly remained in the competence of the federation. Yet the chairman of the working group for relations between the federation, republics, and provinces acknowledged that "such is the practice even now" and suggested that the amendments simply "institutionalized" the existing pattern of decision-making.[32]

The principle of "harmonization of interests," or consensual decision-making, was also applied to the collective Presidency established by the amendments. Its members were to "work on the basis of adjustment of views." But they were not expected to make many formal decisions themselves. Rather, they were to identify interregional conflicts and act quickly to facilitate the resolution of such conflicts by other organs.[33] In other words, they were expected to perform collectively the role of interregional "broker" that Tito had up to then been performing individually.

That task was made more difficult, however, by the size of the Presidency and the diversity of its membership. The 1971 amendments incorporated the principle of regional representation in central decision-making bodies as it had evolved since 1966, and applied it to the collective state Presidency as well as to the Federal Executive Council and its interrepublic committees. All were to be constituted on the principle of equal representation of the republics and "corresponding" representation of the provinces. (Even the military command was to be determined according to the principle of "the most proportional representation" of the republics and provinces.)[34] In the case of the Presidency, representation of the *multinational* character of Bosnia, Vojvodina, and Kosovo was also deemed necessary. Consequently, each republic was to have three representatives, and each province, two.[35] With the inclusion of Tito, the size of the Presidency reached 23 persons. Some regions selected their most powerful leaders for membership in the Presidency, while others selected less authoritative figures in their leaderships. The presidents of the eight regional parliaments were *ex officio* members. Both their large numbers and diversity of political statures would later make it very difficult for the members of the Presidency to achieve either the degree of unity or corporate authority required for them to perform their prescribed role.

Yugoslav President Josip Broz Tito during a September 1971 visit to Ludbreg, Croatia. At left, Tito's wife Jovanka; at right, Savka Dabcevic-Kucar, then President of the Central Committee of the Croatian League of Communists.

—EUPRA.

Adoption of the amendments in June 1971 led to reorganization of the Federal Executive Council in July. As called for in the amendments, the Council established interrepublic committees to take over the role performed since 1967 by its Coordinating Commission. One committee was created for each of the five broad areas of federal policy on which interregional conflict during the preceding years had focused and for which the amendments required interregional consensus: development policy, the monetary system, foreign trade and the foreign currency exchange system, finance, and regulation of the market. However, even though the amendments called for equal representation of the republics and only corresponding representation of the provinces, each committee was actually composed of a president drawn from among the members of the Federal Executive Council and one representative appointed by each of the regional executive councils—a structure duplicating precisely that of the working groups that had prepared the draft amendments. At the same time, the Coordinating Commission of the Federal Executive Council was re-

[32] LCY, *Ustavne promene . . .*, p. 200.

[33] Ibid., pp. 56–57.

[34] Amendment XLI, in Federal Executive Council, Secretariat of Information, *Constitutional Amendments XX–XLII*, Belgrade, Prosveta, 1971.

[35] See the report of the chairman of the working group for organs of the federation in *Ustavne promene . . .*, p. 218.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tained as a higher and more authoritative arena for the handling of those conflicts that could not be resolved in the committees.[36]

None of the organizational and procedural prescriptions for the resolution of interregional conflict contained in the 1971 amendments proved effective in the short term. The collective Presidency, the newly reorganized Federal Executive Council, and the interrepublic committees fell victim to the same interregional deadlock over substantive policy issues that had paralyzed the state and party leaderships during the preceding four years. In fact, the process of constitutional reform in many ways exacerbated the regional economic, ethnic, and political conflicts that divided the leaderships. Nationalistic forces throughout Yugoslavia used discussions of constitutional questions and, later, public forums organized for the discussion of draft amendments to propose highly provocative constitutional formulas of their own and to raise highly explosive issues that heretofore could not legitimately have been raised publicly.[37]

Croatian Crisis and Its Aftermath

The exacerbation of national conflict was most pronounced in Croatia, where already well-organized nationalistic forces—both Croat and Serb—grew dramatically in size, gained increasing popular support, and became politically more active during the spring of 1971. The rise of an organized Croatian nationalist movement and of nationalistic sentiments among the masses in Croatia during the period 1969–71 have been well documented elsewhere and need not be treated in any detail here.[38] It is important to note, however, that the Croatian party leadership could not agree on how to react to these developments. Some Croatian leaders, confident that they could control the more extreme elements among the nationalists, attempted to use popular nationalist pressures as leverage against the leaderships of other regions in order to win further concessions on substantive policy and constitutional issues. Among them, these individuals occupied almost all the most authoritative positions in the party apparatus and other sociopolitical organizations of the republic, and they used their authority to ensure the adoption of positions sympathetic to nationalistic demands. The entire leadership had accepted and approved this strategy in late 1969 and had put it into effect in early 1970. But by early 1971, some Croation leaders began to see the growing power of the nationalist organizations and especially of the Matica Hrvatska as a threat to the party's political monopoly, and increasingly nationalistic sentiments in the populace as a threat to the unity and stability of the Yugoslav state. These leaders, although themselves occupants of high positions in the republic party organization, could not effectively oppose the policies of the former group, who could invoke the principles of party discipline to enforce compliance.

Although the 1971 amendments reflected almost complete acceptance of the positions formulated by the Croatian political leadership, including even the establishment of an effective regional veto over federal decision-making, nationalists in Croatia remained unsatisfied. They advanced additional demands in new areas, some of them separatist in all but name. These demands contributed to the growing uneasiness of some members of the Croatian leadership, the leaderships of the other republics and provinces, and President Tito. In a series of closed meetings, all three demanded that those in command of the Croatian party apparatus support more forcefully adoption of the amendments (in whose preparation they had participated), move decisively against the increasingly oppositional Croatian nationalist movement and its leaders, and proceed to the negotiation of the solutions to the pressing problems confronting the central organs of the state and party. But all three refrained from explicit public criticism of events in Croatia and the policies of the Croatian party, for they remained convinced that those in command of the Croatian party retained control over the nationalists and would on their own take the action necessary to enforce agreements negotiated in the central party organs.[39]

By July 1971, a majority of the Croatian party's Executive Committee sought more resolute action against the nationalists. In August, this majority embarked on a determined struggle to wrest control of

[36] *Sluzbeni List* (Belgrade), No. 32, July 28, 1971; No. 37, Aug. 26, 1971; No. 21, Apr. 20, 1974.

[37] See, for example, the report of a discussion organized by the Law Faculty section of the Association of University Instructors in Belgrade, in Bilandzic, op. cit., pp. 287–88.

[38] See, for example, Dennison Rusinow, *The Yugoslav Experiment*, Berkeley, CA, The University of California Press, 1977, pp. 273ff.

[39] This is evident from the material in League of Communists of Croatia, CC, *Izvestaj o stanju u Savezu komunista Hrvatske u odnosu na prodor nacionalizma u negove redove (Izvestaj usvojen na 28. sednici Centralnog komiteta Saveza komunista Hrvatske, 8. svibnja 1972. godine)* (Report on the Situation in the League of Communists of Croatia with Respect to the Penetration of Nationalism into Its Ranks [Report Adopted at the 28th Session of the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Croatia, May 8, 1972]), Zagreb, Informationa Sluzba Centralnog komiteta Saveza komunista Hrvatske, 1972.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the party away from those sympathetic to the nationalists. By early November, however, it became convinced that by itself it could not win control of the Croatian party organization and that those who did control this organization could no longer control either the growing nationalist fervor in the republic or the growing power of the nationalist movement. Consequently, that majority appealed to President Tito to support its bid to overturn the top leadership of the Croatian party.[40]

If Tito required additional evidence that such action was necessary—and the record strongly suggests that he did not[41]—events of the following weeks provided it. The nationalist leadership of the Croatian student movement escalated its essentially separatist demands and, to support them, launched a strike at Zagreb University.[42]

Almost simultaneously with the beginning of the strike, the entire political leadership of the republic was summoned to a meeting with President Tito. After 20 hours of argument, the now-famous 21st Session of the central party Presidium was convened on December 1.[43] For the first time since the Slovenian "road-building crisis," the entire political leadership of the country was assembled to criticize events in a single republic and the shortcomings of that republic's leadership.[44] For the first time ever, that criticism was made public. The text of Tito's opening remarks, in which he characterized the Croatian nationalist movement led by the Matica Hrvatska as counter-revolutionary and severely criticized the Croatian leaders for their failure to control it, was broadcast while the meeting was still in progress.[45] Both this and the text of his equally critical closing remarks were published immediately after the meeting.[46]

The antinationalist majority in the Croatian leadership now moved to force the resignations of those leaders compromised by too close an association with the nationalist movement and to assume control of the party itself. Capitalizing on the force of Tito's public condemnation, the backing of the military (which Tito controlled), and the leadership of Vladimir Bakaric (the most influential individual in the Croatian party), the new Croatian team conducted a widespread purge of the party, government, and other sociopolitical and cultural organizations in Croatia. It did so in order to reassert the authority of central leadership organs over local and regional organizations in the party and to restore party control over the social, cultural, and political institutions of the republic.[47]

At the same time, a coalition of regional and central political figures, headed by Tito, pursued a similar policy at the center. In an effort to improve the cohesiveness of central party organs, Tito took over direct supervision of the central Presidium and Executive Bureau.[48] In January 1972, the Executive Bureau was reduced from 15 to 9 members, and its heretofore bimonthly rotating chairmanship was replaced by a permanent Secretaryship. Stane Dolanc, who had been Chairman during the recent crisis and had proved himself a loyal and capable executor of Tito's policies, was appointed Secretary of the Bureau.[49] At the 10th Party Congress, held in May 1974, the Bureau was expanded to 12 members and was made the Executive Committee of the Presidium.[50]

The Tito-led coalition also reasserted the right of central party organs to monitor and, if necessary, intervene in the affairs of the regional organizations. In September 1972, even though this coalition may not yet have commanded the support of a majority of the leadership, it put recalcitrant regional leaders on notice by circulating a letter to all party organizations in which it condemned the transformation of the LCY into "an unstable coalition of republic and provincial organizations," emphasized the responsibility of regional leaderships for the implementation of central policy, and affirmed the right of central organs to ensure that implementation.[51] In October, it began a series of such interventions by forcing the leaders of the Serbian republic organization to resign.[52] Over the course of the next year, leadership or cadres changes followed in all the other republic and provincial organizations. By the time of the 10th Congress, 24 of the 52 members of the Presidium elected in 1969 had been replaced—11 of them for having come into

[40] Ibid., pp. 76–105.

[41] Dennison Rusinow, "Crisis in Croatia," Part 4, *American Universities Field Staff Report*, Southeast Europe Series, Vol. 19, No. 7, 1972, p. 11.

[42] For the events of the strike, see *Hrvatski Tjednik* (Zagreb), No. 32, Nov. 26, 1971, and No. 33, Dec. 3, 1971; and daily reports in *Borba*, Nov. 23–Dec. 3, 1971.

[43] *Borba*, Dec. 3, 1971; and League of Communists of Croatia, CC, *Izvestaj o stanju . . .*, p. 112.

[44] *Politika*, Dec. 9, 1971.

[45] Rusinow, "Crisis in Croatia," p. 16.

[46] *Borba*, Dec. 3 and 4, 1971.

[47] League of Communists of Croatia, CC, *Izvestaj o stanju . . .*, pp. 127–29.

[48] LCY, *Druga Konferencija Saveza komunista Jugoslavije* (Second Conference of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia), Belgrade, Komunist, 1972, p. 4.

[49] LCY, *Deseti kongres Saveza komunista Jugoslavije: Dokumenti* (Tenth Congress of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia: Documents), Belgrade, Komunist, 1974, p. 498.

[50] Ibid., p. 564.

[51] Text in LCY, *Nova Inicijativa u SKJ* (New Initiative in the LCY), 2nd ed., Belgrade, Komunist, 1975, pp. 7–14.

[52] See texts in ibid., pp. 15–50.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Josip Broz Tito, President of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia (LCY), and Stane Dolanc, then Secretary of the Executive Committee of the Presidium of the LCY Central Committee, at the party's 10th Congress, in May 1974.

—EUPRA.

"conflict with the course of the LCY."[53]

These changes have been widely and correctly characterized as a recentralization of power in the party. Nevertheless, it is important to note that that recentralization was limited. To be sure, the Tito-led coalition established the right of central organs independently to determine their own internal organization and operation, to expel individuals from their ranks, and to remove regional leaders from office. But it did *not* assert the right of central organs independently to appoint either their own members or the leaders of regional organizations. That appointment power, as well as the power to control cadres assignments in lower-level party organizations, remained in the hands of the regional leaderships themselves. Even after the 10th Congress, the central party organs continued to be made up of individuals appointed by, and therefore responsible to, their respective regional or military party organizations. In addition, the Executive Bureau was reorganized in January 1972 so that it consisted of younger and less influential party functionaries. This limited the accumulation of power by this potential "party center." Moreover, the Tito-led coalition did not abandon the principle of consensual decision-making, based on interregional consultation and "harmonization" of positions, that had evolved in the party since 1966. Indeed, during the period after the 10th Congress, that process became a central element in the effort to restore cohesiveness to the central party leadership.

Nor did the postcrisis leadership abandon the principle of consensual decision-making in the state and government that was embodied in the 1971 amendments. In fact, many issues on which the federal government had earlier been stalemated were now resolved in the interrepublic committees that had been established for that purpose in July 1971. Two weeks after the 21st session, for example, an agreement was reached on the foreign-currency retention quota and exchange system—matters that had been of central concern to the nationalist press in Croatia and a bone of contention between the Croatian and other regional leaderships for several years. This agreement was but the first of more than 120 solutions to interregional conflicts forged in these committees during the first seven to eight months of 1972.[54]

During the postcrisis period, issues on which these committees could not reach agreement were referred to the Coordinating Commission of the Federal Executive Council and, if still unresolved, to the Council as a whole. If the issue could not be resolved by the Council, it was then referred to the collective state Presidency. However, the Presidency was reluctant to consider any but the most intractable issues, and in almost all cases the Council or its Coordinating Commission proved able to resolve the conflict.[55]

The Presidency itself operated on the principle of "harmonization" of regional interests, but even solutions devised by the Presidency and supported unanimously by its members could be rejected by the regional representatives in the interrepublic committees or Federal Executive Council. In such situations, the Presidency was empowered by the 1971 amendments to impose a temporary solution with the force of law. During the first 18 months of its operation, however, it was compelled to do so only once.[56]

As this suggests, the Federal Executive Council and its staff played an increasingly important role in the resolution of interregional conflicts in the postcrisis period. Its representatives in the deliberations of interrepublic committees took positions that were developed in permanent commissions composed of members drawn from the Council itself, from federal organizations and institutions, and from "other organizations that carry out activity on the entire territory of Yugoslavia."[57] They viewed issues from the perspec-

[53] LCY, *Deseti kongres* . . . , pp. 488–89.

[54] Bilandzic, op. cit., p. 291.

[55] *IBSS*, No. 102, Feb. 20, 1973, pp. 3–10.

[56] Ibid.

[57] *Sluzbeni List*, No. 37, Aug. 26, 1971. See also the rules of procedure adopted by the Council in June 1972, in ibid., No. 33, June 30, 1972.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tive of "all-Yugoslav," or "federal," interests rather than regional interests. In turn, they counterposed federal interests to those advanced by the regional representatives, with whom they participated on an equal basis in the interrepublic committees. This proved to be a highly effective strategy for the resolution of interregional conflicts.

Such a strategy, however, relegated the Chamber of Nationalities of the federal parliament to an insignificant role in the federal decision-making process. The Chamber and its committees were excluded from the deliberations of the interrepublic committees and Federal Executive Council. By the time proposals reached the Chamber, they already reflected the compromise of conflicting regional interests and carried the approval of the republic and provincial governments. Because any substantive changes of a proposal would necessitate its return to an interrepublic committee for additional "harmonization" of regional interests, the members of the Chamber were both reluctant to make changes in, and under pressure from their respective regional leaderships not to alter, the proposals that appeared before them.[58]

The Constitution of 1974

Questions such as the role of the Chamber became a central concern of the groups that drafted the text of a new constitution incorporating and extending the principles adopted in 1971. Even as the 1971 amendments were being drafted, the leadership had acknowledged that their adoption would necessitate preparation of another constitution. In July 1971, that task was entrusted to a new, smaller Coordinating Commission, composed primarily of the politically less powerful members of its predecessor.[59] This Commission could not begin serious work, however, until the larger political crisis was resolved.

In February 1972, the drafting process got under way in earnest. Its organization and operation were almost identical to that whereby the earlier amendments had been hammered out. Three groups that had been established in December 1970 to work on longer-range reforms of the assembly system, the commune, and the system of self-management were subordinated to the new Coordinating Commission. These groups had originally been composed of one representative from each of the eight regions. When they resumed work in 1972, however, a representative of the military was added to their memberships. This addition brought their composition into line with the groups that had drafted the 1971 amendments, but it also reflected the increased direct participation of the military in the political life of the country after the crisis. Representatives of sociopolitical organizations on the federal level and functionaries of the federation also participated in the work of these groups.[60] This departure from earlier practice reflected the effort then taking place in the permanent commissions of the Federal Executive Council to include representatives of "all-Yugoslav" interests in the formulation of federal policy, and it presaged the later creation of "federal councils" in which direct consultation and negotiation would be carried out among both regional and all-Yugoslav interests under the auspices of the Federal Executive Council and the collective state Presidency.[61]

During preparation of the new constitution, "quite different and sometimes even fundamentally contradictory" positions were expressed with regard to institutional and procedural arrangements for federal decision-making in areas requiring interregional agreement.[62] To resolve these conflicts, the Coordinating Commission in May 1972 appointed a special working group to review both the functions of, and the methods of decision-making in, the federation and to recommend a solution to the political emasculation of the Chamber of Nationalities. The group was composed of one representative appointed by each republic and province and the military and was under the chairmanship of the Vice-President of the federal parliament. Five of these ten individuals had served in 1970 and 1971 on either the working group for organs of the federation or the working group for relations between the federation and the republics and provinces, and they were already fully committed to the transfer of authority to the regions that was provided for in the amendments drafted by those groups. Members of the earlier groups who had opposed that devolution were not included among the new working group's members.

It is not surprising, therefore, that this group recommended that federal decisions requiring interregional agreement be adopted by unanimous vote of the regional parliaments acting separately rather than

[58] See the report of a speech to the parliamentary leadership by the President of the federal parliament, in *IBSS*, No. 74, Feb. 10, 1972, pp. 3–4.

[59] *IBSS*, Nos. 58/59, July 30–Aug. 10, 1971, p. 4; and No. 93, Sept. 30, 1972, p. 4.

[60] Ibid., No. 77, Mar. 10, 1972, p. 2; and No. 93, p. 5.

[61] *Sluzbeni List*, No. 41, July 26, 1973.

[62] Edvard Kardelj, *Osnovni uzroci i pravci ustavnih promena* (Basic Sources and Directions of Constitutional Changes), Belgrade, Komunist, 1973, p. 106.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

President Josip Broz Tito attends a session of the Yugoslav Federal Assembly in 1972.

—EUPRA.

by a central parliamentary body composed of representatives of the regions.[63] Nor is it surprising that the Coordinating Commission, half of whose members were the presidents of the regional parliaments, at first endorsed this proposal,[64] for this solution represented a logical continuation of the devolution of authority to the regions carried out in 1971.

Unlike the earlier amendments, however, the draft constitution was prepared during a period in which a coalition in the central party leadership was striving to restore central authority in the country. Under the chairmanship of Kardelj and with the participation of two other members of the party's Executive Bureau who were at the same time members of the Commission plus another "representative" of that Bureau, the Coordinating Commission decided to preserve the existence of a federal parliamentary body through which the republics and provinces would formally express their agreement on, or opposition to, federal policies.[65] Other changes embodied in the 1974 constitution drafted by the Commission also strengthened central authority in the state and government, but in a fashion parallel to the strengthening of central authority in the party. That is, they were limited by the retention of principles and practices that reinforced the power of the regions. The 1974 constitution, for example, explicitly forbids members of the Federal Executive Council from receiving or acting on instructions from their respective regions. Council members are required instead to act in the interest of the country as a whole. At the same time, however, the Council is composed according to a formula that requires the representation of each region, and it operates according to rules that require both the participation of regional representatives in its deliberations and the adoption of decisions by consensus.[66] Similarly, the new constitution strengthens the cohesiveness, reinforces the decision-making capabilities, and increases the authority of the collective Presidency by reducing it from 23 members to 9, while preserving the membership in it of the President of the LCY. But the 8 remaining members are elected by the regional parliaments—a situation that places their selection under the effective control of the regional leaderships.

Nowhere is the tension between central and regional authority more obvious than in the provisions for the organization and operation of the new federal parliament and especially its Chamber of Republics and Provinces, successor to the Chamber of Nationalities. The retention of a central parliamentary body with decision-making competence in areas that require interregional agreement compels delegations elected by the regional parliaments to come together, rather than meet separately, to express and defend the positions of their respective regions. This permits representatives of the Federal Executive Council to exercise influence over the discussion and adoption of the Council's proposals by the regional assemblies, just as they do over preparation of the proposals, for they perform precisely the same role in the deliberations of the Chamber of Republics and Provinces and its working bodies as they do in the deliberations of the interrepublic committees, permanent commissions, and federal councils of the Federal Executive Council itself. The constitution provides that delegates in the Chamber retain their membership in the parliaments that elect them, keep those parliaments informed of developments in the Chamber, and participate in the deliberations of those parliaments. In

[63] *Text of the proposal in IBSS*, No. 92, Aug. 1-Sept. 1, 1972.
[64] Ibid., Nos. 88/89, June 30-July 10, 1972, p. 4.
[65] Kardelj, *Osnovni uzroci* . . . , pp. 107-09.

[66] See Article 362, in Federal Assembly, Information Service, Secretariat, *The Constitution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia*, Belgrade, 1974, p. 279. See also *Sluzbeni List*, No. 21, Apr. 30, 1975, and No. 47, Sept. 26, 1975.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED



Mika Spiljak, Chairman of the Chamber of Nationalities, reads the proclamation of Yugoslavia's new Constitution in the Central Hall of the Federal Assembly on February 21, 1974.

—Keystone.

practice, such provisions have meant that delegations in the Chamber of Republics and Provinces not only represent the interests of their respective regions but also function as channels for the exercise of central influence over their respective regions.[67]

At the same time, the constitution makes important concessions to regional authority by setting limits, in its provisions for the organization and operation of the federal parliament, on the centralization of power. For instance, on issues subject to interregional negotiation, voting in the Chamber of Republics and Provinces is by regional *delegation*, and adoption of a proposal requires the approval of each delegation. No discussion of an issue that requires interregional agreement may take place in the working bodies of the Chamber unless all regions are represented. Both the delegations and the individual delegates are required to represent the positions of their respective regional parliaments in such discussions, and all decisions on such issues must be adopted unanimously.[68] These provisions institutionalize the informal practices that evolved in the period after the 1967 and 1968 amendments, and introduce a formal veto into the federal decision-making process. With the inclusion of the Chamber and its working bodies in the preliminary

[67] Assembly of the SFRY, Chamber of Republics and Provinces, *Neka zapazanja iz dosadasnjeg rada Veca republika i pokrajina (period od 15. Maja 1974. do kraja 1975. godine)* (Some Observations from the Work to Now of the Chamber of Republics and Provinces [Period from May 15, 1974, to the End of 1975]), Belgrade, Strucna sluzba Veca republika i pokrajina, June 1976, p. 4.

[68] Articles 296 and 297, in Federal Assembly, Information Service, Secretariat, *The Constitution . . .*, pp. 245–46; and Articles 48, 50, and 52, in idem, "Rules of Procedure of the Chamber of Republics and Provinces," *Rules of Procedures of the SFRY Assembly*, Belgrade, 1975.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

deliberations of the interrepublic committees, permanent commissions, and federal councils of the Federal Executive Council,[69] the Chamber as a whole is protected against being reduced to a rubber stamp.

Patterns of Decision-making

Since the 10th Congress and the adoption of the new constitution in 1974, tension between central and regional power and authority in the party and state has been a persistent feature of Yugoslav politics. Detailed study of the decision-making process in the federal parliament since the adoption of the new constitution suggests that in the state the power of the center—that is, of the Federal Executive Council—has been increasing.[70] A large part of this power derives from the Council's near-monopoly over the scientific, technical, and bureaucratic resources of the state and over the agenda of federal decision-making. The former enables it to amass an overwhelming amount of evidence and material in support of its position on any given issue, and the latter enables it to avoid confronting issues with which it is unwilling or unable to deal. But an important source of this power has been the ability of the Council and its representatives to formulate compromise solutions to conflicts in the interrepublic committees, permanent commissions, and federal councils under its control and in the working bodies of the Chamber of Republics and Provinces.

The responses of the Council and its representatives to interregional conflicts in the Chamber suggest that the Council follows a relatively simple strategy for regulation of such conflicts. It attempts at each stage in the decision-making process to preserve its own proposal against amendment by any region. To accomplish this end, it either attacks the substance of the amendments themselves or enlists the self-interested opposition of other regions. When amendment becomes necessary, it normally seeks to minimize the substance of the amendment by offering a less specific and more complicated formulation of the disputed proposal that appears to satisfy both or all of the regions in conflict. Alternatively, it tries to link together its proposals on several issues to form a package deal in which concessions to regional interests offset one another. It is not unlikely that the Council follows the same strategy in the interrepublic committees, permanent commissions, and federal councils during the preparation of draft proposals.

The Council's ability to impose such solutions depends in large part on the willingness of regional representatives in these various organs and institutions to compromise. However, the Council does possess some leverage to encourage such willingness. If interregional conflicts in the Chamber of Republics and Provinces prevent the adoption of a proposal the Council deems "indispensable," the Council can, with the approval of the collective Presidency, initiate a procedure for adoption of the proposal as a "temporary measure." That procedure calls for a vote of the full Chamber of Republics and Provinces by individual *delegates* rather than by *delegations* and requires only a two-thirds majority for passage.[71] This makes it possible to pass a measure over the unified resistance of delegates from two of the republics or from one republic and both of the provinces, and the pressure that would be brought to bear by the combined support of the Federal Executive Council and the Presidency for such a move would make it unlikely that unified resistance could be maintained in any but the most extreme of circumstances. Consequently, it is not surprising that when the working bodies and leadership of the Chamber of Republics and Provinces appear to reach a deadlock, additional and more authoritative members of the Council join the discussions or the discussions are transferred to the Council itself. The increased participation of the Council, then, almost always results in interregional agreement.

Nevertheless, the role of regional representatives in the federal decision-making process of the state now appears secure. During recent months, for example, this role has been affirmed. In the summer of 1979, the Federal Executive Council undertook a series of regulatory measures aimed at stabilizing the economy, and the Council's seeming independence of action led the editors of the party's own organizational journal to ask whether the federation was not "turning full circle" and to warn that "earlier experience should not be ignored."[72] Almost precisely 10 years earlier, such administrative actions by the Council led to the "Slovenian road-building crisis." Now, however, the Yugoslav press was careful to point out that "there is no doubt that [the Council] . . . simply placed its signature under decisions already harmonized politically

[69] Assembly of the SFRY, Chamber of Republics and Provinces, *Neka iskustva iz dosadasnjeg rada Veca republika i pokrajina i njegovih radnih tela* (Some Experiences from the Work to Now of the Chamber of Republics and Provinces and Its Working Bodies), Belgrade, Strucna sluzba Veca republika i pokrajina, January 1975, pp. 12–14.

[70] Author's research in progress.

[71] Article 302, in Federal Assembly, Information Service, Secretariat, *The Constitution . . .*, p. 249.

[72] As cited in *NIN*, No. 1494, Aug. 26, 1979.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED



The building in Novi Beograd (New Belgrade) that houses the Federal Executive Council and federal Presidency of Yugoslavia.

—Keystone.

at the beginning of the summer."[73]

In the party, by contrast, there has been continuing tension between central and regional power since the 10th Congress. The 12-member Executive Committee appointed at that congress was composed of six members of the Presidium and six nonmembers, drawn from the Central Committee. In February 1975, the six nonmembers were elevated to Presidium membership, thereby increasing the authority and prestige of the central executive organ. At the same time, however, it was necessary to add three other members of the Central Committee to the Presidium in order to preserve the representational balance among republics, provinces, and the military.[74] The dilution of authority and the reduction in effectiveness of decision-making that probably resulted from this expansion of the Presidium from 37 to 48 members may have led to a proposal (alleged to have been under consideration in June 1977) to establish a small, Politburo-like central organ.[75] That such a body has yet to be created is not surprising, for its creation inevitably would have been opposed by the still-powerful regional leaderships.

Nonetheless, central authority was enhanced at the 11th Party Congress, which met in June 1978, by reduction of the Presidium to its 24 most powerful members, by appointment of Stane Dolanc as Secretary of the Presidium, and by appointment of nine "executive secretaries."[76] It was also strengthened by changes in the party statutes that exempted the Presidium from the requirement for leading organs to replace one third of their members at each election, that prohibited the exclusion of any Central Committee member from the party without the knowledge and participation of the Presidium, and that affirmed the right of central organs to maintain direct communication with, and "extend help" to, local party and other

[73] Ibid.
[74] *Politika*, Feb. 21, 1975.
[75] Richard F. Staar, Ed., *Yearbook on International Communist Affairs, 1977*, Stanford, CA, Hoover Institution Press, 1977, p. 92.
[76] *Politika*, June 24, 1978.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

sociopolitical organizations throughout the country.[77] These changes increased both the authority and autonomy of the central leadership and legitimized its intervention in the affairs of lower party organizations.

All the same, the power of regional party organizations was not formally diminished. The new Presidium included the presidents of the regional party organizations, and it was constituted on the basis of the explicit formula for regional representation that had first been established 10 years earlier. Moreover, the "executive secretaries" were selected from each of the regions and the military.

Indeed, new rules in the party statute adopted at the 11th Congress affirmed the role of regional leaders in the operation of the Presidium. These new rules required participation of representatives of the regional central committees in the determination of changes in Presidium membership between congresses and stipulated that the President of the LCY must discuss current issues with, and the Presidium must coordinate its activities with, the regional leaderships. Although such provisions simply formalized existing practice, they clearly represented an attempt to make it more difficult to exercise central authority in the absence of interregional consensus. A change in the rules to prohibit reelection to "executive-political" positions in the party also constrained the further growth of central power by preventing any of the executive secretaries of the Presidium from consolidating their positions.

During the year after the 11th Congress, a series of organizational and procedural changes in the central party organs imposed additional restrictions on the exercise of central authority. In November 1978, *Politika* reported that the Presidium had "recently" adopted new rules of procedure by which a new post of Chairman of the Presidium was created. The Chairman would share many of the powers and responsibilities of the Secretary and would take over the most important of them completely.[78] With the establishment of this post, the powers, authority, and prestige of the Secretaryship declined dramatically. Six months later, in May 1979, Dolanc, the incumbent Secretary since 1972, was replaced "at his own request."[79] The Chairmanship and Secretaryship of the Presidium were now to rotate among the Presidium members and among the executive secretaries from each of the regional organizations on a yearly and biyearly basis, respectively. It appears that the representatives of the military are not to be included in this rotation. Their exclusion from these posts reflects the demotion of the military at the 11th Congress to a status inferior to that of a provincial organization.

The application of a principle of rotation to the leading postions in the Presidium was consistent with a new campaign for collective leadership. President Tito initiated this campaign in November 1978, when in a speech before a trade union congress he suggested that yearly rotation should be applied to almost all organs and organizations "from the commune to the Federation."[80] In April 1979, the Central Committee endorsed the idea.

But this principle was inconsistent with past efforts to establish and maintain a strong party center capable of mediating conflicts among the regional leaderships. Given a high level of agreement among the regional representatives who compose the Presidium, an autonomous party center might be unnecessary. However, recent Central Committee discussions indicate that the regional leaderships in Yugoslavia continue to be divided by conflicts arising out of the contradictory economic interests of their respective regions.[81] Even under such circumstances, the application of a principle of rotation to the leading positions in the party does not by itself undermine the decision-making principles and practices that have emerged in the country since 1966. Indeed, rotation of control over the executive powers of the Presidium and expansion of collective participation in the work of the President of the LCY can be seen as an attempt to reinforce this approach. Were the campaign for collective leadership limited to these changes, the system of decision-making based on regional representation, interregional negotiation, and consensus might prove remarkably stable in the post-Tito period. However, other proposals for change already adopted as part of that campaign strike at the very foundations of that system.

Rotation in the Regions

Following the death of Edvard Kardelj early in 1979, the Presidium adopted a set of conclusions that carried the principle of collective leadership still further. At its June meeting, it called for political leaders to

[77] Cf. statutes in LCY, *Deseti kongres . . .*, pp. 335ff.; and idem, *Jedanaesti kongres Saveza komunista Jugoslavije: referat i zavrsna rijec Predsjednika Tita, Rezolucije, Statut SKJ* (11th Congress of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia: Report and Concluding Speech of President Tito, Resolutions, and Statute of the LCY), Belgrade, Komunist, 1978, pp. 203ff.

[78] *Politika*, Nov. 10, 1978.

[79] Ibid., May 17, 1979.

[80] Ibid., Nov. 22, 1979.

[81] Note the division of regional views at the Sixth Session (*Politika*, June 29, 1979) and the Eighth Session (ibid., Oct. 19, 1979).

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

divest themselves of multiple political functions and for the principle of rotation to be applied to leading positions in the state and party organizations of the republics and provinces and to "the most responsible functions" at the federal level. The Presidium scheduled the rotation in the regional party organizations for completion one year before the next round of party congresses and conferences—i.e., by late 1980—and in the regional parliaments and executive councils before the end of the current mandate period—i.e., by 1982.[82]

The divestiture of multiple positions in the leadership began later that month when three members of the collective Presidency were dropped from the Presidium.[83] A reduction in the overlap between the memberships of these bodies may make a marginal contribution to effective decision-making by the Presidency. As the official rationale suggests, these changes will allow at least some of the Presidency's members to concentrate on their responsibilities as final arbiters of interregional conflicts in the state.

But the changes that are likely to result if the proposals for rotation are implemented could well undermine the operation of the system. As the Presidium is structured at present, rotation of the presidents of the central and provincial committees of the regions will produce an annual turnover of one third of the Presidium's membership. Yet the pattern of political changes in Yugoslavia since 1966 suggests that a system of political decision-making based on regional representation, interregional negotiation, and consensus requires stable regional party leaderships if it is to operate successfully. Stability of leading cadres in the regions, and especially of regional representatives in the Presidium, permits development of the kind of mutual personal trust and understanding that allows regional leaders to make the concessions that are often necessary to bring about agreement and to do so with confidence that these concessions will be reciprocated in some as yet unspecified way in the future.

Even more important, long tenure permits regional political leaders to consolidate their control over their respective party organizations. In the aftermath of the "Croatian crisis" of 1971, Western and Yugoslav analysts and some members of the Croatian leadership agreed that one condition that had made that crisis possible was the weakening of leadership control of middle- and lower-level party organizations in the republic. Rotation of the regional leaderships undoubtedly would weaken their control over lower organizations in their republics, just as rotation at the level of the Presidium weakens central control over the regions. If rotation is applied at the same time to lower-level party organs, as was suggested at the October 1979 meeting of the LCY Central Committee, the degree of control exercised by the regional leaderships over their respective territories will diminish even further.

Any weakening of control over lower-level party organizations also raises the possibility of a revival of nationalist activity in the country, especially because the introduction of rotation in state institutions will require yet another revision of the constitution. Well aware of past events, the Presidium therefore emphasized in its June decision that the present amendment process "must be restricted to immediate questions of the organization and composition of organs, as well as the length of the mandate of the president or chairman."[84] But still more important is the prospect that a weakening of the regional leaderships may jeopardize their ability to enforce in their own territories agreements reached in the Presidium. Yugoslav experience suggests that the inability of a regional leadership to enforce decisions arrived at through interregional negotiation and consensual decision-making will imperil, if not destroy, the system.

Whether rotation will actually be implemented in the regions remains in doubt. In January 1980, President Tito underwent leg surgery, and before he could recover, life-threatening complications set in. By March, his condition was critical, and it was uncertain how long he might live. But it was certain that he would never again play the role in Yugoslav politics that he had in the past.

Prospects for the Post-Tito Period

The death of Tito will remove the ultimate arbiter of political conflicts from the Yugoslav system. In the past, Tito's support for any position in a situation of deadlock guaranteed its adoption as policy. Moreover, his personal authority over the military ensured that substantial coercive force could be mobilized to enforce that policy if necessary. His death, however, will not mean the abandonment of interregional negotiation and consensus as the basic principles of Yugoslav decision-making. Instead, it will mean that consensus will become a necessary condition not only for routine decision-making, but for crisis management as well.

[82] *Politika*, June 27, 1979.
[83] Ibid., June 29, 1979.
[84] Ibid.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED



Members of the federal Presidency, proclaimed elected by a joint session of both chambers of the Yugoslav parliament on May 15, 1979. Pictured from left to right (in parentheses, the republic or province represented): Stevan Doronjski, (Vojvodina), Vladimir Bakaric (Croatia), Fadilj Hodza (Kosovo), Cvijetin Mijatovic (Bosnia-Hercegovina), President Josip Broz Tito, Sergej Krajger (Slovenia), Vice-President Lazar Kolisevski (Macedonia), Petar Stambolic (Serbia), and Vidoje Zarkovic (Montenegro).

—Eastfoto.

The continuing success of the system will therefore depend on the continuing unity of the Yugoslav leadership after Tito.

That leadership has already demonstrated its ability to govern successfully without the full participation of Tito. After the 10th Congress, Tito began to withdraw from direct involvement in domestic decision-making processes. On key questions, such as the selection of individuals for the posts of Chairman and Secretary of the Presidium, it appears that Tito continued to exercise personal control. He also continued, through frequent public speeches and exhortations, to lend support to the policies adopted by the leadership and, through periodic affirmations of its stability, cohesiveness, and competence, to reinforce the authority of that leadership. But by 1976, he was no longer presiding over routine meetings of either the Presidium or the Presidency. During an interview granted in June 1976, a member of his personal cabinet assured this author that Tito was kept "fully informed" of the work of the collective Presidency. However, Tito's comments at the October 1979 meeting of the party Presidium suggest that by then his knowledge of the routine activities of the leading organs of the party was limited to the information contained in formal reports.[85] If this decreasing involvement in the day-to-day operation of the leading organs of the party and state is any indication, then, Tito's death may not detract from the routine domestic decision-making capacity of the leadership.

[85] Ibid., Oct. 24, 1979.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

In recent years, Tito has retained more personal control over the direction of foreign policy than over the direction of domestic policy. Even in this realm, however, the post-Tito leadership is likely to maintain a pattern of consensual decision-making. First, that pattern carries important benefits in two of the most important areas of Yugoslav concern: in relations among Communist parties and states and in the nonaligned movement. In both these areas, the Yugoslav diplomatic corps benefits from its domestic experience in the art of negotiation and consensus-building. Second, Yugoslav resistance to current Soviet actions aimed at establishing hegemony in both these areas must surely reinforce the Yugoslav commitment to maintaining consensual practices at home. Conversely, the successful maintenance of negotiation and consensus as the basis for domestic decision-making must stiffen Yugoslav resistance to efforts to undermine those principles in relations between states.

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan has magnified the long-standing threat of Soviet intervention in Yugoslavia and has thereby reinforced the unity of the Yugoslav leadership. The effect of such external incentives to unity, however, may be short-lived. The Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, for example, threatened Yugoslavia much more directly than have Soviet actions in Afghanistan, and it resulted in a much more dramatic upsurge in popular patriotism throughout Yugoslavia. Yet that invasion was followed less than three years later by the conflicts and crisis of 1971.

Thus, it would seem that the fate of post-Tito Yugoslavia will be determined largely from within, by the ability of the regional leaders who together compose the country's central leadership to reach consensus on the issues that divide them and to implement their decisions. But the decision to apply rotation to the regional leaderships, adopted in June 1979 as part of the campaign for collective leadership initiated by Tito, undermines that ability. The members of the post-Tito party Presidium, therefore, are likely to confront a paradox in the immediate aftermath of Tito's death. The consensual system of decision-making that has evolved since 1966 may justifiably be called Tito's legacy; to preserve it, however, the post-Tito leadership may have to abandon his last major initiative and thereby run all the risks accompanying the reversal of a policy so closely associated with his name so soon after his death.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Growing Tensions in Eastern Europe

By Ernst Kux

Although our world seems to be getting more turbulent, with a "seismic" area now running from South Korea and Southeast Asia to the Middle East and Africa and on to Latin America, things appear all quiet on the original eastern front. That is, Eastern Europe at present looks like an extinguished volcano. Yet appearances may well be deceptive.

From the late 1940's, this area, the main epicenter of the cold war, again and again experienced heavy tremors—Josip Broz Tito's break with Yosif Stalin, a chain of Berlin crises, and the revolutions in East Germany, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia. One of the main aims of the policy of détente was to end East-West confrontation in Europe and to pacify this "arc of crises" between the Baltic Sea and the Mediterranean. With the German "East treaties," the Four-Power Agreement on Berlin, and the Final Act of the Helsinki summit of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), this goal seemed to have been achieved. As the price of this pacification, the West formally accepted Soviet hegemony, Communist rule, and socialist systems in the East European countries, and it also undertook to support the status quo there through economic cooperation and credits. However, the Communist side held that the West's willingness to seek pacification of the area reflected a "change of international power relations in favor of socialism" and the success of cooperation within the "socialist community."

Is this pacification of Eastern Europe permanent, or are there forces at work that one day could produce changes or new eruptions? Can Eastern Europe, for example, be isolated from the sort of developments that have been causing upheavals elsewhere around the globe? If détente gives way to a new cold war, what will be the impact on the status quo in Eastern Europe? What consequences will the Soviet Union's increasing engagements in its eastern and southern rimlands have with regard to its posture on its western flank? Apart from the disruptive effects of the international atmosphere and other outside influences, are the domestic situations of the East European countries sufficiently settled to ensure calm? We know that many sources of tension continue to exist within these states. Could these generate new tremors? And if internal or external forces start to shake the tranquillity of Eastern Europe, will a major transformation of the landscape follow?

These questions are not purely hypothetical, and the problems that they touch upon are not imaginary. Such issues frequently come up in discussions with East Europeans. Indeed, behind the facade of economic development, stable political systems, accepted party leaderships, and unassailable Soviet hegemony, there exists strong potential for instability in Eastern Europe. The repeated attempts at long-range stabilization and unification of the area and the ways and means that Moscow has used to further this purpose have wound up producing new difficulties and tensions there. To be sure, there remain great differences among the East European countries. But to a greater or lesser degree they share many problems, problems rooted in their identical political systems and in their collective dependence on the Soviet Union with regard to political control, planning and economic supplies, and defense and foreign policies.

To understand the potential for instability in Eastern Europe today, it is important to begin by looking at the general status of the so-called "socialist community." Creation of this "community" through the Red Army's

Mr. Kux is Specialist for Communist Affairs, Neue Zürcher Zeitung *(Zürich), and Professor of Political Science, St. Gall Graduate School of Economics, Business, and Public Administration (St. Gall, Switzerland).*

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Soviet General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev reviews East German troops during the 30th anniversary celebration of the German Democratic Republic in October 1979. To the right of Brezhnev is Socialist Unity Party First Secretary Erich Honecker, and to the left is East German Minister of National Defense Heinz Hoffmann.

—Regis Bossu/SYGMA.

occupation of the East European countries and the installation of Communist regimes in them was the great accomplishment of Soviet postwar policy. Moscow thereby recovered the defensive glacis in the middle of Europe that the tsars had possessed—and used it as the basis to build up the USSR's own power. Eastern Europe became a source of economic development for the Soviet Union and a stepping-stone for Moscow to exert pressure and influence in Western Europe.

The Contextual Situation

This "socialist community" the Soviet leadership depicts as an "utterly new, hitherto unheard-of phenomenon,"[1] as a "well-knit family of nations,"[2] and even the "foundation of the future worldwide brotherhood of nations."[3] But there remains a great gap between the theoretical concept of the "socialist community" and reality, for the USSR dominates the other members of the "community." Precisely this contradiction between theory and praxis is the main obstacle to effective functioning of the "community." On the one hand, the "community" constantly has to demonstrate "unity, cooperation, and joint action";[4] on the other, it has to make allowances for national, economic, and social differences among its member countries.

By definition, of course, the "process of all-round drawing-together," which operates as an "objective law" in all the socialist countries, produces "gradual

[1] Leonid Brezhnev, speech in Warsaw at a session of the Polish Sejm, July 21, 1974, in L.I. Brezhnev, *Selected Speeches and Writings on Foreign Affairs*, Oxford, Pergamon, 1979, p. 130.

[2] Leonid Brezhnev, Report to the 24th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), Mar. 30, 1971, in Leonid Brezhnev, *On the policy of the Soviet Union and the international situation*, New York, NY, Doubleday, 1973, p. 93.

[3] Leonid Brezhnev, speech in Warsaw at the Sixth Congress of the Polish United Workers' Party, Dec. 7, 1971, in L.I. Brezhnev, *The CPSU in the Struggle for Unity of All Revolutionary and Peace Forces*, Moscow, Progress Publishers, 1975, p. 268.

[4] Leonid Brezhnev, speech at a joint meeting of the Supreme Soviet in the Kremlin Palace, Dec. 21, 1972, in Brezhnev, *On the policy of the Soviet Union. . .*, p. 217.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

levelling of . . . economic development[,] . . . ever increasing mutual connection and mutual dependence of national economies[,] . . . intensification of the political and ideological interaction of the fraternal states[,] . . . growing similarity in their social and political life" and "topples the antagonism between the national and international and creates preconditions for harmonizing the national-state interests of socialist countries."[5] In essence, this concept of total integration means adaptation to the Soviet model of "real existing socialism."

Yet commonalities such as the exercise of leadership by a Communist party and the existence of the socialist property system did not bring about a new form of cooperation among Communist countries that is qualitatively different from alliances between capitalist states, or even a real "drawing-together" of the "community" members. What has emerged in the 30 years since the establishment of the "socialist community" is a network of bilateral friendship treaties and two multilateral bodies, the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) and the Warsaw Treaty Organization. These institutions of a so-called "union of a totally new type"[6] have not worked differently or more effectively than those of other alliance systems, and they have not overcome "antagonism between the national and international."

Even with the same type of public ownership, countries of the "socialist community" have not grown together into anything like a "world socialist economy" with "joint international ownership."[7] The principal and decisive form of their production relations remains the national economies. Indeed, these states have not even managed to set up a genuine system of joint planning.

The present "socialist community" also falls well short of the worldwide "union of Soviet republics" that Vladimir Lenin envisioned[8] or the confederation of "future Soviet-Germany, -Poland, -Hungary, -Finland with Soviet Russia" that Stalin had in mind.[9] Moscow has not yet tried to incorporate the East European countries into a greater Soviet Union. It is even questionable that the Soviet leadership truly wants to absorb them into this kind of extended system of "real socialism." In fact, the USSR has up to now seemed eager to keep its "brother countries" at a distance, and the famous iron curtain between East and West appears to be more porous today than the barriers within the "socialist community."

For a short time under Nikita Khrushchev, the USSR tried to treat the socialist community as a loosely knit "commonwealth of socialist states" without a leading center or a prescribed model, but the impact on Soviet control of the area was disastrous. Consequently, his successor, Leonid Brezhnev, has since 1965 pushed for unification of the "community" in all spheres, from the ideologic to the economic. Although this effort has been less drastic in execution than what Stalin attempted earlier, it has proved more effective.

Thus, the relationship of the East European countries with the Soviet Union has become more cohesive during the last 15 years, but through subordination and domination rather than through the development of harmonious solidarity. The expression of this relationship is the so-called Brezhnev doctrine, which both gives Moscow the right to intervene in "socialist" countries and restricts their sovereignty. In signing the Final Act of the CSCE, the West formally accepted this state of Soviet hegemony with the expectation that the outcome would be greater respect for human rights on the part of East European regimes and, more broadly, increased attention to the welfare of local populaces. While Soviet leaders for their part gave up some means that the USSR had in the past used to heighten the fears of East Europeans and to try to convince them of the need for Soviet protection—i.e., invocations of an "imperialist threat" or of "German revanchism"—Moscow did not subsequently fulfill Western expectations and loosen its hold on Eastern Europe. Instead of capitalizing upon détente to introduce needed reforms, the Soviet leaders prevented most changes and insisted upon a high degree of conformity within the "socialist community" as a precondition and basis for dealings with the West.

This subordination has constituted the main factor for stability in Eastern Europe, but at the same time it has given rise to fundamental problems there. The contradictions between the theory of "friendship and fraternal cooperation between peoples on the basis of equal rights"[10] and the reality of subordination to

[5] I. Dudinsky, "The Present Stage of the CMEA Countries Cooperation," *International Affairs* (Moscow), September 1978, p. 14.

[6] Leonid Brezhnev, *The World of Socialism—The Triumph of Great Ideas*, Moscow, Politizdat, 1978, p. 508.

[7] B.N. Ladygin and N.A. Zotova, *Sotsialisticheskaya ekonomicheskaya integratsiya* (Socialist Economic Integration), Moscow, Mysl', 1977, p. 19.

[8] V.I. Lenin, *Sochineniya* (Works), 2nd ed., Moscow, Gosudarstvennoye Izdatel'stvo, 1928, Vol. 25, p. 290. Brezhnev, in his Dec. 21, 1972, speech in the Kremlin Palace, drew a parallel between Lenin's project of "uniting the Soviet Republics in a single Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 50 years ago" and the current tasks of the Warsaw Treaty Organization and CMEA.

[9] Yosif Stalin, "Letter to Lenin, 1 January 1920," in Lenin, *Sochineniya*, Vol. 25, p. 624.

[10] Brezhnev, *The World of Socialism*. . . , p. 4.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The current leaders of the Communist parties of Eastern Europe: above, from left to right, Bulgaria's Todor Zhivkov, Czechoslovakia's Gustav Husak, and East Germany's Erich Honecker; on the opposite page, from left

Soviet dictate, between Communist promises of economic growth and social welfare and the actual shortcomings and exploitation, produce considerable tensions within the "socialist community." These tensions require extended discussion.

Sources of Tension

At the beginning of the 1980's, it has become increasingly evident that in all three major areas of interaction within the "socialist community"—party relations, the Warsaw Pact, and CMEA—effective cooperation has proved highly elusive. Indeed, the means and methods by which this cooperation has been pursued have eroded the political, social, and economic bases of the "community," thereby sapping its strength and enlarging the gap between its aims and performance.

Party relations. According to official claims, the special feature, the binding link of the "community" is the rule of Communist parties in all its states. Because these parties have a common commitment to "scientific socialism," the argument goes, there is a solid foundation for bringing about close cooperation.

Yet this supposed advantage has turned out to be more of a liability. In the first place, all the Communist parties of the "community," including the Soviet one, have long since lost their revolutionary dynamism and have become essentially reactionary forces, clinging to the existing status quo in their countries. Ideological commitments have merely served to reinforce this ossification. Thus, the parties have shown little capacity to make the changes necessary in their states to adjust to evolving global circumstances.

Furthermore, interparty ties have posed a dilemma for the East European parties. Should they behave in such a way as to satisfy the needs of the peoples of their countries, or should they obey Moscow's orders and represent Soviet interests in their own countries? It is not easy for East European leaders to assert greater independence from Moscow, for in the final analysis their rule is dependent not on the trust of their peoples but on Soviet support. Their guarantee of survival is precisely the Brezhnev doctrine, which protects them from spontaneous changes or real revolutions at home in return for obedience to Moscow.

In recent years, a number of developments have sharpened this dilemma. As we shall explore in more detail later, many or all the East European states have confronted a revival of national consciousness, growing economic and social problems, and the emergence of a latent opposition motivated by concerns with human rights, religion, or sociopolitical conditions. While it is difficult to assess the impact of

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

to right, Hungary's János Kádár, Poland's Edward Gierek, and Romania's Nicolae Ceausescu.

—Photos of Zhivkov and Kádár by Vincent Mentzel; of Ceausescu by Eastfoto; the rest by Photoreporters.

"Eurocommunism" or of the independent stance of the Yugoslav party within the "socialist community," they have clearly had an influence in Eastern Europe. Romania's steadfastness in its maverick line affords but one illustration. Despite incantations of "proletarian internationalism" and calls for more conformity with Moscow by other East European parties, the Romanian party at its 12th Congress in November 1979 affirmed that "each party must independently establish its policy line, and its revolutionary strategy and tactics, in accordance with the realities prevailing in its own country."[11]

Finally, interparty links have made East European rulers heavily dependent on Moscow to stay in power, and shifts in leadership in the USSR have tended to produce corresponding shifts in Eastern Europe. Both Nikita Khrushchev and Leonid Brezhnev, for example, brought about the ouster of some East European leaders and installed in office men more congenial to them after they themselves took over in the USSR. The impending succession to Brezhnev is likely to have similar results. All the present East European leaders except Todor Zhivkov of Bulgaria and János Kádár of Hungary gained authority during the Brezhnev era. Moreover, as Table 1 shows, only Nicolae Ceausescu was born after World War I, and even he is in his early 60's. (It should be noted that the current leaders of the two East European countries outside the "socialist community," Yugoslavia and Albania, are older yet, so

Table 1: Top Soviet and East European Leaders

Leader (country)	Year of birth	Party chief since	Head of state since
Leonid I. Brezhnev (USSR)	1906	1964	1977
Todor Zhivkov (Bulgaria)	1911	1954	1971
Erich Honecker (GDR)	1912	1971	1976
János Kádár (Hungary)	1912	1956	—
Edward Gierek (Poland)	1913	1970	—
Gustav Husak (Czechoslovakia)	1913	1968	1975
Nicolae Ceausescu (Romania)	1918	1965	1967
Josip Broz Tito (Yugoslavia)	1892	1937	1953
Enver Hoxha (Albania)	1903	1941	—

SOURCE: Borys Lewytzkyj and Juliusz Stroynowski, Eds. *Who's Who in the Socialist Countries*. New York, NY: K.G. Saur Publishing, Inc., 1978.

[11] *Scinteia* (Bucharest), Nov. 25, 1979, in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Eastern Europe* (Washington, DC—hereafter *FBIS-EEU*), Dec. 6, 1979, p. H/13.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

these states too face an imminent shift at the top.)

If the changing of the guard in the Kremlin does indeed cause a similar shift in Eastern Europe, a fairly chaotic situation could develop. To date, the East European parties have appeared to temporize about their own succession problems, waiting to see what happens in Moscow. As a consequence, their leaderships, while not quite as old as the Politburo of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), have become rather aged; moreover, many members of them show signs of exhaustion or poor health. In short, there is no experienced younger generation of leaders around. Under such circumstances, the transition to a new generation of leaders could prove a troubled one, with the emergence of surprises like Prague 1968 a distinct possibility.

Military relations. During the Brezhnev era, the military system of the Warsaw Pact came to be looked upon as the main tie with the "socialist community" and the "main center for coordinating the foreign policy activity of the fraternal countries,"[12] and the Pact's troops were the executioners of the Brezhnev doctrine, as in Czechoslovakia. In fact, the tremendous buildup and modernization of the Pact's conventional forces, along with the introduction of the new Soviet "Eurostrategic" weapons (the SS-20 missile and the Backfire bomber), constituted the "socialist community"'s major successful endeavors. These developments have greatly added to the political weight that the "community" enjoys vis-à-vis Western Europe and NATO.

In the military realm, Soviet domination and control are more pronounced than in other areas of cooperation. The Warsaw Treaty Joint Forces, which include the East European national armies, are under the command of Soviet marshals and generals. Timid proposals by East Europeans for greater participation of their representatives in the military decision-making process—such as the Romanian suggestion that the supreme command be rotated—have all been brushed aside.[13] In the final analysis, the Warsaw Pact is nothing but a pretext and justification for the permanent presence of Soviet troops in the East European countries, with the exception of Romania. The task of these troops is not so much defense of "socialist gains" against "imperialist aggression" as protection of Soviet interests and support of the Communist regimes in Eastern Europe. This political function of the Soviet units prohibits Moscow from participating in effective measures for troop reduction and disarmament in Europe, for their withdrawal would weaken Moscow's hold in Eastern Europe and endanger the Communist regimes there.

Romanian President and Communist Party General Secretary Nicolae Ceausescu signs the declaration at the conclusion of a November 1978 Moscow conference of the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Treaty Organization.

—TASS from Sovfoto.

The maintenance of such a huge Soviet military force in Eastern Europe, however, has had negative consequences for the cohesion and development of the "socialist community." On the Soviet side, it has made Moscow extremely reluctant to accept the forms of multilateral cooperation that prevail within NATO—to say nothing of operating in accordance with the principle of "equality" that is much touted within the "socialist community." There is the constant fear that one or another "fraternal army" may join in a popular uprising, as Pál Maléter's troops did in Hungary in 1956. Even in those cases where the Soviet leadership does not doubt the reliability and fighting power of the "fraternal armies," it finds un-

[12] Brezhnev, Report to the 24th CPSU Congress.

[13] *The Observer* (London), May 22, 1966; International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance, 1979–1980,* London, 1979, p. 13.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

thinkable the notion that these forces could be used in any capacity other than as auxiliary troops or might be allowed an independent command, control over the Soviet troops on local territory, or possession of nuclear weapons.

On the East European side, there is the permanent worry that the Soviet comrades-in-arms could one day become the medium for the extension of "brotherly help" such as that which Czechoslovakia and Afghanistan have experienced in recent years. Moreover, support of an imposing military machine places a great burden on the East European economies and impedes their development. It involves not only large defense budgets to pay for national armies and to offset the cost of Soviet troops stationed in the area, but also expenses to maintain a logistical infrastructure—roads, railways, airfields, and pipelines—that does not always correspond to local economic needs. In addition, the financial share required of the East European countries for the Warsaw Treaty Organization and for the production of conventional and strategic weapons in the USSR must be high and constitute a great drain on their economic resources, although the precise figure remains a secret. Indeed, there are reasons to believe that the massive buildup of the Warsaw Pact forces, and of the Soviet army in particular, has caused stagnation in the economic sphere and thus weakened the economic and social underpinnings of the whole "community."[14]

Economic relations. The "socialist community" is

[14] It is very difficult to calculate the defense expenditures of the Warsaw Pact members and to relate these to the members' normal budgetary outlays, but figures put out by the International Institute for Strategic Studies show a substantial rise in per capita defense spending since the mid-1970's for all the Pact countries except Romania, at a time when these countries were experiencing a slowdown in their economic growth. See *The Military Balance, 1979–1980*, p. 94. At the Warsaw Pact summit meeting in November 1978, Moscow demanded that the East European members agree to be responsible for a greater share of the Pact's defense spending. Only Romania refused to accede to this demand. See International Institute for Strategic Studies, *Strategic Survey 1978*, London, 1979, p. 114.

On the viewing stand of the May 1979 "Shield '79" joint exercise of forces from five Warsaw Treaty Organization members—Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, and the USSR. From left to right are: Hungarian Defense Minister and Army General Lajos Czinege; President of the Presidential Council Pál Losonczi, Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party Secretary Sándor Borbély, and Commander in Chief of the Warsaw Treaty Combined Forces, Marshal of the Soviet Union Viktor Kulikov.

—Eastfoto.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Table 2: Annual Growth Rates of Gross Industrial Production of CMEA States, 1971–79

(in percent)

	1971–75	1976–80 (planned)	1976	1977	1978	1976–78	1979
Bulgaria	9.1	9.0	6.8	6.8	6.9	6.8	6.5
Czechoslovakia	6.7	5.3	6.5	5.6	5.0	6.2	3.7
GDR	6.5	6.8–7.2	5.9	4.8	4.7	5.1	4.8
Hungary	6.4	6.7–7.0	4.1	6.8	5.2	5.5	2.8
Poland	10.4	8.5	9.3	7.5	4.8	7.0	2.8
Romania	12.9	10.7	11.4	12.5	9.0	11.1	8.0
USSR	7.4	7.0–7.8	4.8	5.7	4.8	5.1	3.4

SOURCES: For the 1971–78 data, see *Statisticheskiy yezhegodnik stran-chlenov Soveta Ekonomicheskoy Vzaimopomoshchi 1979* (Statistical Yearbook of the Member States of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance, 1979), Moscow, CMEA Secretariat, 1979, p. 67. For the 1979 data, see the year-end figures as reported respectively in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Eastern Europe* (Washington, DC), Feb. 21, 1980, p. C/3; Jan. 25, 1980, p. D/4; Jan. 23, 1980, p. E/8; Feb. 4, 1980, p. F/5; Feb. 11, 1980, p. G/9; Feb. 12, 1979, p. H/4, and *Pravda* (Moscow), Jan. 26, 1980. For the 1976–80 plan figures, see Radio Free Europe Research, *Background Report* (Munich), No. 15, Jan. 18, 1980, p. 2, for Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, and Romania; Erich Honecker's report to the Ninth Congress of the Socialist Unity Party, *Neues Deutschland* ([East] Berlin), May 19, 1976, for the GDR; Aleksey Kosygin's report to the 25th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, in *Pravda*, Mar. 2, 1976, for the USSR.

supposed to be "the world's most dynamic economic force, developing at a high, steady pace,"[15] but the current economic situation in Eastern Europe belies such a claim. Although the present five-year plans of CMEA countries (for 1976–80) on the average set lower rates for the growth of gross industrial product than were recorded in the last five-year period, fulfillment of these plans is now clearly impossible (see Table 2). Economic stagnation has become rampant in Eastern Europe, and there is even potential for a recession in some countries. For example, Poland's Central Statistical Office announced on February 8, 1980, that national income produced had declined by 2 percent in 1979.[16]

This state of affairs reflects a variety of problems from the East European standpoint. First, despite much talk about integration of the national economies of CMEA countries and about a division of labor among them, there has been only slow progress toward coordination of their five-year plans and long-term programs and toward the development of an interrelated planning and production area and a unified socialist market. Hungarian Deputy Premier József Marjai complained recently:

A rapid and spectacular further development of the division of labor we have established with the socialist countries is hampered to some extent by the temporarily limited nature of our partner's export capacity, particularly with regard to energy and raw materials. . . . A problem is also caused by the fact that the methods of our economic cooperation do not keep up in every respect with the changed conditions of the division of labor. Under today's intricate system of conditions in trade, joint ventures and technical-scientific cooperation, finding joint interests and the means to fulfill joint interests has become a more complicated task than before. . . . The forms of organization and motivation in these trends of cooperation, whose complexity was inconceivable in the previous period, do not as yet keep pace with requirements today.[17]

The main obstacles to development, integration, and reforms in the CMEA system lie, in the absence of a functioning market and pricing mechanism, in the national planning and control institutions and the no less bureaucratic and cumbersome apparatus of CMEA programming and coordination.

Such a gap between theory and reality leaves strong grounds for doubt that the acceleration of economic growth and the improvement in living standards that the East European member states of CMEA experienced in the early 1970's reflected integration within the CMEA framework. Probably much more influential were the intensification of East-West trade and the availability of credits and advanced technology from the West. For instance, those CMEA members that pursued a more independent foreign policy (like Romania) or a fairly distinctive economic policy (like

[15] *Pravda* (Moscow), Jan. 24, 1980.

[16] Despite this dip, Poland experienced a 3 percent increase in popular consumption of material goods. To sustain this, the planners had to countenance an 8.2 percent drop in investment outlays. See Warsaw PAP broadcast in English, Feb. 8, 1980, in *FBIS-EEU*, Feb. 11, 1980, pp. G/9–10.

[17] *Magyar Hirlap* (Budapest), Nov. 7, 1979, in *FBIS-EEU*, Dec. 12, 1979, p. G/1.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Poland and Hungary) traded more with advanced capitalist countries than did other CMEA members (see Table 3), and even though one cannot establish a statistical correlation, they by and large appear to have had higher growth rates than did other East European states (see Table 2). Indeed, Romania, the CMEA member that traded most extensively with the capitalist countries, registered a more rapid increase in industrial production than did any other member of the "socialist community."

Second, economic relations within the "socialist community" are highly unbalanced. About half of the USSR's deliveries to East European CMEA members consist of fuel and raw materials. The major exception is in the case of Romania, which is not dependent on Soviet oil and has kept the share of raw materials to roughly 30 percent of total imports from the USSR. For their part, the East European states export finished goods, high-grade technology, and consumer articles to the Soviet Union.[18] Such an arrangement tends to serve the development of the USSR far more than it does that of the East European CMEA members, for these East European countries are by no means underdeveloped areas. In fact, their development in some sectors exceeds that of the USSR's "most highly developed socialism" (see Table 4). If one takes per capita output as a measure, for example, in 1978 the Czechoslovaks produced more steel than did the Soviets; both the Poles and Czechoslovaks mined more coal; the East Germans generated more electricity; the Bulgarians, East Germans, Poles, Romanians, and Czechoslovaks turned out more cement; the East Germans produced three times as much fertilizer; the Hungarians, East Germans, Romanians, and Czechoslovaks manufactured more machine tools; and the East Germans, Poles, and Czechoslovaks turned out more cars. Even more striking is the picture with respect to agricultural output. For instance, the Hungarians produced more grain than the Soviets, and all the East Europeans produced more meat and eggs.

Third, the dependence of the East European CMEA states on raw-material, and especially oil, deliveries from the USSR has made their economic growth rates a captive of what limitations Moscow imposes on these deliveries and what price it charges for them. That this dependence has been growing, rather than decreasing, is quite clear. According to one Soviet source, for instance, CMEA members were to import 368 million tons of oil, about 100 billion cubic meters of gas, and 67 billion kwh of electricity from the USSR in 1976–80—the bulk of which was to go to East European members of the organization. These totals amounted to 1.5 times those for 1971–75.[19] Later sources give corrected figures of 88 billion cubic meters of gas and 64 billion kwh of electricity.[20] According to these same sources, Soviet deliveries enable CMEA countries to meet 80 percent of their import requirements for oil and oil products, 99 percent of those for natural gas, 75 percent of those for ores (iron, chrome, and manganese), and 75 percent of those for cotton. Another

[18] See I. Dudinsky, "Socialist Internationalism in Action," *International Affairs*, February 1980, p. 12f.

[19] "The Council of Mutual Economic Assistance—30 Years," *Kommunist* (Moscow), No. 3, February 1979, p. 19.

[20] Dudinsky, "Socialist Internationalism in Action," p. 14.

Table 3: Distribution of CMEA States' Foreign Trade by Groups of Trading Partners, 1970–78[a]

(in percent)

	Intra-CMEA trade			Trade with other Communist states			Trade with advanced capitalist states			Trade with the developing states		
Country	1970	1974	1978	1970	1974	1978	1970	1974	1978	1970	1974	1978
Bulgaria	74.4	70.2	78.4	3.4	2.0	1.9	16.6	17.4	12.4	5.6	9.7	7.3
Czechoslovakia	64.2	61.0	68.5	5.8	5.1	4.2	22.4	25.9	20.7	7.6	8.0	6.6
GDR	67.3	61.0	68.8	4.3	3.1	3.3	24.4	30.9	22.7	4.0	5.0	5.2
Hungary	62.1	59.0	52.1	3.2	3.2	4.0	28.4	30.5	34.8	6.3	7.3	9.1
Poland	63.1	47.0	54.7	3.1	2.4	2.7	27.1	44.4	36.2	6.7	6.2	6.4
Romania	49.3	34.7	39.7	6.7	6.5	6.9	35.8	45.4	(?)[b]	8.2	13.4	(?)[b]
USSR	55.6	48.9	55.7	9.7	5.2	4.1	21.2	31.3	28.0	13.5	14.6	12.2

[a] The dates 1970, 1974, and 1978 were chosen as, respectively, the year immediately preceding the 1971–76 plan period, the year of the low point for intra-CMEA trade for all countries listed except Hungary, and the latest year for which the volumes in the cited statistical series provide data.

[b] For 1978, the cited series does not apportion the 53.4 percent non-Communist share of Romania's trade between the advanced capitalist states and the developing states.

SOURCES: *Statisticheskiy yezhegodnik stran-chlenov Soveta Ekonomicheskoy Vzaimopomoshchi* (Statistical Yearbook of the Member States of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance), volumes for 1971, 1975, and 1979, Moscow, CMEA Secretariat, pp. 342, 333, 373, respectively.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Table 4: Per Capita Production of Selected Commodities in CMEA Countries, 1978

Commodity	Bulgaria	Czechoslovakia	GDR	Hungary	Poland	Romania	Soviet Union
			Industrial commodities				
Steel (kg)	280	**1,010**	416	363	550	539	580
Coal (kg)	796	**4,278**	—	942	**4,855**	479	1,860
Electricity (kwh)	3,572	4,559	**5,727**	2,391	3,301	2,940	4,600
Cement (kg)	**584**	**674**	**747**	446	**618**	**636**	486
Fertilizer (kg)	77.5	81.2	**276.0**	**95.7**	74.9	**113.0**	90.5
Machine tools (per 10,000 inhabitants)	17.4	**22.6**	**11.5**	**11.9**	7.9	**12.4**	9.1
Cars and trucks (per 10.000 inhabitants)	—	**143.0**	**124.0**	0.6	**109.0**	52.7	79.4
			Agricultural commodities				
Grain (kg)	860	735	591	**1,266**	623	873	908
Meat (kg)	**82.4**	**101.0**	**108.0**	**143.0**	**89.5**	**70.0**	58.8
Milk (kg)	227	**377**	**442**	220	**488**	256	362
Eggs	**247**	**310**	**311**	**444**	**243**	**288**	242

SOURCE: *Statisticheskiy yezhegodnik stran-chlenov Soveta Ekonomicheskoy Vzaimopomoshchi 1979* (Statistical Yearbook of the Member States of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance, 1979), Moscow, CMEA Secretariat, 1979, pp. 138f, 271f, and 334f. Figures in bold type indicate per capita output higher than that in the Soviet Union.

calculation places Soviet supplies of fuel to the CMEA countries in 1976–80 at 800 million tons (standard equivalent), 43 percent more than in 1971–75. It also states that whereas in 1975 the CMEA countries aside from the USSR needed roughly 580 million tons of fuels and met 70 percent of this from their own production, in 1980 they will need 780 million tons of fuels and will be able to supply only 60 percent by themselves.[21]

In January 1980, the Soviet Union announced plans to provide CMEA members with "almost one billion tons of fuel" during the next (1981–85) plan period.[22] This will involve a slower rate of increase in Soviet oil deliveries than during the current planning period. Whether Moscow will fulfill even this promise remains open to doubt in light of an expected slowdown of Soviet oil production.

Since escalation of world oil prices began in 1973–74, the USSR has greatly upped the price that it demands for the oil that it exports to Eastern Europe. Whereas Poland paid a nominal price of 16.55 rubles for a ton of Soviet oil and oil products in 1971, the figure rose to 39.50 rubles in 1975 and then to 42.03 rubles in 1976. Between 1971 and 1976, the price that the USSR charged for a ton of oil went up from 14.60 to 37.51 rubles for Bulgaria, from 16.64 to 44.73 rubles for Hungary, from 16.23 to 34.08 rubles for Czechoslovakia, and from 13.60 to 32.06 rubles for the German Democratic Republic. It is impossible to determine the post-1976 price increases, for the USSR has stopped publishing figures on its oil exports to Eastern Europe. Nevertheless, an official Soviet source has indicated that in 1978 as compared with 1971, imports of fuel from the USSR absorbed a higher percentage of total imports from the Soviet Union for every one of the East European countries, and that for most of the countries the share had doubled.[23] Because, according to the so-called "Bucharest formula" introduced in 1975, nominal contract prices within CMEA are fixed on the basis of world market prices and are readjusted annually to a five-year moving world price average, the fuel costs of the East European countries will inevitably escalate further in 1980 when the spectacular rise in prices charged by oil-producing states in 1979 enters into the calculation of CMEA prices.

While the contract prices for certain Soviet raw materials like iron ore have remained relatively stable, other commodities imported from the USSR have clearly become more expensive. For example, in 1971 Poland had to pay only 684 rubles for a ton of raw cotton, but by 1978 the price had reached 1,051 rubles. During the same period, Poland confronted a

[21] *Nepszabadsag* (Budapest), Jan. 8, 1980, as reported by MTI in English, Jan. 8, 1980, in British Broadcasting Company, *Survey of World Broadcasts* (London), SWB/EEW/1066, Jan. 17, 1980, p. A/9.

[22] *Pravda*, Jan. 14, 1980.

[23] For precise figures for 1971, 1975, and 1976, see *Vneshnyaya torgovlya SSSR* (USSR Foreign Trade) for 1971 and 1976, Moscow, Mezhdunarodnyye Otnosheniya, 1972 and 1977. The volume of this source for 1978 provides the more general data for the comparison between 1971 and 1978.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Assembly of EC-1040 electronic data processing units at the ROBOTRON works in Dresden, East Germany, in August 1979. Some 100 such units have been delivered to the Soviet Union. Computers from the plant are exported to more than 60 countries.

—Eastfoto.

price rise of nearly 100 percent for a ton of paper, from 123 rubles to 220 rubles.[24]

In 1979, the rising cost of oil, as well as other economic pressures, forced a number of East European countries to increase consumer prices. Hungary in July announced price changes for basic food products, consumer services, fuel and energy, building materials, furniture, leather products, and motor vehicles. At the same time, Czechoslovakia upped prices for gasoline fuel and electricity and for postal services. In November, Bulgaria followed with rises in retail prices for basic foodstuffs, power and fuel, and postal services. In March 1980, Poland drastically increased domestic prices for gasoline, diesel oil, lubricants, and motor oil. The GDR, instead of raising prices directly, switched to a new three-level pricing system that in fact ups prices for technical and luxury goods.[25]

With these measures, the East European countries began to abolish their subsidization of consumer goods and services.[26] These new price adjustments are in fact a restoration of a domestic price system as the primary method of consumer rationing, and they bring the existing inflation more into the open. This enforced income redistribution represents a fundamental change in social policy within Eastern Europe.[27] To a certain degree, it will also level out the differences that exist between living standards and supplies for consumers in Eastern Europe on the one hand and the USSR on the other.

The official explanation of the pressures to which

[24] *Vneshnyaya torgovlya SSSR* for 1971 and 1978.

[25] See Radio Free Europe Research, *Background Reports* (Munich), Hungary, No. 15, Aug. 1, 1979, pp. 1ff; Czechoslovakia, No. 22, July 24, 1979, p. 1; Bulgaria, No. 14, Nov. 13, 1979, p. 1f; Poland, No. 7, Mar. 20, 1980, p. 6f. The new price system for the GDR was announced by Erich Honecker in his report to a Central Committee plenum of the Socialist Unity Party (SED), *Neues Deutschland* ([East] Berlin), Dec. 14, 1979.

[26] In the summer of 1979, Politburo member Miklós Óvári revealed that state subsidies in Hungary had over the previous decade risen from 15 billion florint to about 45 billion florint. Without the price adjustments instituted, they would have amounted to 75 billion florint in 1979. See Radio Budapest, Aug. 1, 1979.

[27] H. G. Trend, "Consumer Price Increases in Eastern Europe," Radio Free Europe Research, *Background Reports*, No. 167, July 26, 1979.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

these measures represent a response is that "socialism is not spared the caprices of nature and the crisis of the capitalist world,"[28] but this is essentially a defensive reaction. To be sure, the recession in capitalist countries and the pricing policy of the oil-producing states have had an effect in the CMEA area—despite earlier protestations that the socialist system protected it against crisis, inflation, and international market forces. Yet the present difficulties of the East European CMEA members are not so much imported from the West as they are created by inefficient planning systems and the postponement of needed reforms.

János Kádár came close to admitting as much when he told the 12th Congress of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party (HSWP) on March 24, 1980:

Despite our efforts, owing to conditions which were decidedly less favorable than foreseen, the expected results of our economic development are lagging behind the provisions of the Fifth FYP. National income and consequently the standard of living, are growing at a slower rate than planned. The situation is more complicated today, and economic work therefore now requires greater effort and better organization than hitherto. We must also see that the unfavorable changes in external economic conditions are bringing out in sharper relief the weak points of our economy and the faults of our work. In the face of the adverse development of the conditions we must and can act effectively through the alteration of production structures and selective industrial development. The practice of economic direction, however, has not been able to make sufficiently quick and elastic adaptations to the changed circumstances.[29]

Like the USSR, all CMEA countries suffer from an

[28] Speech by Konstantin Chernenko, CPSU Politburo member, at a friendship rally in Sofia, Bulgaria, on Dec. 5, 1979, in *FBIS-EEU*, Dec. 11, 1979, p. C/8.

[29] MTI in English, Mar. 25, 1980, in British Broadcasting Company, *Survey of World Broadcasts*, SWB/EE/6382, Mar. 28, 1980, p. C/14.

Workers from the German Democratic Republic near completion of work on a sector of the Orenburg gas pipeline in the western Soviet Union in mid-1977. The writing on the pipe reads: "Last Section—Laid and Welded on May 23, 1977." The line now delivers Soviet natural gas to points in Eastern and Western Europe.

—TASS from Sovfoto.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The bustle of traffic in downtown Budapest suggests the impact of consumerism on Hungarian society.

—Vincent Mentzel.

increasingly tight energy-supply situation, bottlenecks in transport, and insufficient food and consumer production.[30] Instead of addressing these problems squarely, the East European states in the 1970's attempted to avoid them by relying upon readily available capitalist surplus value. This policy left a number of them with sizable foreign debts that must now be serviced.

When one looks to the future, the prospects for improvement of the economic circumstances of the East European CMEA member states during the next five-year plan period (1981–85) appear dim. Even Edward Gierek has recently conceded:

Some factors contributing to the high growth rates in the 1970's—including a large labor reserve, the possibilities of increasing investment outlays, the obtaining of suitable loans abroad and the purchase of cheap raw materials and cheap fuels—all these have been exhausted.[31]

Thus, the East European countries will probably come under increasing pressure from two fronts. On the one hand, they must improve their trade with the West to at least pay off the huge credits that they have accepted. On the other hand, they face the necessity of obtaining vital fuel and raw materials from the USSR in the context of increased scarcity and hence higher prices. This imperative may well force them to invest heavily in Soviet development. Indeed, the long-term programs for CMEA call for the East European states to take a greater part in the development of fuel and raw-material resources in the USSR and to provide capital and labor forces for such joint ventures.[32]

Plainly, then, the relative satisfaction of consumer demands and the visible rise of living standards that have in the past led to a degree of acquiescence on the part of the East European peoples, and thus constituted an important factor of stability in the area, seem at an end, and harsher times and a period of

[30] With regard to the Soviet Union, see Leonid Brezhnev's speech at the plenary meeting of the CPSU Central Committee on Nov. 27, 1979, in *Moscow News* (Moscow), No. 48, 1979, Supplement, pp. 2ff.

[31] See his speech in Katowice on Dec. 10, 1979, in *FBIS-EEU*, Dec. 13, 1979, p. G/6.

[32] Dudinsky, "Socialist Internationalism in Action," p. 14.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

strict austerity appear to be beginning. Hungarians, for example, have already been warned that "for some years we must reckon on no change at all or at best, only a marginal rise in the living standards."[33] There have even been hints that as a result of new East-West tensions and the "recent unpropitious decision of NATO to complete its armament," it may become necessary for the Communist countries "to expand essential defensive measures and to slow down the growth of the standard of living."[34]

Such prospects could have major domestic consequences. Without doubt, as a Polish source puts things, the measures that East European countries have already taken to deal with the situation confronting them will have a "negative influence not only on the living standard, but also on the . . . political climate, on the activity of the working masses and on their readiness to overcome difficulties."[35] Hungarian Prime Minister György Lázár has even gone so far as to say that "a more consistent assertion of our principles, involving more differentiated distribution of the means of development and wages, will lead to more conflicts between social and group interests and those of individuals than we have hitherto experienced."[36]

The last time that the East European peoples faced a decline in their incomes and a reduction of the goods available for them to purchase, the outcome—e.g., in Poland—was major social unrest. Unless the party leaders in Eastern Europe decide to introduce the economic reforms that they have thus far evaded (fearing that such changes would weaken their rule), they could once again find themselves having to deal with such unrest.

Impact of the USSR's Global Goals

Moscow's attempts to expand the "socialist community" into a "socialist world system" have also generated tensions within the "community." The USSR has sought to use Eastern Europe as a supply base. CMEA has now expanded beyond its original seven European members to encompass Mongolia, Cuba, and Vietnam as well. Moreover, Yugoslavia and North Korea have become associate members, and Laos, South Yemen, Ethiopia, Iraq, and Angola participate as "observers." In addition, CMEA has concluded cooperation agreements with Finland and Mexico. The East European countries have provided these "fraternal states" with financial and technical aid and with advisers. For instance, Mongolia finances about half of its investments with credits from CMEA.[37] Such assistance has constituted a drain on East European monetary resources and manpower; thus, it has not been very popular with the party leaderships of the area. Indeed, some party leaderships are known to have voiced opposition to extending aid to underdeveloped "socialist" countries.[38]

The USSR has likewise endeavored to use Eastern Europe as a reservoir of auxiliary troops, particularly for advances into the Third World. To date, Kremlin attempts to expand the jurisdiction of the Warsaw Pact beyond Europe by making such states as Mongolia or Vietnam members have been rejected by the East Europeans.[39] Nonetheless, Mongolia, Cuba, Vietnam, and recently Afghanistan—plus, in a looser way, South Yemen, Ethiopia, and Angola—are indirectly connected with the Warsaw Treaty Organization through military clauses in their bilateral friendship treaties with the Soviet Union for protection of their "socialist gains" and through their acceptance of the Brezhnev doctrine, and they are all receiving large amounts of weapons and military aid from the organization.[40] Discussions within NATO about extending its security interests beyond the North Atlantic area might even give Moscow a pretext to raise a formal umbrella of "brotherly help" over at least some of these states. Here again, such involvement outside Europe places heavy burdens on the East European countries, as well as on the USSR.

The only case in which the Soviet Union has proved relatively successful in gaining solid backing from its East European "comrades-in-arms"—with the notable exception of Romania—has been in its approach to China. East European leaders know, of course, that Chinese claims that the peoples of Eastern Europe will rise one day against their Soviet "oppressors," that "national wars against large scale aggression, en-

[33] MTI in English, Nov. 9, 1979, in *FBIS-EEU*, Nov. 13, 1979, p. F/5.

[34] *Rude pravo* (Prague), Jan. 10, 1980, in *FBIS-EEU*, Jan. 15, 1980, p. AA/1.

[35] *Polityka* (Warsaw), Nov. 17, 1979, in *FBIS-EEU*, Dec. 12, 1979, p. G/1.

[36] Speech to the HSWP Congress, MTI in English, Mar. 25, 1980.

[37] Yumjaagiyen Tsedenbal, "Hallmarks of Socialist Cooperation," *Problemy mira i sotsializma* (Prague), February 1980, p. 159. For more extended discussion of the economic assistance furnished non-European "fraternal states" by Eastern Europe, see Ernst Kux, "Eastern Europe's Relations with Asian Communist Countries," in Kurt London, Ed., *Eastern Europe in Transition*, Baltimore, MD, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1966, pp. 277ff.

[38] Information from private discussions.

[39] Information from private discussions.

[40] *International Affairs*, March 1979, p. 18, and May 1979, p. 6. The USSR delivers arms to Algeria, Libya, South Yemen, Benin, Ethiopia, Afghanistan, and Cuba. See *The Military Balance 1979–1980*, pp. 104ff.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Soviet Premier A.N. Kosygin, standing at right, addresses the 33rd Session of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA), which opened in Moscow on June 26, 1979. Delegations were headed by the premiers of the respective CMEA member states.

—TASS from Sovfoto.

slavement and slaughter by a superpower are not only possible and probable, they are inevitable, progressive and revolutionary,"[41] have no chance of becoming reality at the moment. Nevertheless, China is the sole Communist country that does not accept the status quo in Eastern Europe and presses for "national liberation" there. Moreover, the existence of the Chinese challenge gives the East Europeans a certain leverage on Moscow. For their support against Beijing, Moscow has to pay a price, especially to refute Chinese accusations of "hegemonism." Thus, the Soviet Union's engagement on its Asian flank affects its position in its East European backyard, and will continue to do so in the future.

New Local Pressures

Finally, the internal situations in at least most East European states are now in considerable flux, with both new and revitalized old forces and tendencies in play. Human rights activists and intellectual dissidents, whom the rigid and ossified parties condemn as "antisocialist elements," exist in all the East European countries, and even if their numbers are small and they have been unable to establish international links with one another, they have obviously had an impact on the local parties and populations. In a larger sense, visitors to Eastern Europe report a spreading of disappointment and pessimism. Even János Kádár has complained about "certain anxieties" and a "lack of confidence" on the part of the Hungarian population, and he has lamented that there "still exist nationalistic, cosmopolitan, revisionist, ultra-radical and other harmful and hostile views [which] gain occasionally influence and have an effect." In youth, he has detected "negative attitudes, such as indifference, in the case of some people even cynicism, and a tendency to seek an easy life."[42]

Manifestations of nationalism have become rampant

[41] *Renmin Ribbao* (Beijing), Nov. 1, 1977.

[42] Report to the 12th HSWP Congress, loc. cit.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED



Pope John Paul II, the former Archbishop Karol Wojtyla of Krakow, walks among a crowd of fellow Poles after celebrating a mass in Warsaw's Victory Square on June 2, 1979. To the right is Stefan Cardinal Wyszynski, the Primate of Poland.

—Liaison.

in countries like Poland. Recently, for example, an official publication in Poland criticized the expression of open anti-Russian sentiments there.[43] In addition, the election of a Polish pope and the visit of John Paul II to his homeland in June 1979 have had major political and religious impact throughout much of Eastern Europe.

The economic development and social changes of the last decade have produced a substantial middle class in most East European countries, and these new social elements are trying to define and protect their vested interests. Although they have been the social group hardest hit by the recent economic adversities, no one knows how they will react to the changing conditions.

At the same time, the party leaderships are increasingly losing contact with their populations, and the rank and file of the parties are becoming more corrupt and infected with "dishonesty, nepotism, parasitism, and speculation."[44] A situation seems to have emerged in all the East European countries, as well as the Soviet Union, that is similar to what Karl Marx described at the beginning of the French revolution of 1848 as "a motley mixture of highflying phrases and real insecurity and clumsiness, of enthusiastic mania for innovation and well-grounded reign of old routine, of a fictitious harmony of the whole society and a deep alienation of all her parts."[45]

Conclusion

In light of the foregoing discussion, it is clear that Eastern Europe would probably be the first victim of a

[43] *Polityka*, Nov. 10, 1979, in *FBIS-EEU*, Dec. 5, 1979, pp. G/3ff.

[44] Edward Gierek, speech at the pre-electoral meeting in Sosnowiec, Mar. 6, 1980, in *FBIS-EEU*, Mar. 7, 1980, p. G/6.

[45] Karl Marx, "The 18th Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte," in Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, *Werke* (Works), Berlin, 1960.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

change in the global climate, whether through a return to the cold war or a Sino-Soviet clash. The détente of the 1970's, even though it failed to shake Soviet hegemony in the slightest degree, provided a breathing space of stability and economic improvement for the East European countries.

But the East European leaders and peoples have no means at their disposal to influence the Soviet decision about the future of détente. If the USSR chooses to try to alter the global power balance in its favor, be it through achievement of strategic superiority or through geopolitical expansion beyond its borders, they have no recourse but to accept that choice. Control of the East European glacis is one of the most important elements of strength that Moscow boasts in the world power balance.

At the same time, it is equally plain that even if no great changes take place in the global climate, stability may not continue to prevail in Eastern Europe. The methods that the USSR has employed to forge a "socialist community" have not in fact leveled out differences of development and national traditions or produced a qualitatively new form of coherence and unity. Indeed, they have not even ensured Soviet hegemony in perpetuity in the area. At present, neither of Moscow's two options for bringing about a long-term solution of the difficulties in Eastern Europe—total subjugation of East European regimes and their incorporation into a greater Soviet Union or the granting of greater independence to them—appears realistic. Thus, the pressures for change that the ruling classes in both the USSR and the East European states have long dreaded may well arise during the 1980's.

If change does actually occur, its pattern will depend a great deal on how it comes about—i.e., from below, through social pressure, or from above, through rejuvenation of leadership, decentralization of government, establishment of a more pluralistic order, and opening of greater opportunities for private initiative and the influence of market forces. To be sure, economic difficulties, social unrest, and disappointment with rigid Communist leaders produced revolts in East Germany in 1953, Poland and Hungary in 1956, and Czechoslovakia in 1968, as well as the events in Poland in the early 1970's. Yet such conditions do not inherently lead to political upheavals. Other patterns of challenge and response are possible.

Nonetheless, it is not inconceivable that in the 1980's upheavals could develop in a number or all of the East European countries more or less simultaneously. Such turmoil would pose larger problems for Moscow than any it faced in the area during the 1950's and 1960's.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Soviet Muslims and the World of Islam

By Alexandre Bennigsen

The iron curtain drawn by Yosif Stalin around the Muslim territories of the Soviet Union, hermetically sealing Soviet Central Asia and the Caucasus off from the Middle East, has gradually parted since 1953 as Stalin's successors have begun cautiously to employ Soviet Islam as a means of addressing the greater Muslim world. These careful and controlled beginnings have accelerated in dramatic and less controlled fashion as a result of the revolution in Iran and then the major increase in Soviet involvement in Afghanistan. Soviet Muslim lands are reestablishing contacts with the Dar ul-Islam, to which they belonged from the earliest centuries of the Hegira and in the history and culture of which they had played a major part. There appears no likelihood that this evolution will be reversed within the reasonably foreseeable future. Thus, it becomes essential to examine its probable consequences—short- and long-term—for both the Soviet Union and the Muslim world.

In what follows, we shall first examine the bases for identification between Soviet and non-Soviet Muslims. Then we shall explore the ways in which the post-Stalin leadership, particularly the post-Khrushchev leadership, of the USSR has attempted to exploit Soviet Islamic institutions to further Moscow's ends in the Muslim world. Finally, we shall trace the impact of developments in Iran and Afghanistan and the dilemmas these events pose for the Soviet Union.

A number of factors have served to link the Muslim peoples of the Soviet Union with Muslims elsewhere in the world. Among them are religion and ethnolinguistic ties.

Religious and Ethnic Bonds

Religious identity. That Soviet Islam has served as such a link may, at first glance, seem somewhat paradoxical. In the Soviet Union, the religion found itself under the domination of an atheist state, whose avowed aim was—and still is—the thorough and systematic eradication of *all* religious creeds. As a result of half a century of antireligious campaigns, Islam in the USSR lost a portion of its believers. Some became indifferent, while others (more rare) turned into authentic atheists. Islam also lost, more or less completely, its hold on the economic and political life of the believers' community. In many ways, Islam became a "private affair," and its administrative structure was modified to fit in better with the realities of the Soviet system. Islam, in other words, has adjusted to new circumstances with apparent submissiveness. Moreover, its official leaders in the Soviet Union have seemed to be willing to cooperate with the authorities in certain domains, especially—as we shall see below—when the cooperation concerns relations with the Muslim world abroad.[1]

However, though forced to adapt itself to the new

Mr. Bennigsen is Visiting Professor at the Department of History, University of Chicago (Chicago, IL), and Directeur d'Études at the École des Hautes Études, University of Paris (Paris). He is coauthor of Muslim National Communism: A Revolutionary Strategy for the Colonial World, *1979, and author of* Islam in the Soviet Union, *1964.*

[1] The meekness of Islam, though surprising at first sight, is understandable enough. As far as Soviet Muslims were concerned, there was not much difference between their "infidel" Christian-Russian masters of tsarist days and those same masters turned atheists. If anything, in the latter guise these masters may even have appeared more acceptable, inasmuch as they now declared *all* religious creeds equally obnoxious and endeavored to prove by word and deed the frailty of false beliefs that the former Orthodox government had tried for centuries to force on the Islamic faithful.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

order of things, Islam has in no way been contaminated either by Marxism or by secularism. From the standpoint of Islamic law and theology, Islam in the USSR is the same unadulterated, pure religion that it had been before 1917, and its leaders, though formally submissive to the godless Soviet regime, have never been accused by anyone—friends or adversaries—of heresy *(shirq),* infidelity *(kufr),* or even innovation *(bida).* Paradoxically, nowadays, Islam in the Soviet Union appears more conservative, more traditionalist, and less modernist than the creed practiced in many Muslim countries of the Middle East or the very progressive Islam of prerevolutionary Russia. Nevertheless, a Soviet Muslim and a Muslim from abroad feel completely at home with each other in whatever country they meet. Both belong to the same Muslim "millet" (nation), to the same Dar ul-Islam, and share the same spiritual background which rules their everyday life. They observe the same religious rites and social customs. They have the same dietary traditions, wear almost the same clothes, and display the same attitude of deeply rooted mistrust toward the non-Muslim West (represented by Americans and Europeans in the Middle East and by Russians in Central Asia). In short, they are brethren facing together a hostile world.

A Soviet Muslim at prayer in Kazan.

—Jonathan Wright for Gamma/Liaison.

There are three branches of Islam represented today in the USSR, with differing levels of contact with their coreligionists abroad. The first is Sunni Islam, which is the religion of the immense majority of the Turkic, Iranian, and Caucasian Muslims of the USSR. Since World War II, Soviet Sunni Muslims have maintained continuous, though limited, contacts with the religious centers abroad, such as the holy places of Mecca and Medina, and the Islamic universities of al-Azhar and Qarawyin. The "parallel" (unofficial) popular Islam is represented in Central Asia, the Caucasus, and the Volga region by the great Sufi brotherhoods (*tariqat*), the same that exist throughout the Muslim world—especially the Naqshbandiya and the Qadiriya. These Sufi orders are highly decentralized, but their spiritual doctrine and the mystical rituals and practices of the adepts (*zikr*) are rigidly the same everywhere.

A second branch of Islam in the USSR is Shi'a Islam (the Ithna Ashariya or "Twelvers"). Unlike Sunni Islam, this branch has a centralized hierarchy of clerics within an organization that can be termed a "Church," with spiritual centers in Iraq (An Najaf and Karbala') and Iran (Mashhad and Kom). However, in the Soviet Union, the Shi'a "Church," to which some 3 million Azeris belong, is cut off from these spiritual centers abroad.

Finally, there are the Ismailis of the Nizarite rite (followers of Aga Khan)—consisting of some 60,000 to 100,000 Pamirian peoples in the Autonomous Oblast of Gorno-Badakhshan. It is a highly centralized sect, which until the 1950's seems to have maintained certain illegal contacts with the Ismaili spiritual and political centers in India.

Ethnic and linguistic kinship. Soviet Muslims also identify with Muslim brethren abroad through feelings of ethnic kinship. The southern frontiers of the Soviet Union have been traced in a purely artificial way and do not reflect any natural national or geographic divisions. As a result, almost all Soviet Muslim nationalities possess more or less important correspondent "brother" groups abroad.

These national groups may be classified into four categories. The first category comprises large nationalities distributed in practically equal numbers between the USSR and one or several foreign states. These include the Azeris (with 5.5 million in the USSR as of 1979 and over 4 million in Iran); the Turkmen (2 million in the USSR and a total of about 1 million in Afghanistan, Iran, Turkey, and Iraq); and the Tajiks (3 million in the USSR, 3 to 4 million in Afghanistan, and small groups in China). With the Turkmens, who con-

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED



Ethnic brethren: at left, a Turkman in northern Iran, and at right, a Soviet Turkman in Ashkhabad, the capital of Soviet Turkmenia.

—Photos by Bijan Banjahmad/Pictorial Parade and Keystone.

stitute a tribal federation rather than a modern consolidated nation, the sense of kinship among Soviets, Iranians, and Afghans is reinforced by the fact that often members of the same tribe are separated only by mere political frontiers. Such is the case with respect to the Yomuds, the Göklens, the Emrelis, and the Salyrs—who live in the USSR and Iran—as well as the Ersaris, the Saryks, and the Ali Elis—who dwell in the USSR, Iran, and Afghanistan.

In the second category are large Muslim nationalities of the USSR with corresponding minorities beyond the Soviet border. These include the Uzbeks (with 12.5 million in the USSR in 1979 and about 1.5 million in Afghanistan); the Kazakhs (6.5 million in the USSR, small groups in Afghanistan, and an important minority—about 400,000—in Xinjiang); the Kirghiz (2 million in the USSR, probably more than 100,000 in China, and a small group of less than 10,000 people—the Wakhan—who once lived in Afghanistan but have now migrated to Pakistan).

The third category consists of the immigrant nationalities in the USSR, with majorities abroad. These include the Uighurs (210,000 in the USSR in 1979 and as many as 7 million plus in China); the Dungans (50,000 in the USSR and 3.5 million in China); the Baluchis (13,000 in the USSR in 1970 [they were not counted in 1979] and an indeterminate number in Pakistan, Iran, and Afghanistan); and the Kurds (over 150,000 in the USSR in 1979, 1 million in Iran, 4 to 6 million in Turkey, and 1 million in Iraq).

Finally, there are Soviet Muslim nationalities that have established more or less important colonies abroad. These have not lost their original national identity or their language, and they maintain in some cases official or clandestine contacts with their original homeland and their brethren in the USSR. This is the case of the so-called Circassians (Cherkess) in Turkey, Jordan, Israel, and the United States. The name "Circassian" is a common appellation designating the descendants of various North Caucasians.

The bonds of religion and the ethnic and sometimes tribal kinship between some 43 million Soviet Muslims and the Turco-Iranian world—more than 100 million strong—beyond the Soviet borders have made for a complicated relationship between the Soviet Muslims and the Muslim world abroad. In particular, two important questions arise. First, what and where is the real national center of these populations? Is it in the USSR, where Muslims enjoy a measure of cultural and lin-

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

guistic freedom and are formally endowed with "autonomy" and distinct administrative and territorial status, but where de facto they are subjected to religious discrimination (often bordering on persecution) and where their political development is placed under the meticulous control of the "elder brother"? Or is it abroad, where they are granted full religious freedom and where, theoretically at least, they have, as individuals, access to political power, but where their communities have no national existence whatsoever?[2] Second, what is the relationship between Soviet Islam and the Muslim world abroad? What official or underground channels are used for their contacts? What strategic position does Moscow assign to Islam, and what part do Soviet Muslims play in the relations between the USSR and the outside Muslim world?

Soviet Muslims' Attitudes

Let us look at the traditional attitudes of Soviet Muslims toward Muslims abroad. It should be noted that such attitudes, or at least their expression, have been limited by official policy. Specifically, the Soviet government has never formulated any irredentist claims in connection with Azeris, Turkmen, Uzbeks, or Tajiks living in Iran or Afghanistan. Soviet propaganda ignores them. Their ethnic or religious kinship with elements of the Muslim population in the USSR is never mentioned. According to Moscow's official line, Soviet Muslims express solidarity only with those engaged in a struggle against imperialism, whatever their creed (Muslim or other). For Soviet Muslims their Russian "elder brothers" are supposed to be the "nearest and dearest," well ahead of any "bourgeois" or "feudal" Muslim brethren residing abroad. This official doctrine explains the scarcity of written sources about the relations between Soviet Muslims and the outside Muslim world. Analysis of these relations must therefore be based mainly on information derived from personal contacts.

It can be said that, as a rule, the Central Asian *masses* are ignorant of the world beyond the Soviet frontiers. Where foreign Islam is concerned, their main feeling is that of a vague religious kinship.[3]

The position of the Muslim *elites* of Communist upbringing is, on the other hand, complex and ambiguous. In general, Central Asian intellectuals are intensely interested in and hence well acquainted with the political evolution of the Muslim world abroad, while, with few exceptions, the Middle Eastern elites know little of Soviet Islam. The Soviet Muslim elites' attitude toward their foreign brethren is a complex

[2] The Azeri language, for example, has not been officially recognized as a written literary language in Iran, and the same is true for Kurdish in Turkey and Iran and for Uzbek and Turkman in Afghanistan.

[3] This feeling seems, however, to be fairly strong. As a Soviet Muslim soldier (a Turkman) who deserted and joined the Afghan rebels recounts, Russian officers found it necessary to say that in Afghanistan, Soviet units were fighting not *Muslims*, but some kind of pagans. This was communicated to the author by Afghan émigrés the author interviewed in Paris.

Muslims of the USSR and Afghanistan: at left, customers at a tearoom in Samarkand, in Soviet Uzbekistan; at right, tribesmen living north of the Hindu Kush in Afghanistan.

—Photos by EUPRA and Marc Riboud/Magnum.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

blend of interest, disdain, and an ardent desire to help.

Regarding Soviet policy in the Middle East, Soviet Muslim elites have traditionally been more radical and adventurous than the Russian leadership of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU). In approaching the issue of the Ghilan Republic in 1920 and the questions of Azerbaydzhan and Kurdestan in 1946, for instance, these elites endorsed the most drastic policy, the annexation of the whole of northern Iran. It is likely that the present-day elites favor Soviet annexation of, if not the whole of Afghanistan, then at least Afghan Turkestan north of the Hindu Kush. Such an annexation would considerably strengthen the Soviet Muslims' demographic and political position vis-à-vis the Russians.

Soviet Muslim political elites have also consistently championed a "transfer of revolutionary energies" from Europe to the Muslim world at large. In the 1920's, many Muslims expressed the hope that Soviet Central Asia or the Caucasus would eventually become a "revolutionary springboard" and that the Soviet Muslims—Tatars, Azeris, Turkestanis—would be the "middlemen" between Moscow and Asia, the torchbearers of the "socialist revolution" to the teeming millions of Asians and Africans. Thus, Nariman Narimanov, the First Secretary of the Communist Party of Azerbaydzhan, wanted that republic to serve as a "duct for [the passage of] Bolshevik-style revolution into all the states and nationalities professing Islam,"[4] and Najmuddin Efendiev (Samurskiy), the Daghestani Communist leader, considered that Daghestan "ought to serve as a bond of union between the USSR and Asia and as a channel of Communist ideas flowing toward the Near East."[5] Similarly, Mir Said Sultan Galiev, the Tatar Communist, wrote in 1923: "Tatar workers were the best conductors of revolutionary energy . . . in the entire East."[6] Elsewhere he observed, "If we want to sponsor the revolution in the East, we must create in Soviet Russia a territory close to the Muslim East which could become an experimental laboratory for the building of communism,"[7] and, "Just as Red Turkestan is playing the part of a revolutionary beacon for Chinese Turkestan, Tibet, Afghanistan, India, Bukhara, and Khiva, Soviet Azerbaydzhan . . . will become a Red beacon for Persia, Arabia and Turkey."[8]

Suspicious of such spontaneity, Stalin banned these views as "bourgeois nationalism" and eventually liquidated Sultan Galiev and Efendiev as traitors (Narimanov died in his bed but was denounced posthumously). Now, after half a century, the position of Moscow remains unchanged: it is the Russian "elder brother" alone who bears the responsibility for carrying out a revolutionary strategy in the Third World. Muslim Communists are no more trusted in such roles today than they were 50 years ago. At best, they tend to be used as technical advisers but not as political cadres.

This low level of involvement or contact probably causes no great discomfort to Soviet Muslims in the case of the Arab countries, in which they have shown little interest.[9] However, they do feel stronger ethnic and religious kinship with Iran and, especially, Turkey. Particularly among Soviet Muslim intellectuals there are still feelings of empathy for fellow Muslims seeking revolutionary change in those countries, and, as we shall see, there is even the belief that these brethren might in some way help Soviet Muslims ease the tight control exercised over them by the Russian "elder brother."

Islam—a Policy Tool?

It is paradoxical that, despite the CPSU's deep distrust of Muslim cadres as means of promoting Communist revolution abroad, the Muslim religious establishment, represented by the four Muslim Spiritual Boards,[10] appears today to be the most effective "agent" that Moscow has for pursuing its state strategy toward the Muslim world beyond Soviet frontiers. In contrast with the indifferent, ignorant, or disdainful—and therefore largely ineffective—West, the USSR has a cautious, restricted, but systematic

[4] See Narimanov's *Bor'ba za pobedu Sovetskoy vlasti v Azerbaydzhane 1918–1920* (The Struggle for the Victory of Soviet Power in Azerbaydzhan, 1918–1920), Baku, Azernasher, 1967, p. 20.

[5] N. Efendiev (Samurskiy), *Daghestan*, Moscow, 1924, pp. 117–18.

[6] M.S. Sultan Galiev, "The Tatar Autonomous Republic," *Zhizn' natsional nostey* (Moscow), No. 1, 1923, p. 25.

[7] M.S. Sultan Galiev, "Decree on the Tatar-Bashkir Republic," ibid., No. 4, 1920.

[8] M.S. Sultan Galiev, "Toward Declaration [of the Founding] of the Azerbaydzhan Soviet Republic," ibid., Apr. 9, 1920.

[9] The "pogroms" in Daghestan in the wake of the "Yom Kippur" war of 1973 were obviously sponsored by the authorities and cannot be considered an expression of real popular antisemitism.

[10] These are located in Tashkent, for Central Asia and Kazakhstan (because of its importance, its chairman, Ziautdin Babakhanov, has the title of "Grand Mufti"); Ufa, for European Russia and Siberia; Makhachkala, for the Northern Caucasus, including the krays of Krasnodar and Stavropol'; and Baku, for the Shi'ia Muslims throughout the USSR and for the Sunnis of Transcaucasia. The first three Boards are Sunni (Hanafi in the case of Tashkent and Baku, and Shafei in the case of Makhachkala). In the case of the Baku Board, the chairman is also the Sheikh ul-Islam of Soviet Shi'ites, and the vice-chairman is the Sunni mufti.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Islamic policy aimed at using the Islamic religion for Soviet ends. This strategy, inaugurated after Nikita Khrushchev's downfall, seeks to advertise the "freedom" of Islam in the USSR through the testimony of official Islamic representatives; to present the Soviet Union with its 43 million Muslims as a better partner than the West for the world of Islam; and, finally, to establish contacts with the conservative pro-Western Muslim states, such as Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Morocco, and Egypt.

Since 1964, Soviet Muslim territories of Central Asia and the Caucasus have opened their frontiers to foreign Muslims, welcoming delegations for "friendly visits" and for participation in the numerous lavish international conferences organized by the Tashkent Spiritual Board. The pattern of such visits is predictable. An invitation is issued by the Grand Mufti of Tashkent, Ziautdin Babakhanov. The visit begins in Tashkent, with a reception by the officials of the Board and often, though not always, by those of the Uzbekistan government. Then there is a trip to the two Soviet Islamic madrasahs (universities)—Mir-i Arab in Bukhara and Imam Ismail al-Bukhari in Tashkent—and to some of the "working" mosques in Tashkent, Bukhara, and Samarkand. After Central Asia, the foreign delegation is taken to Baku, where the Sheikh ul-Islam greets it at the Taze Pir mosque. Finally, the delegation goes to Leningrad and Moscow where the delegates are received by the local *imam-khatibs* (clerical heads of mosques). In Moscow, they are also received on behalf of the Soviet government by Abdullah Nurullayev, an Uzbek who is deputy chairman of the Council for Religious Affairs of the USSR Council of Ministers. Sometimes they also visit Ufa.[11]

Such tours are intended to produce the general impression that in Sovietland, Islam is free and opulent and that the government treats its Islamic leaders as "partners" and not as "tools." Abd al-Bari Isaiev, the Mufti of European Russia (Ufa), put it this way in an Arabic-language broadcast on Radio Moscow:

We often welcome in our country our brothers in religion in the guise [sic] *of various delegations. They visit our mosques and say prayers with us. They can personally verify the truth of what we say concerning the freedom of Islam in our country . . . . Our Muslim guests publish frequently their impressions in the Islamic magazine published monthly in our country* [Muslims of the Soviet East]. *They note with complete satisfaction that the Soviet Union zealously safeguards Islamic monuments . . . and that the Soviet state does not interfere with religious affairs . . . .*[12]

Grand Mufti Ziautdin Babakhanov, Chairman of the Muslim Spiritual Board of Central Asia and Kazakhstan, addresses a world religious conference in Moscow in June 1977 on the theme "For Lasting Peace, Disarmament, and Just Relations Among Nations."

—TASS from Sovfoto.

Various international congresses organized by the Spiritual Board of Tashkent provide even better opportunities to demonstrate the "prosperity" of Soviet Islam and its unconditional support of Soviet policy. A brief sampling follows:[13]

- In 1970, a conference was organized in Tashkent on the general theme of "unity and cooperation of Muslim peoples in the struggle for peace." It was chaired by Ziautdin Babakhanov and attended by a hundred Soviet ulemas and by representatives of 24 Muslim countries. Violent attacks were launched against US, Israeli, and South African "imperialism."

[11] The following are just a sampling of the Muslim delegations that have visited the USSR in recent years: in the winter of 1974, Jama at-i Ulema-i Islam of Pakistan, Young Muslim Society of Egypt, and a delegation of Muslims from Singapore; in the winter-spring of 1975, Abdul Razzak Mohammed, Deputy Prime Minister of Mauritius, and a delegation of Somali ulemas; in the spring of 1976, an Afghan ulemas delegation headed by Afghanistan's Minister of Religious Affairs; in 1978, a delegation of Turkish ulemas, a Pakistan delegation headed by the Secretary General of the World Islamic Conference, and a Jordanian delegation.

[12] Radio Moscow in Arabic to the Arab world, June 25, 1979.

[13] The best source on the activity of Soviet Muslim religious leaders is the journal *Muslims of the Soviet East*, a monthly published in English, French, Arabic, and Uzbek by the Muslim Spiritual Board of Central Asia and Kazakhstan, in Tashkent. Specific citations to this journal are given for several of the activities listed below in the text.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

• In 1973, the same Board convened another conference in Tashkent, on the theme "Soviet Muslims support the just struggle of the Arab people against Israeli imperialist aggression."

• In August 1974, an important international congress was held in Samarkand to commemorate the 1,200th anniversary of Imam Ismail al-Bukhari. High-ranking representatives from 25 Muslim countries were present (including ones from Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Sudan, Morocco, and Jordan). On this occasion, the congress, in an unusual departure from the norm, abstained from attacking the US or Israel.

• In October 1976, a congress was convened in Tashkent by Babakhanov, to celebrate the 30th anniversary of the founding of the Central Asian Board. It was attended by distinguished representatives from Syria, North Yemen, Morocco, Jordan, Tunisia, India, and Pakistan.

• On July 3, 1979, an international conference was held in Tashkent to celebrate the 10th anniversary of the establishment of the journal *Muslims of the Soviet East*. The conference was chaired by Grand Mufti Babakhanov and attended by high-ranking delegates from Jordan, Iraq, India, Turkey, Tunisia, Pakistan, Kuwait, Iran, Lebanon, Japan, Bulgaria, and Ethiopia. Its final declaration—signed by all the delegates, including those from "pro-Western" countries—contained vicious attacks against "Israeli, USA, South African, and Chinese imperialism."[14]

• In September 1979, a symposium was convened by the Central Asian Board at Dushanbe, the capital of Tadzhikistan. Its theme was "the contribution of the Muslims of Central Asia, of the Volga, and of the Caucasus to the development of Islamic thought, to the cause of peace and social progress." Delegates from 30 Muslim nations were present, and Grand Mufti Babakhanov took the opportunity once more to denounce "Israeli and South African imperialism."

• In September 1980, a large international congress is scheduled for Tashkent. It will be devoted to the following subject: "the 15th century of the Hegira must become the century of peace and international friendship." A permanent exposition bearing on "Islam in the USSR" is to be organized, and a book on the life of the Muslims in the Soviet Union is to be published.[15]

All of these visits and conferences in the USSR are carefully staged and controlled so as to strictly limit how much of Soviet Muslim realities the visitors see. Nevertheless, a fair number of foreign Muslims have seen behind the pious screen erected by the Spiritual Boards to perceive the genuine misery of Islam in the Soviet Union (there are probably less than 200 "working" mosques in all of Soviet Central Asia) and the classic type of colonial relations existing between the ruling Russians and the Muslim natives.[16]

Aside from receiving foreign Muslim delegations in the USSR, Soviet Muslim religious leaders are constantly touring Muslim countries—especially those with conservative and pro-Western governments, such as Jordan, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Tunisia. The Soviet delegations are in general headed by Ziautdin Babakhanov or one of his two deputies: vice-muftis Abdulgani Abdullayev and Yusufkhan Shakirov. Members of these delegations speak perfect Arabic and have a thorough knowledge of all aspects of religion. Thus equipped, they are certainly the best possible Soviet itinerant ambassadors to the Muslim world.[17]

The enumeration of services by Muslim spiritual leaders to the Soviet government would be incomplete if we omitted the propaganda broadcasts (such as the one cited above) by Soviet muftis and other represen-

[14] For the text of the declaration, see *Muslims of the Soviet East*, No. 3, 1979, p. 18.

[15] Radio Moscow in English, May 11, 1979.

[16] *Muslims of the Soviet East* regularly publishes important articles signed by the Grand Mufti of the Tashkent Spiritual Board or his deputies denouncing foreign Muslims who, after visiting the USSR, have published unpleasant reports. See, for instance, No. 2, 1974, pp. 25–29 (criticizing a Moroccan visitor); No. 1, 1975, pp. 8–13, and No. 3, 1977, pp. 18–20 (attacking Pakistani visitors).

[17] Some of the recent trips abroad by Soviet Muslim delegations include:

• 1972, delegation led by Babakhanov, to Morocco.

• 1974, delegation headed by the same mufti, to North Yemen.

• Summer of 1975, an important delegation with Babakhanov among its members, to Iraq, Jordan (reception by King Hussein), and Egypt (reception at the University of al-Azhar).

• September 1975, Soviet delegation to a conference in Mecca on the "mission of the mosques"—Babakhanov received by King Khalid of Saudi Arabia.

• October 1975, Soviet delegation to the International Symposium on Islamic Education, in Lucknow, India.

• October–November 1975, delegation headed by Yusufkhan Shakirov, to Somalia and Mauritius.

• 1976, delegation led by Abdullayev, to a Muslim-Christian dialogue in Tripoli.

• Winter of 1977, delegation under the direction of Abdullayev, to the International Conference on "Islamic Thought" in Ouargla, Algeria.

• March 1977, Soviet delegation headed by Abu Turab Yunus, *imam-khatib* of the "Tilla Sheikh" Mosque of Tashkent, to an international symposium in Bangladesh on the Muslim predication (sermon).

• July 1978, delegation headed by Babakhanov, to an international conference in Karachi on the propagation of Islam.

• Summer of 1978, delegation headed by Abdullayev, to Niger, Mali, and Senegal.

• September 1978, delegation led by Babakhanov, to an international conference in Istanbul on the Hegira calendar.

• Winter of 1978, delegation headed by Abdullayev, to the 12th International Conference on "Islamic Thought" in Batna, Algeria.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED



The interior of an Islamic madrasah, converted by Soviet officials into a Communist museum in Bukhara, Uzbekistan.

—Hussein Rofe/Keystone.

tatives of the Soviet Islamic hierarchy. These broadcasts in Arabic, Persian, Pashto, Urdu, and Turkish have increased in frequency during the last two years. Their themes do not vary much from standard Soviet emanations, but voiced by the highest religious authorities, they may be assumed to have somewhat greater weight among foreign Muslim audiences. They condemn Israeli, Chinese, American, and South African "imperialism"; call for political harmony between Islam and the Soviet government; trumpet "freedom of religion" in the USSR; denounce numerous "enemies," including Soviet Muslim émigrés (especially those working for Radio Liberty); and (in recent months) exhort the Afghan people to resist "wicked fanatics." The following excerpt from a broadcast by Ziautdin Babakhanov is typical:

The Muslims of Afghanistan for centuries have suffered the oppression of the foul order of feudalism, and now they have chosen the independent path of growth and progress. All peace-loving forces, first and foremost the friendly people of the Soviet Union support them . . . . But the counterrevolutionary elements in Afghanistan who were deprived of their privileges as a result of the April revolution are trying to restore the regime of injustice condemned by Islam itself. The glorious Koran says: "God orders justice and decency." US imperialism has embarked on activities against Afghanistan and tries to distort the ideas of the revolution and to cast aspersions on friendship and mutual assistance between Afghanistan and the USSR. American imperialism is arming the rebels, interfering in the internal affairs of a sovereign state and causing bloodshed which is condemned by God . . . . We Muslims of the eastern Soviet republics, in accordance with our religious duty and our conscience, cannot remain unconcerned about the events in our neighboring Islamic country; we completely support

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the people of Afghanistan in its struggle for freedom and against imperialism. We decisively demand that the interference by US imperialism and Chinese militarism in the internal affairs of Afghanistan be stopped. We ask all our coreligionists in the countries neighboring Afghanistan not to believe the lies of the imperialists and to make efforts so that bloodshed should not take place among Muslim peoples.[18]

It is obvious that cooperation between the Soviet government and the USSR's Muslim leaders is fruitful and beneficial for the former. For some years now, respected religious leaders in the USSR have praised the Soviet government at every Islamic conference in every Muslim country—including some held in the holy cities of Saudi Arabia. Moreover, not a word has been said at these conferences in defense of the US or of the West in general.

On the other hand, the Soviet regime must pay in "cash" for any action by the Muslim leaders in its favor—by immediate and important concessions such as the slowing down of antireligious propaganda, the opening of new mosques, or the publication of religious literature. It is clear that Soviet authorities are not happy to promote the process of religious revival within Muslim territories, a process which, in conjunction with the demographic explosion of the Muslim populations of Central Asia and the Caucasus[19] and the intense activity of the xenophobic fundamentalist Sufi brotherhoods,[20] is bound to become a major threat to the future stability of the Soviet regime.

Soviet Muslims in Afghanistan

Beyond participating in exchanges of Islamic delegations, Soviet Muslims had, until recently, generally not been assigned to diplomatic, economic, technical, or military missions abroad. Only two or three of them

[18] Radio Moscow in Pashto, Jan. 29, 1980 (Ziautdin Babakhanov's talk at the Tashkent Central Mosque on the occasion of Mawlud—the Prophet's birthday). See also Radio Moscow in Arabic to the Arabic world, Jan. 14, 1980.

[19] See, for example, Michael Rywkin, "Central Asia and Soviet Manpower," *Problems of Communism* (Washington, DC), January-February 1979.

[20] The best sources on this phenomenon, admittedly from Soviet eyes, are two antireligious periodicals: *Vestnik nauchnogo ateizma*, a quarterly, and *Nauka i religiya*, a monthly, both published in Moscow. For fuller detail, see the author's article, "Muslim Religious Conservatism and Dissent in the USSR," *Religion in Communist Lands* (Keston), Autumn 1978.

An armored personnel carrier and troops of the Soviet force occupying Kabul in February 1980.

—Katherine Young.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

had attained ambassadorial rank (N.A. Mukhitdinov, the former First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Uzbekistan, was Soviet ambassador in Damascus in the 1950's). In foreign Muslim countries, USSR Muslims were employed in subordinate capacities—as technicians, interpreters, or auxiliary staff (cooks, chauffeurs), and even then only in small numbers.

This pattern has been disrupted by events in Afghanistan, starting with the April 1978 coup against President Mohammad Daoud and continuing through the Soviet invasion of December 1979, which overthrew the regime of Hafizullah Amin. At first intent on helping a friendly Marxist regime, and then moved by the need to prevent a total collapse of state administration in an Afghanistan wracked by successive purges within the ruling *Khalq* (People's) party, the Soviet Union undertook to send in large numbers of administrative and technical cadres. Inasmuch as there existed few Russians with sufficient knowledge of local conditions and languages, Soviet authorities were forced to employ Central Asians (mainly Uzbeks and Tajiks, but also some Turkmen) in these missions. By late 1979, there were several hundreds (perhaps even thousands) of Soviet Muslims in positions at all levels of Afghanistan's administration, from the lowest posts up to deputy minister jobs. The invasion only increased their numbers. Moreover, the rank and file of the invading USSR forces included a fair percentage of Central Asians, even though the officers in command were Slavs.[21]

The Soviet Muslims sent as administrative cadres to Afghanistan after the 1978 coup in Kabul enjoyed direct contact with the native Muslim population under conditions of practically no Russian control—a thoroughly new experience in the history of the Soviet Union. In effect, they found themselves realizing the dream of the Muslim "national Communists" of the 1920's (Sultan Galiev, Turar Ryskulov, Najmuddin Efendiev, etc.), i.e., the building of communism in a neighboring Muslim country, a large part of whose population shares a common ethnic, religious, and linguistic background with the Soviet Muslim advisers.

Before the invasion, certain Western observers had argued that the existence of some 30 million Muslims in Soviet Central Asia might constitute a deterrent to a Soviet military occupation of Afghanistan.[22] However, far from opposing the occupation of a brother Muslim land, the Central Asian Muslim elites seemed to welcome the adventure.[23] Conceivably, they sincerely believed that they were helping liberate their brothers, Uzbek and Tajik, from the "imperialists" and from "feudal domination." But their involvement in the Afghan operation also has given them a better bargaining position with regard to the Russians and might eventually oblige the latter to pay for the cooperation with important concessions, such as deciding to increase industrial investment in Central Asia rather than attempt to siphon Muslim manpower off to projects in the purely Russian areas of Western Siberia and northern Russia.

In all likelihood, the Central Asians were very useful in the course of the military operations involved in the invasion. For instance, they probably served as interpreters for the Soviet armed forces. They likewise made it possible for the Afghan administration to function under the occupation. Furthermore, their presence tended to give to the Soviet occupation of the country the character of an intra-Islamic affair. Certainly, this seemed to be the intention of the Soviet leadership in the beginning, when Central Asian Muslims were spectacularly exhibited in Kabul.

But the operation did not prove a success. In February 1980, the USSR began to systematically pull out units with Central Asian soldiers and replace them with purely Slav units. At the same time, the Soviet Muslims manning the Afghan administration began to be superseded by Russians or even by East Germans.

One can discern several possible reasons for this withdrawal of Soviet Muslim cadres. First, there is the violent opposition of the Pushtuns—a self-styled *Herrenvolk* who have traditionally viewed the Uzbeks and other Turks residing north of the Hindu Kush as *Untermenschen*. The Pushtuns would rather be occupied by the Russians than by despised and hated neighbors from Central Asia. As a consequence, Central Asian Muslims were attacked and in some cases killed,[24] and any hope of securing the support of the

[21] The fact that many Central Asian Muslim soldiers were serving in the Soviet units which invaded Afghanistan in December 1979–January 1980 suggests that the Soviets did not expect these units to fight the rebels. It is a rule in the USSR that only purely Slav units should be used in quelling uprisings in Muslim territories. Such was the case in the repression of the May 1979 riots in Dushanbe and disturbances in Tashkent in the 1960's.

[22] For example, Louis Dupree argued: "The Muslim population of the Soviet Central Asian republics themselves might object to being involved in the occupation of a brother Muslim land." See his article, "Afghanistan Under the *Khalq*," *Problems of Communism*, July-August 1979, p. 49.

[23] The author's discussion of the Soviet involvement in Afghanistan is based on personal contacts with Afghan émigrés in Europe and information provided to him by journalists and diplomats in Moscow.

[24] Information circulating in Moscow in March 1980 told of a riot of Kazakhs in Alma Ata over plans to bury in a non-Muslim cemetery Muslim kinsmen returned from Afghanistan in coffins.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Members of the Jamiat Islami Afghan rebel forces opposing the Soviet-sponsored regime in Kabul, photographed in the Nuristan-Kunar area of northeastern Afghanistan in January 1980.

—Alain Dejean/SYGMA.

Pushtuns through them was doomed. This card had to be abandoned.

Second, the *non-Pushtun* population—Tajiks, Turks, and Hazaras—greeted the Soviet Muslims only too well. Friendly contacts were established without the Russians' being able to intervene, and Soviet Muslims were submitted to systematic religious and political "intoxication" by the Afghans. In some places, including Kabul, an active "black market" in Korans was organized. Eventually, in January 1980, some Soviet Muslim soliders deserted and went over to the rebels, in spite of the extreme difficulties of doing so.[25]

Finally, even those Central Asians willing to assist their Russian "elder brothers" in the mission of "liberation" cooled off when ideology had to be translated into action, which had a rather gruesome side. "Liberating" Tajik and Uzbek brethren in Afghanistan seemed to entail shooting these same Uzbek and Tajik brethren, or—even worse—helping Russians shoot them. Although the immense majority of Soviet Muslims in Afghanistan remained obedient to Soviet orders, Moscow perhaps came to question the degree of their reliability as the need for military operations grew more pressing.

Moscow's Options in Afghanistan

These recent actions suggest some awareness on the part of the Soviet leadership of the potentially destabilizing impact of the Afghanistan venture on Soviet Central Asia. One way of assessing this potential is to examine Moscow's options and their possible consequences.

If the Soviets prove unable to crush the rebels' resistance in Afghanistan rapidly and decisively, they will have to face a lengthy guerrilla war. This would be

[25] Soviet Turkmen defectors have reached Pakistan and have been interviewed there.

In addition, a New Delhi dispatch by the Associated press dated Mar. 27, 1980, quotes "a reliable Western source" to the effect that he met with three Soviet army reservists from Uzbekistan who had deserted to a rebel-controlled area in Afghanistan. A UPI dispatch of the same day reported that one of the three defectors had said that they had been told they would be fighting American, Chinese, and Pakistani enemies of Afghan Muslims. Instead, they found they were "fighting our Muslim brothers. We were lied to."

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

a grim prospect, for sooner or later such a conflict would be bound to antagonize the Muslim world and could also awaken the never quite forgotten attitudes that motivated the great Basmachi movement in Central Asia.[26]

Were the Soviets to succeed in liquidating or neutralizing the rebellion (which for the time being seems quite unlikely), they would then have the choice of several solutions: (1) They could annex Afghanistan, which would thus become the 16th "Soviet Socialist Republic" of the Union. This outcome would be welcomed by the Soviet Muslim elites, religious and Communist alike, since it would add 15 million deeply religious and nationalist brethren to the existing 43 million Soviet Muslims and thus strengthen their not unreasonable hope of outnumbering the Russians. (2) The Soviets could annex the northern, Turkic part of Afghanistan to the Uzbek and Tadzhik republics of the USSR and permit the country south of the Hindu Kush to become a purely Pushtun state. This solution might be even more favorable in the eyes of Central Asian Muslims. (3) Soviet armed forces might withdraw from Afghanistan in favor of establishment of an "independent" but highly submissive Afghanistan ruled by pro-Soviet but non-Communist leaders receptive to Soviet civilian advisers. Such a modified "finlandization" of that country may already be under consideration by the Soviet authorities.

Further issues arise, however, with regard to the last option. Would Moscow favor a Pushtun-dominated regime, with the Pushtuns won over by a promise of eastward expansion toward the Pathan territory of Pakistan? In such a case, Soviet Central Asians would be excluded from Afghanistan in deference to Pushtun sentiments. Or would the USSR seek a regime dominated by the non-Pushtuns (Tajiks, Hazaras, and Uzbeks). Central Asians would then presumably participate in the political and economic life of Afghanistan. This would be a very favorable solution for the Central Asians but one with dangerous, far-ranging implications for the Russians.

Within the framework of most of these possible alternatives, Central Asian Muslims would certainly have much to give the Afghans in the way of technology and practical know-how, but also could receive much in return. As suggested above, the iron curtain between Muslim brethren on opposite sides of the Soviet-Afghan border has already crumbled, with active circulation and uncensored exchange of information and ideas now taking place. One of the key sets of ideas which could strike responsive chords in Central Asia is a fundamentalist, conservative religious revivalism, for such a revivalism would fortify already existing currents in the Central Asian republics. For instance, the Sufi brotherhoods hidden away within the Soviet republics would probably welcome even a temporary success of the religion-inspired resistance in Afghanistan, with its strong flavor of Holy War. If armed resistance continues in Afghanistan, it might well become a model of heroism for contemporary Muslim nationalists such as that which Shamil and his Naqshbandi murids provided all the nationalist anti-Russian movements in the tsarist Empire.[27]

The Soviets' room for maneuver in Afghanistan is therefore very narrow. Their victory must be rapid, complete, and spectacular. A failure, or even a doubtful success, might be a dramatic signal to the Central Asian Muslims, not unlike that of the defeat of the tsarist armies in Manchuria in 1905, which spurred the birth of a Muslim national movement.[28]

Iran's Influence

While developments in Afghanistan seem to have the greatest potential for immediate and profound impact on Soviet Muslims, events in Iran may also have a direct, deep, and far-reaching effect. Iran is undergoing an Islamic fundamentalist and anti-imperialist revolution not very different in character from that of the "theocratic state" of Uzun Haji and his followers in 1918–21, which has left long-lasting memories among the Caucasian Muslims.[29] (Curiously, the Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini even bears a physical resemblance to Uzun Haji.) Since the downfall of the Shah, Caucasian and Central Asian Muslims have displayed a passionate interest in news reaching them from Tehran and Tabriz. Iran has always enjoyed, and still enjoys, an immense prestige in the Turco-Iranian

[26] *A guerrilla movement, centered mainly in the Fergana Valley and in* southeastern Uzbekistan, which started in 1918 and lasted until 1928 (in some isolated areas until 1936).

[27] The impact of the Caucasian wars on the development of the Ukrainian, Polish, and Tartar national movements is well known.

[28] Almost all the Muslim political parties appeared immediately after Russia's defeat in the Japanese war. Among them were Ittifak al-Muslimin, Tangchylar, and Uralchylar in the Tartar country, and Hummet and Musawat in Transcaucasia.

[29] In 1918–19, Uzun Haji, a Daghestan Sufi Sheikh (Naqshbandi), founded the "Emirate of Daghestan-Chechniya," a theocracy based on the shari'a. Subsequently, even though he was in his 90's, he led the great rebellion of North Caucasian mountaineers against the Soviets. Uzun Haji died in 1921, during the fighting, and his tomb in the village of Vedeno in the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic is one of the most popular "holy places" of pilgrimage in the Caucasus. See V.N. Basilov, *Kul't svyatykh v Islame* (The Cult of the Saints in Islam), Moscow, 1970.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED



Ayatollah Seyyed Kazem Shari'at-Madari, an Azeri Shi'a Muslim from Iran who has called for greater religious freedom for his brethren in the Soviet Union.

—Alain Keler/SYGMA.

world, not only because of the country's unique and advanced culture but also because of its long tradition of statemanship. This is especially true among the Caucasian Muslims, for whom Iran remains—in spite of the uncertainty of its present position—an inspiring model.

Several aspects of the Iranian revolution evoke especially resounding echoes in the Caucasus—among the younger generation of Muslim intellectuals and among the quite numerous "religious fanatics" in this region (i.e., members of the Sufi orders). First, there is the "anti-imperialist" aspect of the Iranian revolution. It is easy to draw a parallel between the "foreign imperialism" of the Americans in Iran and the "imperialism" of the Russians in the Caucasus and in Central Asia. As the Iranian Shi'a religious leader Ayatollah Seyyed Kazem Shari'at-Madari (an Azeri Turk from Tabriz) put it:

The Iranian Muslim people's triumphant struggles consitute a turning point in the history of world struggles, and the best model to follow by the oppressed Muslim peoples of the world, who are meticulously studying Iran's great Islamic movement. These peoples should be benefiting from the Iranian struggles' special characteristics for the liberation of Muslims from the yoke of satanical powers, blasphemy and impiety. . . .[30]

Second, there is the "populist" character of "Khomeini-ism," with its promise to bring to power a new category of younger political leaders of more popular origin. Third, there is the exaltation of the cultural, moral, and political values of Islam. This flatters the innate sense of superiority that the Caucasian Muslims feel with regard to their non-Muslim (Russian or Armenian) neighbors. The fact that "Khomeini-ism" is a Shi'a phenomenon and has "reactivated" Shi'a minorities in Iraq, Syria, and Yemen probably would not be a great obstacle to a religious union of Muslims in the Caucasus, where differences of dogma between the Sunnis and Shi'ites have been weakened during the 60 years of the Soviet regime.

However, religious fundamentalism is not the only ideology which Iran can export to its northern neighbors. Radicalism of various sorts—always spiced with the time-honored religious flavor—is another possible Iranian influence on Soviet Islam. Among its various forms is the wild romantic philosophy of Ali Shariyati, which attempts to reconcile Marxism with Shi'a Islam. Such creeds do not always conform to the laws of logic, but "Islamic Marxism" (or "Marxist Islam"), with its tremendous pathos, its constant references to the glories of the past, and its promise of a happy and mighty future, constitutes a powerful and dynamic revolutionary ideal, more inspiring than the emasculated, bureaucratic Russian model of socialism.

All of these factors help to explain a dramatic reversal in the flow of influence between the Soviet Union and Iran since the fall of the Pahlevi monarchy in January 1979. Where once Iranians listened to propaganda broadcasts from Radio Baku, today it is the Soviet Azeris and Turkmen who follow with interest the broadcasts from Tabriz and Tehran. In June 1979, Allahshukur Pachayev, *akhund* (head) of the Baku Jami mosque and Shi'a deputy chairman of the Muslim Spiritual Board for Transcaucasia, told a group of foreign journalists in Baku that "events in Iran do not

[30] Tehran broadcast in Persian, Feb. 22, 1979. That Shari at-Madari included Soviet Muslims among those suffering oppression was soon evident. In an Apr. 19, 1979, Tehran broadcast of an interview the Ayatollah had granted to Soviet newsmen, he was quoted as saying: "We expect the USSR to show greater respect for the religion of the 45 million Muslims of that country and allow them greater freedom."

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

A meeting of the Muslim Spiritual Board for the Northern Caucasus, presided over by its chairman, the Mufti Hapiz Omarov (center) in Makhachkala, Daghestan, in August 1979.

—TASS From Sovfoto.

mean that Islam will also make new inroads in the Soviet Union,"[31] but one wonders how realistic this official assessment was. Once more, as in 1908, Iran presents the picture of a "revolutionary" country where "something is on the move." Even if the Muslims of the USSR prudently express the view that developments in Iran cannot affect their life and ideology, something of their inner joy still shines through: if their Shi'a brethren in Tehran have succeeded in humiliating what they see as one mighty "imperialism" —the US—then its counterpart, Soviet "imperialism," may too be defeated one day in the Caucasus.

Prospects

There is thus considerable potential for events in such unlikely places as Afghanistan or Iran to have a profound impact on Soviet domestic politics, although one would be foolhardy to predict its precise nature. Should this actually happen, the situation would contrast sharply with those obtaining at the birth of the Soviet Union and in its Stalinist period. In the 1920's, when Soviet Russia was struggling against countless economic and political difficulties and its Muslim territories were only slowly emerging from the chaos of the Civil War, Soviet Islam was a breeding ground of revolutionaries and an exporter of ideas. Muslims who had joined the Bolsheviks tried to elaborate theories adapting Marxism to the specific conditions of a Muslim society, and these formulations—for example, Sultan Galiev's "national communism," Turar Ryskulov's "Pan-Turkic Marxism," and Najmuddin Efendiev's "Revolutionary Pan-Islamism"—made their way to the outside Muslim world. Indeed, their enduring echoes may still be heard in the radicalism of Libya's Mu'ammar Qadhafi and in the programs of Algerian or Syrian socialists. Then, with the advent of Stalinism, this communication of ideas ceased.

In the post-Stalin period, Moscow authorities cautiously opened some communication channels between Soviet and foreign Muslims, apparently on the assumption that the technical and intellectual achievements of Soviet Muslims and the facade of official Soviet Islamic institutions would impress the greater Muslim world. However, after decades of enforced conformity to stale Russian Marxism, Soviet Muslims had nothing to export in the political domain. To the contrary, it is they who are likely to be influenced by ideas, programs, and ideologies—perhaps even by models of political warfare and guerrilla activity—moving northward from a "destabilized" and radicalized Middle East. These ideas—ranging from the most conservative religious fundamentalism to the wildest revolutionary radicalism—share one common characteristic: the potential for destabilizing Soviet Islam, and thereby for undermining the unity of the USSR.

[31] A full text of Pachayev s statement can be found in Steffan Teste, "Soviet Muslims Rejoice Over Iran," *Dagens Nyheter* (Stockholm), June 11, 1979.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Books

Whither the Soviet System?

By Robert F. Miller

ACADEMY OF SCIENCES OF THE USSR. *Leonid I. Brezhnev: Pages from His Life.* New York, NY, Simon and Schuster, 1978.

DANIEL TARSCHYS. *The Soviet Political Agenda: Problems and Priorities, 1950–1970.* White Plains, NY, M.E. Sharpe, 1979.

GEORGE W. BRESLAUER. *Five Images of the Soviet Future: A Critical Review and Synthesis.* Berkeley, CA, University of California Press, 1978.

ALEXANDER DALLIN, Ed. *The Twenty-Fifth Congress of the CPSU: Assessment and Context.* Stanford, CA, Hoover Institution Press, 1977.

ALEXANDER YANOV. *The Russian New Right: Right-Wing Ideologies in the Contemporary USSR.* Berkeley, CA, University of California Press, 1978.

WOLFGANG LEONHARD. *Am Vorabend einer neuen Revolution? Die Zukunft des Sowjetkommunismus* (On the Eve of a New Revolution? The Future of Soviet Communism). München, C. Bertelsmann Verlag, 1975.

AS THE BREZHNEV era draws to a close in the Soviet Union, the question of the future shape of the political system over which Leonid I. Brezhnev has presided becomes steadily less a matter of purely academic speculation and more a matter of direct political significance for policymakers and concerned citizens throughout the world. In the Brezhnev years, the Soviet Union has manifestly enhanced its capacity to influence the context of international relations and even to a certain extent the domestic considerations of statesmen and private individuals in many countries outside as well as inside the Soviet orbit.

Unfortunately, our ability to predict the nature of Soviet political processes and relationships in the post-Brezhnev period does not match our need to do so. Any such prediction requires a variety of things. We need, first of all, a solid understanding of the existing structural, procedural, socioeconomic, demographic, ethnic, and attitudinal correlates of the system and how they have operated under specific conditions of stress in the past. In addition, we must assess the role of personal factors such as leadership style and the evident policy preference of dominant individuals — factors that up to now have been decisive for understanding how the Soviet system works.

Personal factors are notoriously difficult to accommodate in any predictive exercise (in this case, we do not even know who Brezhnev's ultimate successor will be). However, as most of the authors reviewed here seem to agree, there has occurred a degree of institutionalization of power relations under Brezhnev's leadership which may make idiosyncratic personal factors somewhat less crucial for future analyses. Our knowledge about the formal and informal structures and processes of the Soviet system, while considerable, is still a far from perfect base upon which to predict. Predictions founded on social, economic, or demographic indicators and tendencies are not that solid either. Not only are reliable data less likely to be available for the USSR than for most other advanced industrial societies (in no case, of course, are the data ever totally satisfactory), but the extrapolation of future trends and behavioral patterns from such material is fraught with reductionist or deterministic assumptions which most Western analysts would be reluctant to see applied to forecasts of their own societies. We know perhaps even less about the attitudes and values of the various Soviet elite groups and of the populace at large. Therefore, we cannot with confidence say very much about the crucial question of the legitimacy of the system for its citizens and how the society is likely to react under internal or external stress.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Despite these methodological and substantive problems, we must nevertheless recognize the need for informed forecasts and welcome the efforts of those bold enough to undertake them. Four of the six books reviewed here directly address, either wholly or in part, the task of prediction. The other two (the volume on Brezhnev and Daniel Tarschys's study of Soviet politics in the 1950's and 1960's) present information and insights useful in setting the framework for prediction.

THE BREZHNEV volume, commissioned by Simon and Schuster and produced by a team of authors from the USSR Academy of Sciences, is a collage of biographical information, laudatory commentary on Brezhnev's style of leadership, and appeals for peace and businesslike cooperation between the United States and the Soviet Union. The facts and opinions assembled by the authors offer little that is new to the reasonably well informed general reader. But what is of interest is the carefully nurtured image they present of the relations between Brezhnev, as party and state leader, and the various institutions of Soviet power and administration. The style and structure of decision-making portrayed are obviously those considered optimal for contemporary conditions of the "scientific and technological revolution" (NTR) and East-West détente. Accordingly, while paying tribute to Brezhnev's sterling qualities of maturity and judgment as a leader, the authors are careful to present him as a team player, whose chief function as general secretary is to coordinate the implementation of policies generated by the requirements of "objective necessity," as perceived by a corps of technical experts and institutional leaders. In short, what we see is the image of a successful corporation executive, rather than that of a *vozhd'* (a supreme leader or commander) or a Khrushchevian "mover and shaker." One cannot be assured that this portrayal is, in fact, valid, but it does seem to square quite well with the perception of Soviet elite politics and decision-making as a system of tacit interinstitutional and interregional "contracts," which is used as a basis for prediction by George Breslauer in *Five Images*, and by Breslauer, Gail Lapidus, and Gregory Grossman in their contributions to the volume edited by Alexander Dallin.

If such a picture is correct, the Soviet Union has changed considerably under Brezhnev—perhaps not so much in terms of *what* is decided, but *how* it is decided. Daniel Tarschys's analysis tends to support this proposition, even if one must have serious reservations about his method of arriving at his findings (he bases his formal investigation exclusively on an information-retrieval type of content analysis of the lead editorials in *Pravda* for the years 1950, 1960, and 1970). Of particular note is his description of the process by which issues are placed on the "political agenda," which suggests some interesting hypotheses about the functioning of the system as a whole.

Like Gail Lapidus and, by implication, Paul Cocks (both in the Dallin volume), Tarschys discerns a tendency under Brezhnev toward the "depoliticization" of issues. In the Soviet context, this tendency might be interpreted as a manifest,

Reviewers in This Issue

ROBERT F. MILLER—Senior Fellow in Political Science, Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National University (Canberra); author of an ANU Occasional Paper in Political Science entitled "Tito as Political Leader and External Factors in Yugoslav Political Development," 1977, and of articles on Soviet and Yugoslav politics in *Osteuropa, Soviet Studies,* and *Worldview.*

T. H. RIGBY—Professorial Fellow in Political Science, Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National University (Canberra); author of many works on the Soviet state and Communist party, including, most recently, *Lenin's Government: Sovnarkom 1917-1922,* 1979; coauthor of *Authority, Power and Policy in the USSR,* 1980.

DENNIS J. DUNN—Associate Professor of History, Southwest Texas State University (San Marcos, TX); author of *The Catholic Church and the Soviet Government, 1939-1949,* 1977, and *Detente and Papal-Communist Relations, 1962-1978,* 1979; editor of *Religion and Modernization in the Soviet Union,* 1977.

WILLIAM POTTER—Assistant Director, Center for International and Strategic Affairs, University of California at Los Angeles (Los Angeles, CA); coauthor of *SALT and Beyond: A Handbook on Strategic Weapons and Means for Their Control,* 1977; contributor of articles to *The Journal of Conflict Resolution, Western Political Quarterly,* and *Papers of the Peace Science Society (International);* currently preparing a study on Soviet perceptions of US arms control policy.

JOHN M. STARRELS—Director of International Trade, National Association of Manufacturers (Washington, DC); coauthor of *Politics in the German Democratic Republic,* 1975; author of articles and papers on East German politics and policy.

MAURICE D. SIMON—Assistant Professor of Political Science, University of North Carolina at Greensboro (Greensboro, NC); coeditor of *Policy and Politics in Gierek's Poland,* forthcoming; contributor of articles on Polish politics to journals such as *Legislative Studies Quarterly* and to various symposia.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

or at least a latent, function of the long-term program to automate or computerize routine decision-making in various social and economic spheres, to replace politics by a form of social engineering. But one can observe a similar tendency toward depoliticization in Yugoslavia (see, for example, Edvard Kardelj's last work on "democratic pluralism of self-managing interests"[1]) and in the strategies of political coalition and the programmatic statements of the Eurocommunist parties in Western Europe. In neither of these cases is the scientific and technological aspect, which so markedly informs Soviet policy, very prominent. This suggests a more general hypothesis: Communist politicians, nurtured in the traditions of democratic centralism, naturally abhor ordinary political competition. Such a possibility should be kept in mind in the search for clues about the future course of Communist systems.

In this connection, Tarschys makes the interesting observation that politics in the USSR is an "arena of the semi-strong and the semi-weak," that is, of persons and groups not strong enough to fend for themselves in the struggle for a share of the material and cultural values which Soviet society has to offer, but with access to members of the elite who can provide the necessary support for particular aspirations. It is in this indirect way, according to Tarschys, that the "semi's" place issues on the agenda.

Of course, patron-client relationships exist to some extent in all political systems, but the nature of these relationships and the modes of access in Soviet-type systems bear some specific features of their own. In the USSR, Tarschys argues, distributive issues are ordinarily settled by custom according to an established pecking order or by agreement among the top-level elites in a kind of bargaining process. Those groups and interests which find themselves left out of the resultant bargains are forced to petition elite patrons for a share of the available resources, hoping to find individuals willing to carry the ball for them or, if necessary, to raise the particular issues or claims to the level of state policy. As an example, he cites the 1971 campaign for consumer goods production. The 1965 economic reform could also be mentioned.

However, as several of the authors reviewed here point out, every attempt at reform or redistribution in the USSR calls forth opposition from entrenched forces who fear a loss of privilege or status from the proposed changes. There is general agreement that these forces include ideologically or politically conservative elements in the central and regional apparats who are well represented in the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), although Wolfgang Leonhard and Breslauer correctly caution that not all of the party apparatchiks necessarily take conservative positions. Nevertheless, as Khrushchev learned to his dismay, the conservative elements as a group constitute an extremely powerful political force, capable of sabotaging reform programs and ultimately even of causing the downfall of top leaders.

A basic feature of Brezhnev's mode of leadership has been a determination not to alienate these forces. Rather than simply *imposing* new policies upon them, he has tried to win them over, or, if need be, to buy their acquiescence by modifying the tempo or even the substantive details of his reform measures.

Herein lies the essence of the "contractual" arrangements mentioned earlier. This approach has led to remarkable stability and continuity of the political elites at various levels, but it has also led to a rather rigid and dilatory system of decision-making and administration, one that is unresponsive to new policy and organizational initiatives. By its age structure and its monopoly of executive and administrative power, moreover, the stratum of middle-level apparatchiks has effectively blocked the accession of younger, presumably more flexible and dynamic, and certainly better-educated, individuals to decision-making roles. Thus, an element of personal frustration has been added to the pressures for innovation and rationalization that virtually all of the authors reviewed see as the main problem of the post-Brezhnev succession.

THIS DIAGNOSIS is, in effect, the agreed starting point and the major premise of the debate over the future of the Soviet system represented by the works of Leonhard, Alexander Yanov, and Breslauer, and by several of the contributors to the Dallin book. The basic questions addressed by the forecasters include the following: (1) How serious is the immobilism of the system in light of the probable challenges it faces? (2) What are the composition and relative strengths of the social and political forces ranged on the opposing sides of change and stability (or, indeed, retrogression)? (3) What are the most salient weapons—ideological and/or spiritual, material, and coercive—in the arsenals of the contending forces? The variety of predictions offered reflects the dif-

[1] Edvard Kardelj, *Democracy and Socialism*, translated by Margot and Bosko Milosavljevic. Belgrade, Yugoslav Review, 1978.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

fering answers to these questions.

Perhaps the most extreme prognosis is that presented by former Soviet writer and journalist Alexander Yanov, who sees as highly probable a drastic shift in the post-Brezhnev period toward an authoritarian, right-wing Russian nationalist regime. In contrast to the native Western analysts under review, Yanov attributes a continuing vital significance to ideological and spiritual factors in the Russian (not necessarily Soviet) political culture. While agreeing with most of the other authors that Marxism-Leninism is a spent force in the USSR and its satellites, Yanov maintains that Russian culture requires, and has always required, a spiritual impetus to legitimize popular political obligation. The present ideological vacuum is about to be filled, he argues, by a marriage of the doctrines espoused by the currently dissident "New Right" Orthodox Christian revivalists and by conservative Russian chauvinist elements in the political, ideological, and police leaderships. And he warns that a hard-line policy by the West on economic and political relations with the USSR will increase the probability of this outcome by justifying the repressive, xenophobic tendencies of the political reactionaries and their "exclusivist" New Right ideological partners.

Wolfgang Leonhard's book is a *tour d'horizon* of predictions regarding the future of Soviet communism. In the course of a painstaking examination of alternative interpretations and prognoses by Western authorities and Soviet dissidents of all political hues, he rejects the Yanov scenario, among many others, and does so on several grounds. For one thing, he considers Marxism-Leninism, although no longer a vital motive force in internal Soviet life, as too useful a legitimizing factor in intra-bloc relations and other areas of foreign policy (for example, in dealing with so-called national liberation movements) to be given up by an essentially rational Soviet leadership for so narrow and irrational a doctrine. (Yanov, incidentally, rejects this kind of argument as a manifestation of a Western cultural bias, one which cannot conceive of spiritual factors in other than an instrumental light.) For another thing, Leonhard argues that the accumulated problems of the Soviet social and economic system and the ambitions and responsibilities of the USSR as a superpower militate against the self-indulgent, narcissistic Russian purism demanded by the New Right dissidents and those who tacitly or overtly support them within the apparat. Moscow's problems with the Soviet Union's non-Russian nationalities, noted by Leonhard and several other authors, would also inevitably be aggravated by such a tendency, which would violate many elements of the existing "contract" with these groups.

Leonhard devotes more attention to the possibility of a revolution or radical change from the other direction — that is, a liberal and/or technocratic reaction against the inability of the existing order to cope with the technical and administrative contradictions which have doomed the USSR to a mediocre living standard and a manifestly inefficient use of available resources. However, he sees as more likely a continuing effort at controlled modernization without the sacrifice of the leadership's monopoly of power. Up to now, the regime has succeeded in co-opting members of the technical intelligentsia and repressing active dissidents, without substantially diluting its own power. Leonhard's view that this limited accommodation will probably be inadequate to cope with the accumulated distortions of the system is the main basis for his contention that the possibility of a revolution "cannot be excluded." This is as far as he is willing to go. Indeed, despite his exhaustive consideration of various alternative scenarios, Leonhard provides the reader with remarkably little in the way of solid prediction; some possibilities are simply a bit less remote than others.

Of the authors who focus on one or another dimension of the managerial, technological, or scientific aspects of the existing order, Paul Cocks (writing in the Dallin volume) is probably the most optimistic concerning current Soviet programs. He regards Brezhnev as fully committed to the wholesale rationalization of the economy and social organization and of their accommodation to the perceived imperatives of the NTR. Brezhnev's modernizing strategy, Cocks suggests, is to restructure the administrative system so that it is compatible with modern information processing and control techniques, to introduce an integrated systems approach into the processes of goal formation and policy planning, and to foster the development of executive and managerial personnel who are supportive of and conversant with the new methods of decision-making and policy implementation. Cocks credits Brezhnev with exercising a great deal of tactical circumspection in the pursuit of this strategy so as to avoid unnecessarily antagonizing the conservative bureaucratic forces which have resisted the projected changes. By way of illustration, Cocks cites the regime's resort to careful experiments on a sectoral or regional basis before it has recommended programs for nationwide implementation.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The widely publicized commitment to organizing for the NTR is undoubtedly an important feature of current Soviet politics, but it is probably not as important in practical terms as Cocks assumes (the reviewer must plead guilty to a similar fascination with the theoretical implications of the new projects for the system as a whole). Gregory Grossman's account (in the Dallin volume) of the shortfalls in the Ninth and early Tenth Five-Year Plan periods and Brezhnev's own complaints at the 25th CPSU Congress about the pace of substantive and organizational change (noted repeatedly by contributors to the Dallin book) offer a useful reminder of the frequent contradictions between programmatic commitment and actual performance in the USSR. There is ample evidence that entrenched forces have succeeded in stemming, or at least slowing down, the process of restructuring the economic and administrative systems for the NTR. Whether Brezhnev's successors will be able, or indeed willing, to revive the initial enthusiasm for "scientific management" is doubtful—at least in the short run, while the process of jockeying for leadership position works itself out. And experience in even the most advanced Western societies suggests that the longer-run prospects for truly scientific decision-making and administration are not outstanding either.

WHERE does this negative assessment of the various predictions of radical change leave us in our quest for convincing prognoses of the future of Soviet communism? George Breslauer's concept of "welfare-authoritarianism" as a description of the present and likely short-term future system in the USSR is a useful starting point. It is based on the proposition that the existing authoritarian system enjoys a substantial degree of legitimacy among the majority of at least the Great Russian masses of the Soviet population. This legitimacy stems from a popular perception that Soviet policymakers continue to hold as fundamental the ideologically prescribed goal of relative equality of rewards and access to publicly supplied health, educational, cultural, and other consumption facilities (however great the stratification of benefits in actual practice). Indeed, the ruling ideology—however eroded as an inspirational factor—does continue to perform an important residual function in guiding official social policy, especially in the welfare and employment areas.

A major question is whether the manifest inefficiencies of the economic and administrative systems will permit the regime to maintain a rate of growth that will meet to a tolerable, if not entirely satisfactory, degree the rising expectations of the masses, at the same time as it permits diversion of huge quantities of resources to the traditional power and prestige areas of heavy industry and military preparedness. Those who predict instability after Brezhnev contend that the system will not be able to do this. But there is little hard evidence that failure is inevitable, or that the requisite adjustments cannot be made. Breslauer argues rather convincingly that there is ample room for maneuver between liberal and conservative adjustments within the framework of the welfare-authoritarian system—that is, without the need for a revolutionary change in the basic political structure.

Nevertheless, Yanov's insistence upon the unique spiritual dimension in Russian political culture cannot be dismissed out of hand. It may turn out that those leaders who come to power after Brezhnev will simply not be satisfied with incremental, pragmatic adjustments uninformed by consistent principle and will attempt a return to more traditional Russian patterns of authoritarian discipline and sacrifice. Such an attempt would undoubtedly evoke bitter resistance from more rationally inclined forces within the party and society at large. Much will depend, as Yanov suggests, on the state of international relations, but perhaps not in quite the way he imagines. Policies of détente and accommodation with the USSR will not have the effect—predicted by Yanov—of encouraging rationally or liberally minded Soviet opponents of neo-Stalinism to resist the resurgence of aggressive, narrow Russian chauvinism if these policies are pursued by a West that is militarily weakened and socially and spiritually fragmented. And while it is conceivable that a strong, united, and determined West might evoke a New Right–inspired Soviet regime, such a regime—ironically—would probably be easier to deal with, even if the cost of its existence to the Soviet people would be considerable.

On balance, though, one would expect the future Soviet system to reflect the present pattern of institutionalized power relationships and to maintain the basic social policies and relationships of welfare-authoritarianism. While the current leadership style has its problems, acknowledged by Brezhnev himself, it is difficult to conceive of the emergence of a radically different alternative, given the present complexity of Soviet social and economic life and the probable balance of political forces in the post-Brezhnev era. This judgment assumes, of course, that no foreign or domestic catastrophe impels a defensive reversion to Stalinist modes of totalitarian rule.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Whether the response to the inevitable, if less catastrophic, pressures for modernizing change falls at the liberal or conservative end of the welfare-authoritarian range—or, indeed, somewhere outside that range—will depend very much on external factors and the resulting perceptions of threat or opportunity on the part of the leaders who emerge in the post-Brezhnev succession.

How the Obkom Secretary Was Tempered

By T.H. Rigby

N.S. PATOLICHEV. *Ispytaniye na zrelost'* (Test of Maturity). Moscow, Izdatel'stvo Politicheskoy Literatury, 1977.

A.I. MIKOYAN. *V nachale dvadtsatykh* (In the Early Twenties). Moscow, Izdatel'stvo Politicheskoy Literatury, 1975.

LEONID IL'ICH BREZHNEV. *Vozrozhdeniye* (Rebirth). Moscow, Izdatel'stvo Politicheskoy Literatury, 1978.

FOR WESTERN analysts, unobscured glimpses into the closed world of the Soviet political elite have been all too few. Now, with the publication of these three volumes of reminiscences (Brezhnev's could more accurately be described as a brochure), the door to an important but little-known group within this elite—the provincial party bosses, that is, the first secretaries of the oblast party committees (obkoms)—has swung open a bit more widely. The analyst of Soviet affairs, by looking carefully and perceptively at the position and role of the obkom secretary as they emerge from such books as these, can gain a better understanding of the informal power relationships, prevalent attitudes, and standard behavior patterns at the oblast level and the ways in which these are linked to those of the central party apparatus.[1]

In the USSR, the obkom secretary is the top party official in the oblast, the principal administrative-territorial unit below the republic level. He wields extensive powers over both party and government, much in the manner of a regional satrap. Several (but not most) republics contain obkoms, but special interest attaches to the 72 obkom and kraykom (kray committee) first secretaries of the Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic (RSFSR) and, to a somewhat lesser extent, to the 26 such secretaries in the Ukrainian SSR, since from their ranks can be expected to come many of the top party officials of the 1980's.

In the case of the three men whose reminiscences are reviewed here, the experience as obkom secretary was a crucial career step, for each made the jump to the central party apparatus immediately or soon after his work at the oblast level. N.S. Patolichev (1908–), obkom secretary in Yaroslavl' Oblast from 1941 to 1945, was brought to Moscow in 1946 and placed in the first of a series of high party offices he was to hold; he is now the USSR Minister of Foreign Trade. A.I. Mikoyan (1905–78), gubkom secretary (secretary of the party's guberniya committee; the guberniya was the administrative-territorial unit that preceded the oblast) in Nizhniy Novgorod Guberniya (now Gor'kiy Oblast) from 1920 to 1922 and secretary of the Southeast Bureau in Rostov-on-Don from 1922 to 1926, subsequently served a rec-

[1] Apart from the books reviewed here, several other memoirs have issued from the pens of officials who have served as regional party leaders. The most interesting are A.S. Chuyanov, *Na stremnine veka: zapiski sekretarya obkoma* (On the Rapids of the Century: Notes of an Obkom Secretary), Moscow, Izdatel'stvo Politicheskoy Literatury, 1977; F.T. Morgun, *Khleb i lyudi* (Bread and People), 2nd ed., Moscow, Izdatel'stvo Politicheskoy Literatury, 1975; and N.N. Smelyakov, *S chego nachinayetsya Rodina: vospominaniya i razdum'ya* (Where the Homeland Begins: Reminiscences and Meditations), Moscow, Izdatel'stvo Politicheskoy Literatury, 1975.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ord term as Politburo member and deputy premier under both Yosif Stalin and Nikita Khrushchev. L.I. Brezhnev (1906–), *obkom* secretary in Zaporozh'ye Oblast from 1946 to 1947 and in Dnepropetrovsk Oblast from 1947 to 1950, has become the General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) and President of the USSR.

Each memoir reflects some of the difficulties of the genre. With few exceptions, elder statesmen everywhere tend to show themselves in the best possible light, reinterpreting events and highlighting, distorting, or suppressing the facts so as to enhance their own reputation. In the case of Soviet memoirs, there are no dissenting firsthand accounts available either from independent scholars and journalists or from the materials contained in the official archives. Furthermore, Soviet memoirists, no matter how eminent, do not escape the monopoly of the party propaganda authorities over the molding of public opinion. Thus, the unavoidable subjectivity of the memoirist himself is joined to a second layer of distortion, the distortion that stems from the Propaganda Department's current line on what people should know and believe, and it is rarely easy for the reader to sort out the one from the other.

Such difficulties, however, do not destroy the utility of Soviet memoirs as sources of information. Recent studies of the reminiscences of Soviet military commanders have proved this point.[2] Even the relatively meager and politically sensitive (as well as distortion-prone) memoirs of Soviet party and government officials can yield much of interest.

LIKE MOST current Soviet leaders, Nikolay Semënovich Patolichev owed the opportunity to demonstrate his "maturity" to the purges of the 1930's and to World War II. Early in 1938, during the final stage of the *Yezhovshchina* (the height of the Great Purge), Patolichev, a 30-year-old graduate of the Military Academy of Defense Against Chemical Warfare, was taken onto the staff of the Central Committee's Department of Leading Party Organs—either by lucky coincidence, as Patolichev represents it, or by shrewd calculation. Within a year, he had advanced to first secretary of the Yaroslavl' Obkom. His performance there in reorganizing the oblast for war—or was it the "pull" of his patron—earned him a transfer to Chelyabinsk Obkom, in a vitally important industrial region.

Some two thirds of Patolichev's memoirs covers his service in these two regional satrapies. The book breaks off with Patolichev's star at its zenith—in 1946, when after Patolichev has served a brief tenure as head of a Central Committee department, Stalin has made him a Central Committee secretary (replacing G.M. Malenkov) and a member of the Organizational Bureau (Orgburo). The failure of Patolichev to go on to even greater things was probably due in large part to the declining power of his patron, Politburo member A.A. Andreyev.

The second volume of Anastas Mikoyan's memoirs, *In the Early Twenties*, provides an instructive comparison with Patolichev's *Test of Maturity*, for it too covers a period, though some 20 years earlier, when its writer held successively two regional party secretaryships. Curiously, both Mikoyan and Patolichev turned up on foot to assume their first regional office, but the different circumstances provide a good measure of the changes over the intervening period. In 1920, Mikoyan gave no prior warning of his arrival and simply walked to his office from the station, an act that commanded no special attention (Mikoyan, p. 26). In 1939, Patolichev walked because his official chauffeur-driven car had broken down, and the ludicrousness of his arriving on foot to take up such an elevated post has since never ceased to amuse him (Patolichev, p. 82). Furthermore, Mikoyan quickly found that the Central Committee's "recommendation" did not guarantee election: indeed, it took him several months of intense struggle with the local party leadership to gain for himself the post for which Moscow had intended him. By Patolichev's time, "recommendation" and "election" had long since become practically synonymous.

The dominant preoccupations of the party regional secretaries underwent no less a change. In his first regional appointment, in the Nizhniy Novgorod Gubkom, Mikoyan was primarily engaged in political struggles within the party organization, that is, in breaking the power of the entrenched local clique (which had proved too much for his predecessor V.M. Molotov) and in battling with the supporters of Leon Trotsky and especially the Workers' Opposition. In his second appointment, as secretary of the Southeast Bureau, a regional office that covered the Rostov region, the Kuban', and the North Caucasus, all recently "liberated" from the White armies, he had to build up a core of reliable cadres in a predominantly hostile environment, breaking down localism and welding together a disciplined party machine. In both cases he had to build a following dependent on and

[2] See especially Seweryn Bialer, *Stalin and His Generals: Soviet Military Memoirs of World War II*, New York, NY, Pegasus, 1969.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

responsive to the party command in Moscow. One aspect of building such a following was extension of the party committees' control over the local organs of economic administration—clearly a touchy issue, whose resolution at the local level carried large implications for power relationships at the center. In 1922, when the People's Commissar for Food Supplies reprimanded his chief administrator in the Southeast Region for taking his cue from the regional party bureau rather than from the commissariat, Mikoyan countered by invoking the authority of the Central Committee (Mikoyan, p. 179).

By this time, the party machine was already greatly concerned with meeting grain delivery targets, but not until much later did it closely and directly involve itself in management of the economy generally. Direct involvement began with the First Five-Year Plan in the period 1928–32 and reached its height during World War II. This fact is strikingly illustrated by Patolichev's account, which mentions internal party matters only incidentally or as an afterthought and devotes scores of pages to the problems of industrial plants, raw material and fuel supplies, and rail transport.

IN BOTH Patolichev's and Mikoyan's volumes, the portraits of Yosif Stalin reflect the current emphasis on the positive. Stalin is thoughtful, farsighted, sensible, thoroughly master of the problems at hand, firm and clear in decision, and, in short, a rock of Leninism. How far this expresses the authors' true attitudes we can only guess, perhaps with more confidence in Patolichev's case than in Mikoyan's. It is what comes through *incidentally* that is interesting. For instance, Stalin summoned Mikoyan to Moscow in January 1922, before Stalin became General Secretary but when he, as the only Orgburo member with a seat on the Politburo, was already master of the central party machine (p. 140). Stalin's purpose was, first, to warn Mikoyan of the need to combat Trotsky's supporters in the regional party elections leading up to the forthcoming 11th Party Congress and, second, to dispatch Mikoyan to Siberia to convey instructions to the party leadership there to this end. Mikoyan was to pretend that his visit was for family reasons and to confide its real purpose only to M.M. Lashevich, Chairman of the Siberian Revolutionary Committee. Notwithstanding Mikoyan's (or is it his editor's?) singularly unconvincing effort to represent Stalin as acting with Lenin's blessing in this matter, the story gives an intriguing glimpse of the conspiratorial dimension of Stalin's relationships with his "Mafia" in this crucial phase of his rise to power.

Mikoyan's frequent references to his contacts with Stalin (pp. 193–94, 292, 349, 375, 378) are suggestive of a growing personal bond. Whether Stalin had a hand in Mikoyan's appointment to Nizhniy Novgorod in 1920—the decision was said to have been made by the Orgburo, of which Stalin was already a member, but the Secretariat was at that time dominated by Trotsky's supporters—it is clear that by early 1922 Mikoyan was in Stalin's confidence. To judge by Mikoyan's own account, the struggle of "platforms" in the elections of delegates to the 10th Party Congress in March 1921, elections in which support for Stalin meant support for Lenin and support for Lenin meant support for Stalin, was a crucial political experience for many Communist officials in the provinces, one that disposed them to place themselves under Stalin's mantle. This experience may indeed have influenced Mikoyan, whatever his previous view of his fellow Caucasian. By 1923, the political bond, at least, was clearly a close one, and Mikoyan was closeted with Stalin on January 21, 1924, when Bukharin rushed in to report that Lenin had died.

Patolichev's account of the post-purge years leaves no doubt as to Stalin's dictatorial power and the fear this power inspired in subordinates. This comes through clearly in Patolichev's recounting of a meeting in 1941 when Stalin gave him a dressing-down for failures in the Yaroslavl' Rubber Combine and declared he must be punished. Stalin was evidently playing with Patolichev, for he then "unexpectedly smiled and said, 'Patolichev must be put on a commission for working out a decision on the People's Commissariat for the Chemical Industry.'" Everyone, adds Patolichev, "breathed a sigh of relief" (pp. 84–85). Or did the representatives of the commissariat breathe a sigh of something other than relief?

Trepidation also comes through in Patolichev's account of a night in May 1946, when Stalin's personal secretary A.N. Poskrëbyshev called up to order him to appear at Stalin's Kremlin apartment immediately. When Patolichev was admitted to the Presence, he also found party secretaries A.A. Zhdanov and A.A. Kuznetsov there. "From the expression on Zhdanov's and Kuznetsov's faces I could see that the situation was calm, and my agitation gradually subsided" (p. 280). Stalin grilled Patolichev at length on how to improve the Central Committee's control over the regional party machine and then suddenly said: "and what if we make you a secretary of the Central Committee?" Stalin was pacing up and down as usual, and, when Stalin momentarily turned his back,

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Patolichev took the chance to glance to Zhdanov and Kuznetsov for guidance:

Zhdanov, smiling, threw his arms wide, as if to say, "you do the deciding yourself, you do the answering." Drawing level with me, Stalin said, "Well, say something." "Comrade Stalin, you decide whatever you think necessary," was my reply. After that, Stalin went to the telephone, and, dialing a number, presumably Poskrëbyshev's, he said: "Write down a second point in that Central Committee decision—to approve Comrade Patolichev as Secretary of the Central Committee." What the first point was I did not know. It became known only later. It stated that G.M. Malenkov was relieved of responsibilities as Secretary of the Central Committee. (p. 284)

Stalin's capacity well before this incident to decide even the highest-level appointments by fiat is something we may well take for granted, but there is precious little direct evidence of it. Consequently, accounts such as Patolichev's acquire no little historical value, since in the present climate in the Soviet Union it is reasonable to assume that Stalin would not be represented as more powerful than he really was.

One might cite other instances, both from Patolichev's book and from other personal accounts. In December 1941, for example, when Patolichev was transferred from the Yaroslavl' Obkom to the Chelyabinsk Obkom, he was not consulted in advance but simply instructed by telephone to appear in the Kremlin the next day. When he got there, Central Committee secretaries A.A. Andreyev and Zhdanov gave him his instructions but in so doing "cited Stalin's authority" (p. 165).

PATOLICHEV also provides abundant illustration of the importance of *svyazi* (connections) and patronage. If Mikoyan's "godfather" was Stalin, Patolichev's was apparently Andreyev, apart from Stalin the most important figure in the central party apparatus in the years after the Great Purge. It was Andreyev who took Patolichev up in 1938 and made him a Central Committee instructor, and it was Andreyev who evidently engineered Patolichev's appointment a year later as First Secretary of the Yaroslavl' Obkom. Several of Patolichev's references to Andreyev testify to the warmth of the bond that such relationships may forge. Thus on an occasion when Patolichev was summoned to the Kremlin:

In the morning I was informed in the Central Committee that Andrey Andreyevich Andreyev would talk with me in his office. My mood improved. We loved Andrey Andreyevich. . . . We young party workers of those years not infrequently copied Andrey Andreyevich in one way or another. In our opinion, he possessed the best qualities of the party official. We tried to develop them in ourselves. We also called him by his first name and patronymic. Our memory of Andrey Andreyevich preserves this warmth to the present day. (p. 98)

Patolichev writes of no other party leader in comparable terms.

Another instance of *svyazi* is worth citing. During the war, regional party leaders not only were given exceptionally heavy responsibilities for industry but also were expected to exercise an unprecedented autonomy of decision in this area. As a result, a premium was placed on horizontal collaborative relationships between regional party bosses, especially between the first secretaries of the several Urals and Siberian oblasts that produced most of the country's armaments. Referring to the party secretaries of these oblasts, Patolichev writes: "We discovered and employed every possibility for mutual assistance—telephone calls, telegrams, meetings, chats. This drew us together" (p. 171). It was no accident, then, that when Stalin asked Patolichev, in the abovementioned conversation in 1946 in the Kremlin, who he would like working under him as deputies in the newly formed Central Committee Directorate for Checking Party Organs, Patolichev named precisely three of these secretaries (p. 282). He also appointed V.A. Gogosov, who had worked under him in Yaroslavl' in the capacity of chairman of the soviet executive committee, as one of the powerful group of inspectors in the directorate (pp. 161–63).

The most pervasive impression built up by Patolichev is the oblast party secretary's enormous, if ill-defined power, on the one hand, and his utter dependence on the supreme power in Moscow, on the other. Patolichev takes personal responsibility for all sorts of major industrial decisions, often without clearing them with the relevant ministers, but when his personal fate is involved, he is completely in Stalin's hands and can only hope that his protectors in Stalin's entourage will dispose the dictator in his favor. In accord with current ideological guidelines, of course, he generally plays down the terror and repression, and he also cites incidents that show him as saving officials unjustly accused (pp. 67–68, 87–88). Presumably, he introduces these incidents both for the sake of his own reputation and to "demonstrate" that Stalin's terror machine was really not so bad, since its "excesses" could be

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

curbed by courageous and honest men. What actually comes through in these stories, though, is the personal helplessness of the victims of unjust charges and the extreme risks taken by even the most powerful officials who dared to intervene on their behalf.

One anecdote is particularly worthy of note, since it illustrates both these points and the vital importance of protection and patronage. It concerns L.P. Malkevich, Chief of the South Urals Railway, with whom Patolichev developed a close working and personal relationship out of the enormous wartime difficulties of rail transport and the critical importance of keeping industrial materials and war supplies moving. In 1942, Malkevich was awarded the Order of Lenin, but a few months later Patolichev was stunned by an order from Moscow to sack Malkevich and put him on trial. Patolichev, convinced that the charge was groundless, could nevertheless think of no formal action he could take, since the order was personally signed by Stalin. Moreover, he adds, "even today I do not know who could have introduced such an unjust proposal." He did get in touch with his protector Andreyev and also with General A.V. Khrulëv, who was both Commander in Chief of the Home Front and People's Commissar for Railways, who had been a comrade-in-arms of Patolichev's father during the Civil War, and who had had an emotional meeting with Patolichev junior at a Central Committee gathering in 1940 (pp. 3–4). Neither Andreyev nor Khrulëv could promise anything, yet a few days later Andreyev telephoned to rebuke Patolichev for being "soft-hearted" but at the same time to report that Malkevich's "punishment" had been mitigated—he was merely to be transferred to a lesser post in another oblast—and to warn Patolichev to offer no further objections. "There was nothing left for us but to express our thanks, which of course we did." Later, Patolichev contrived to have Malkevich restored to his former command of the South Urals Railway, and as a prima facie indication of their mutual loyalty it is worth recording that some three decades later, with Patolichev now Minister of Foreign Trade, Malkevich is Deputy Chairman of the State Committee on Foreign Economic Relations (pp. 218–25).

WHERE the memoirist happens to be L.I. Brezhnev, the problems of dealing with memoirs as a historical source are compounded, since the country's top leader will be concerned both to project the aura of his exemplary personality and to spare the mass audience any disturbing facts or thoughts.[3] The result is doubtlessly further pressure for distortion, concealment, and the smoothing of sharp edges.

Thus far, Brezhnev's efforts at autobiography have comprised three slim booklets. *The Little Land (Malaya Zemlya)* treats his experiences as a senior political officer in World War II; *Rebirth (Vozrozhdeniye)*, his experiences as an obkom first secretary in the postwar Ukraine; and *Virgin Land (Tselina)*, his experiences as party leader in Kazakhstan under Khrushchev. These publications will undoubtedly receive the extensive attention their author's position demands,[4] and here I wish simply to look at parts of the second booklet, namely, those parts that amplify points that emerge from Patolichev's and Mikoyan's accounts of their experiences as regional party bosses.

Despite the problems mentioned, even the memoirs of a General Secretary–President can yield revealing glimpses of the texture and mores of Soviet life. For example, when Brezhnev (or his ghostwriter) relates how he responded to a personal approach for help by a worker whose wife had lost the family ration cards (p. 20), his intention is no doubt to display his fatherly concern and humanity. What he conveys incidentally, however, is the ordinary person's utter dependence on the "humanity" of officials, and that a family of four had gone for almost a month without legal food supplies because no official below the oblast's top man had been able or willing to exercise such "humanity." In such cases, it is not the iconographic flourish but the background on which it is drawn that is informative, precisely because this background must be sufficiently familiar to Soviet readers if the iconography is to have any chance of impressing them.

Like Patolichev, Brezhev found his path to high office opened up by the *Yezhovshchina*, but his first taste of top leadership came with his appointment as first secretary of the Zaporozh'ye Obkom in August 1946. It was an appointment that would make or break his career. For more than two years after the expulsion of the Germans, Zaporozh'ye Oblast, whose industrial potential was vital to Moscow, had remained in an appalling condition of destruction, confusion, misery, and lawlessness, the essentials of which Brezhnev conveys fairly enough in a few laconic sentences (pp. 22, 46–47). Brezhnev's predecessor had been removed in disgrace, and Brezhnev

[3] The first edition of *Vozrozhdeniye* ran to 2 million copies.

[4] See Viktor Nekrasov, "Brezhnev the Writer, I," *Survey* (London), Autumn 1977–78, pp. 94–96; and Efim Etkind, "Brezhnev the Writer, II," ibid., pp. 97–108. For a brief independent account of Brezhnev's period in Zaporozh'ye, see John Dornberg, *Brezhnev: The Masks of Power*, London, Andre Deutsch, 1974, pp. 94–98.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

himself was to be threatened with a similar fate when the oblast's performance came under fire and Stalin had a "serious" talk with him on the telephone (p. 24). Brezhnev survived his "test of maturity," however, and in October 1947 he was promoted to first secretary of the neighboring, but even more important, Dnepropetrovsk Oblast, where he again stepped into the shoes of a purged predecessor. There he remained until 1950.

In comparing Patolichev's and Brezhnev's experiences as obkom first secretary, it is apparent that prewar and wartime patterns essentially carried over to the postwar period and that the smooth processes of "inner-party democracy" changed but little. Brezhnev learned he was to be first secretary of the Zaporozh'ye Obkom in a telephone call from Moscow, whence a Central Committee department head was dispatched to preside over his "election" (p. 6). The obkom first secretary continued to be answerable for and entitled to intervene in anything and everything that happened in the oblast (pp. 20, 24, 61). Nevertheless, his central concern remained economic performance, in Zaporozh'ye the reconstruction of the great Zaporozh'ye hydroelectric station and the Zaporozh'ye steelworks. Although the Central Committee was then making efforts to have local party officials unburden themselves of the petty details of industrial production, most of the incidents and conversations recounted in *Rebirth* relate to industrial problems, and for a time Brezhnev even shifted his office onto the premises of the Zaporozh'ye Construction Trust (p. 23). Hence the continued importance of the nexus with government ministers responsible for locally prominent branches of the economy and the premium placed on the first secretary's establishing good personal and working relations with such ministers (p. 36).

Brezhnev likewise provides further glimpses of the importance of informal relationships of mutual assistance and protection between officials and the frequent durability of patron-client bonds so forged at the oblast level. Brezhnev's no. 2 in the secretariat of the Zaporozh'ye Obkom was A.P. Kirilenko, the man who more than 30 years later serves as his no. 2 in the Secretariat of the Central Committee. The administrator of the Zaporozh'ye Construction Trust (where Brezhnev had his office for a time) was V.E. Dymshits, destined to hold key government office under Brezhnev. N.A. Tikhonov, like Brezhnev a graduate of the Dneprodzerzhinsk Metallurgical Institute and the man brought in to head the important Southern Pipe Plant in Nikopol' in Zaporozh'ye Oblast after his fellow alumnus took over the obkom, has recently been elevated to First Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers and since November 1979 has been a full member of the Politburo.

Tikhonov was also the central figure in an incident related by Brezhnev no doubt with the purpose of demonstrating his exemplary loyalty to his protégés—a quality highly valued by the middle and lower-level officials for whom his reminiscences probably are largely intended. On an inspection of Tikhonov's Nikopol' pipe plant, I.F. Tevosyan, the powerful Minister of Ferrous Metallurgy, who was accompanied by Brezhnev, berated the plant director for improperly diverting funds allocated to the improvement of the workers' facilities and for building a new road into the plant. It was a touchy moment. In those days industrial executives could lose their jobs and their liberty for lesser offenses, and Tevosyan had the power to bring ruin down upon the plant director. Brezhnev, instead of abandoning his subordinate to a "just" fate, sought first to ease the situation by quipping "yes, what a nice little dacha he's built for his personal use" (pp. 50–51). When Tevosyan remained unmollified, Brezhnev pointed out that without the road it would have been impossible to run a night shift. However embroidered this version of the incident may be, it reflects the larger truth that such acts of protection are the necessary ingredients of a durable bond of mutual support between patron and protégé in the Soviet system, no less so than in other political and bureaucratic structures.

THE REMINISCENCES reviewed here provide useful material on many other facets of the operation of the Soviet system apart from the role and position of the provincial party secretary, on which I have focused—a role and position that had their origins in the earliest years of the Soviet regime, that reached their full development under Stalin, and that remain essentially unchanged to the present day. Despite pitfalls, which I may not have entirely escaped, such memoirs can aid our understanding of how the Soviet system operates, and they are not simply to be dismissed with scorn as self-serving mendacity or disinformation by the Propaganda Department.

Reading the recollections of elder statesmen about their experiences as obkom secretaries reminds us, too, that tomorrow's top leaders will probably be drawn in large part from today's obkom secretaries. Are they likely to prove leaders of a different cast from their predecessors? Not very different, in my view. Their style and at-

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

titudes will certainly have been affected by the fact that they will have spent more of their careers under the calmer rule of Brezhnev than under the murderous rule of Stalin and the turbulent rule of Khrushchev. Many will have enjoyed a better formal education. But the political and administrative skills through which they are now demonstrating their "maturity" and suitability for top office are essentially those developed by the Patolichevs and Brezhnevs of the 1940's and 1950's.

That this is so, in turn, is because the *role* of the obkom first secretary remains essentially the same. It is at his desk that the "buck" still stops, especially, as before, in economic matters but also if the problem is one of education, housing, personnel, security, or anything else. And the obkom first secretary still operates within *both* a formal network of political and administrative structures that is today even more like the formal network established under Stalin than the network of 15 or 20 years ago, *and* an informal network whose norms of protection, mutual cover-up, and mutual support against rival informal networks remain those in which today's Politburo members were nurtured.[5] In the Soviet Union, too—and perhaps more than in many other countries—the past continues to illuminate the future.

[5] For a different view on some of the issues raised here, see Jerry F. Hough, "The Generation Gap and the Brezhnev Succession," *Problems of Communism* (Washington, DC), July–August 1979, pp. 1–16. See also T.H. Rigby, "The Soviet Regional Leadership: The Brezhnev Generation," *Slavic Review* (Urbana, IL), March 1978, pp. 1–24.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Religion and Nationalism in the USSR and China

By Dennis J. Dunn

RICHARD C. BUSH, JR. *Religion in Communist China.* Nashville, TN, and New York, NY, Abingdon Press, 1970.

V. STANLEY VARDYS. *The Catholic Church, Dissent and Nationality in Soviet Lithuania.* New York, NY, Columbia University Press, 1978.

HARRY G. SHAFFER. *The Soviet Treatment of Jews.* New York, NY, Praeger, 1974.

OTTO LUCHTERHANDT. *Der Sowjetstaat und die Russisch-Orthodoxe Kirche* (The Soviet State and the Russian Orthodox Church). Köln, Verlag Wissenschaft und Politik, 1976.

CHRISTEL LANE. *Christian Religion in the Soviet Union: A Sociological Study.* Albany, NY, State University of New York Press, 1978.

RELIGION PLAYS a role of singular importance in the Soviet Union and in parts, at least, of the People's Republic of China (PRC). Yet, the West has failed to give it its due. There are few Western works on the subject, and few knowledgeable specialists, no more than a few dozen. It is hardly surprising, then, that many scholars conclude, as Walter Laqueur did for the Soviet Union, that religion has not been a major factor in these Communist states.[1]

One reason for such inattention is not hard to discern: reliable information about the role of religion is difficult to come by. In Communist systems, where the church is routinely persecuted and churchgoers are subjected to discrimination or worse, there is almost no direct evidence on the issue. It hardly needs saying that the findings of Soviet "opinion polls" on this question are dubious, that there are no reliable figures on church membership or church attendance, and that the Communist press treats religion tendentiously.

In most cases, therefore, those who study religion in the Communist states must resort to a variety of more subtle approaches. The *samizdat* literature has given some indication of the part religion plays in the mounting dissident movement, and well-publicized stories about religious dissidents appear from time to time. But it is hard to tell how representative this literature and these figures are of broader religious currents. One gauge, perhaps as revealing as any other, is the time and effort—in the form of antireligious propaganda, museums of atheism, surveillance, and outright persecution—that the various Communist regimes spend in an attempt to undercut the appeals of religion. All too often, though, the researcher must rely on his own impressions, on chance conversations, and on secondhand accounts, any of which may or may not be accurate.

In a matter so private and so difficult to measure as religion, then, it is extremely hard to gain some appreciation of the depth to which religion is rooted in the societies of the Communist states and some appreciation of the ways in which religion might manifest itself in any given set of circumstances. Even in the West—one is compelled to add—where there are no institutional impediments to research on the church and religion, scholars can still disagree on the meaning of, say, declining church attendance and thus on the status of religion in general.

In any case, the most objectionable approach to the question is to argue by analogy—that is, to argue that since modernization in the West has led to the decline of religion (itself a debatable point) and since the USSR and PRC are "modern" states, religion has been on the decline in the USSR and

---

[1] *The New York Times Review of Books*, Feb. 28, 1971. To take another example, Paul Hollander maintains that "religious values do not govern or significantly affect the life of the majority in either" the Soviet Union or the United States because both are "modern, urban, industrial societies." Paul Hollander, *Soviet and American Society: A Comparison*, New York, NY, Oxford University Press, 1973, pp. 186–87.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PRC. The analogy simply does not hold. If "modernization" means industrialization, urbanization, reliance on advanced technology and science, and the emergence of political, philosophical, and other values and ideas (often in a form altered by the indigenous culture) conducive to these processes—including the concept of separation of church and state—then the USSR and PRC are not "modern" in the full sense of the word.[2] And even if they are "modern" in at least some senses, it does not necessarily follow that religion in the two countries has declined. To conclude that religion has so declined is to accept an unproved assumption based on an unproved premise.

IF RELIGION is a powerful force in both the USSR and PRC, one of the principal reasons is that it is a primary source of nationalism throughout the Eurasian region. In Western Europe, nationalism for the most part was and is secular and anticlerical. In Eastern Europe and Asia, it was and is inextricably linked with religion. In the case of the Russians, as Nicolas Berdyaev aptly put it, the "profession of the true, the Orthodox Faith, was the test of belonging to the Russian kingdom."[3] By the same token, Lithuanian, Jewish, or Kazakh nationalism is inseparable from Catholicism, Judaism, or Islam, respectively. This crucial difference between West and East is often overlooked.

True to the traditions of the East, the USSR and PRC are multinational empires with a fundamental interest in forging homogeneous societies and eliminating national differences among their subject peoples. Because religion underlies many of the fissiparous minority nationalisms in both empires, Moscow and Beijing have adopted antireligious policies, promoting Marxism-Leninism as a kind of secular religion in an attempt to overcome the divisive religions of the peoples scattered on and around the Eurasian plain and in the hope, by so doing, of eroding these minority nationalisms. The Communist regime in the USSR does not officially promote russification, and the Communist regime in China does not officially promote sinicization. If either one did so, it would be clearly marked as a reactionary imperialist and colonialist. Instead, under the guise of Marxism-Leninism, both governments attack the religious base of minority nationalism. This policy allows them to diminish minority nationalism and still maintain the important propaganda argument that they are "modernizing" regimes.

In the Soviet Union, this approach has not been without paradox. Reliance upon Marxism-Leninism has led to attacks on Russian Orthodoxy and has thus hurt Russian nationalism. The paradox has yet to be resolved, but in recent years, since the removal of Nikita Khrushchev, the Kremlin has seemed to favor clearing up the paradox by opposing all religion in theory and by attacking primarily the minority religions in practice. The problem is made all the more pressing because the minorities in the Soviet Union are growing and now constitute more than 50 percent of the country's total population.

It is clear, then, that in both countries religion has implications for majority nationalism far different from the implications it has for minority nationalism. This fact is abundantly illustrated in the various books under review here.

THE PRC's problem with minority religions and minority nationalisms is less acute than that of the USSR. In fact, China is ethnically an almost homogeneous society, in which the minorities account for only 6 percent of the total population. The minorities are important, though, because they are located in China's strategic borderlands, particularly in the sensitive region of Xinjiang. Richard C. Bush, in *Religion in Communist China,* attempts to provide a general survey of what happened to the major religions of China between 1949 and 1969. Because of the lack of primary sources, his work is inevitably incomplete, but it is clear that Islam is still a force among the country's Turkic peoples, that Lamaism remains strong in Tibet, and that Buddhism and Confucianism persist among the Chinese. Christianity, to be sure, always identified as a foreign religion, seems to have suffered grievously, but even Christianity might revive as the Chinese begin once again to open themselves to Western influence. Since the Chinese are such a majority and since they have had some success in sinicizing certain minorities, such as the Chuang, they may in the future feel a decreasing need for Marxism-Leninism as an ideological cement. The Muslim proples of Xinjiang, however, will remain a significant problem.

In a pioneering work on the crucial relationship between religion and minority nationalism in the Soviet Union, V. Stanley Vardys, in *The Catholic Church, Dissent and Nationality in Soviet Lithuania,* presents a fascinating case study

[2]For a good definition of the concept of modernization, see Cyril E. Black et al., *The Modernization of Japan and Russia,* New York, NY, The Free Press, 1975.

[3]Nicolas Berdyaev, *The Origin of Russian Communism,* Ann Arbor, MI, University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor Paperbacks, 1960, p. 10.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

of Soviet nationality policy and the symbiotic relationship between religion and nationalism in Lithuania.[4] Moscow's ultimate goal in Lithuania is surely dissolution of the Lithuanian nationality as such, and to this end it has mounted a relentless attack on the Catholic Church, which lies at the heart of Lithuanian nationalism. The means of attack are many and varied. The Soviets continue to close churches, keep the number of places in the only remaining theological seminary in Kaunas below replacement needs, refuse to fill episcopal vacancies, control church communications, interfere in personnel assignments, cultivate a collaborationist clergy, isolate the church from the Vatican, and arrest priests, "illegal" nuns, and active laymen.

For their part, the Lithuanians know that their church is crucial to their identity and cohesiveness as a nation, and they are determined to protect their church and their nation against all Soviet forays. Of course, the struggle is uneven, for the Soviets have all the coercive powers on their side. All the same, the Lithuanians have thus far managed to defend themselves, by means as numerous and varied as Moscow uses against them. Since 1972 they have persisted in publishing *The Chronicle of the Catholic Church in Lithuania,* an underground journal that serves as an inspiration to Lithuanian nationalists and dutifully reports Soviet attacks against the church to the outside world. They have also mounted significant campaigns petitioning the Soviet government to abide by its own legislation, to halt arbitrary interpretations of religious laws, and to curtail all forms of religious persecution. Small underground convents also persevere in Lithuania, in which "illegal" nuns do most of the work in providing the young with a religious education. As in other areas of the Soviet Union, the socialization of the young has continued as the central arena of confrontation between the church and the atheist government.

The Lithuanians have been quite disturbed by a recent Soviet tactic, that of appealing to the Vatican to lessen its support for the besieged Lithuanian Catholics. This tactic seemed to enjoy some success when Pope Paul VI was still alive, but it is doubtful that the present Pope, Karol Wojtyla, the former Archbishop of Krakow, will be persuaded to neglect the Lithuanians. After years of successful resistance to Stalinism in Poland, Pope John Paul II seems to believe that it would be a fundamental mistake to appease Moscow on any issue regarding Lithuania without obtaining in return a concrete guarantee for the security and well-being of the Lithuanian church and nation.

In *The Soviet Treatment of Jews,* Harry G. Shaffer takes up the issues of antisemitism and Zionism. His book is not an analytical, definitive study of these issues, but is simply an attempt to put into perspective the wide diversity of views regarding the policy of the Soviet government toward the Soviet Jews. His conclusion is that although there is "no rampant anti-Semitism in the Soviet Union today," the Soviet government is a steadfast opponent of Zionism and expects Soviet Jews to dissociate themselves from Zionism. It opposes Zionism for a number of reasons, but primarily, as in the case of Lithuanian nationalism, because it considers Zionism centrifugal and divisive in terms of the cohesiveness of the USSR.

In its campaign against Jewish nationalism, Moscow attacks Zionism, just as in its drive against Lithuanian nationalism, it strikes out at the Catholic Church. It thereby once more underscores the degree to which religion and nationalism in the USSR sustain each other. Indeed, it may be argued that if Soviet policies toward Soviet Jews are not rampantly antisemitic, at least to the degree to which Soviet policies in Lithuania are opposed to Lithuanian nationalism, it is because the Jewish religion in the USSR is weaker than the Catholic Church is in Lithuania and, thus, less of a barrier to the assimilation of Jews into Soviet society.

Otto Luchterhandt's *Der Sowjetstaat und die Russisch-Orthodoxe Kirche* is the first reliable book on Soviet legislation on religion and the effects of that legislation. It treats the entire corpus of such legislation since 1917, analyzing the origins, meaning, and intentions of the legislation as well as the lacunae in the legislation. The author, trained in jurisprudence, is aware that legislation on religion is always subservient to state policy in the Soviet Union and that the state disregards and violates its own laws when it has no interest in following the law. At the same time, he correctly emphasizes the importance of the legislation itself. To be sure, the Soviet Union's progressive legislation, including a rather liberal constitution, which allows freedom of conscience, is but a facade. On various occasions, however, the published laws have proved to be

[4] Apart from the present work by Vardys, the only significant books on the question of religion and minority nationalism in the Soviet Union are several works by the late Walter Kolarz. See, for example, *Religion in the Soviet Union,* London, Macmillan, 1961. Essays on various aspects of the subject by such scholars as Bohdan Bociurkiw and Alexandre Bennigsen are important. See Dennis J. Dunn, Ed., *Religion and Modernization in the Soviet Union,* Boulder, CO, Westview Press, 1977.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

important. For example, the dissidents have been able to use the law as a means of judging just how far they can go and as a means of pressuring the Kremlin to curb its arbitrariness whenever the Kremlin has wanted to court Western public opinion.

Luchterhandt concludes that Soviet legislation and policy on religion have much in common with the Josephinism of the 18th century, although he stresses that the Soviets make supremist claims well beyond those ever made by Joseph II of Austria. In effect, the Soviets have separated the church from the state but have not freed the church of the state. The book makes a strong case for those who would maintain that the Soviet Union, with its persecution of religion and repression of minority nationalism, is in many ways a continuation of autocratic, tsarist Russia.

Christel Lane's *Christian Religion in the Soviet Union* deals directly, from a sociological point of view, with the impact of Soviet rule on all the major Christian religious groups in the USSR—namely, Russian Orthodoxy, the Orthodox sects, Catholicism, Lutheranism, the Baptist church, and the small Protestant sects, with the exception of Georgian Orthodoxy, Armenian Orthodoxy, and the illegal Uniate Catholic Church in the Ukraine. Relying primarily upon Soviet sources, she concludes that religion has declined dramatically in the USSR, although she refrains from saying, because of the lack of reliable evidence, whether this is the result primarily of the socialist nature of Soviet society or the inevitable consequence of a society caught up in modernization. She maintains, furthermore, that religion in the USSR has changed in ways similar to the ways in which it has changed in the contemporary West, although she also admits that the USSR's rate of development, its atheistic policies, its socialist institutions, and its politics, especially during the Stalin era, have produced differences as well.

In light of her reliance on Soviet sources, it is not surprising that Lane concludes that Christianity has declined in the Soviet Union. Despite her pessimism, though, she has written a work of some merit. Apart from the works of Stephen and Ethel Dunn, her book is the first serious sociological study of the Christian religion in the USSR. Lane clearly recognizes the affinity between religion and nationalism, and, quite importantly, she frequently draws attention to characteristics of Soviet society that she concludes resemble traits of late medieval society. Indeed, with its collectivized farms, its one-party government, and its official policy of atheism, the USSR is more than fleetingly reminiscent of the Russia of, say, Catherine II—with its peasant communes, its authoritarian government, and its support for Orthodoxy—more so than it is of modern developed societies.[5]

THE AUTHORS of all these books on the Soviet Union write from different perspectives—Vardys from the standpoint of the political scientist, Shaffer from that of the scholar of Soviet Jewish affairs, Luchterhandt from that of the legal scholar, and Lane from that of the sociologist. In the end, though, they come, explicitly or implicitly, to a common conclusion. That is, they draw a picture of the USSR as a feudal, patriarchal society. The Bolsheviks, after all, were not the purveyors of "modernization." In some sense, they turned the clock back, particularly with regard to the emergence of pluralism and religious tolerance in Russia. The PRC is likewise hardly a bastion of free inquiry. At the moment, both states resemble premodern regimes, a fact they themselves cannot fail to grasp as they scramble to gain access to Western science and technology.

[5]Franz Cardinal Koenig made precisely this point in a widely cited article, in *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* (Frankfurt), Aug. 16, 1975.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Perception and Misperception in US-Soviet Relations

By William Potter

MORTON SCHWARTZ. *Soviet Perceptions of the United States.* Berkeley, CA, University of California Press, 1978.

NIKOLAI V. SIVACHEV and NIKOLAI N. YAKOVLEV. *Russia and the United States: U.S.-Soviet Relations from the Soviet Point of View.* Chicago, IL, University of Chicago Press, 1979.

EUGENE ANSCHEL, Ed. *American Appraisals of Soviet Russia, 1917–1977.* Metuchen, NJ, Scarecrow Press, 1978.

FRED WARNER NEAL, Ed. *Detente or Debacle: Common Sense in U.S.-Soviet Relations.* New York, NY, W.W. Norton, 1979.

US SENATE, COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS. *Perceptions: Relations Between the United States and the Soviet Union.* Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1978.

SOCIAL SCIENTISTS interested in misperception have long been fascinated by Soviet and American images of each other. Faulty perceptions by the political elite of the two countries have been cited by various scholars as responsible for the deterioration of US-Soviet relations after World War II, the escalation of the nuclear arms race, and the persistence of most outstanding international political issues. It has even been alleged that the Soviet Union's distorted picture of the United States is curiously similar to the American image of the Soviet Union and that this bleak "mirror image" may be self-perpetuating.[1]

The books reviewed here do not dispel the impression that misperceptions continue to bedevil US-Soviet relations. However, they do indicate that Western Sovietologists now have sophisticated counterparts in the Soviet Union who can, and occasionally do, portray the United States in realistic terms. The volumes under review also point up a number of major methodological and substantive shortcomings in existing research on the perceptions of the Soviet elite.

A FREQUENT CAUSE of misperception is the lack of adequate information and of opportunity to check perceptions against reality. This constraint can make it very difficult even for sensitive observers to comprehend phenomena which they themselves have never experienced. Such was the case, for example, in the United States between the two world wars, when university, governmental, and foundation support for the study of the Soviet Union was absent. Although certain gifted journalists such as William Henry Chamberlin and Louis Fischer "sporadically discovered Russia for Americans,"[2] the state of American perspectives on the Soviet Union in the pre–World War II period is probably not inaccurately characterized by a story about an elderly New England lady. She asked a Russian émigré whether it were true that Russians still rode bears—and received the reply that those who used to ride bears probably still did so.

Constraints on access to information and restrictions on foreign travel have been an even greater problem for Soviet American watchers. Morton Schwartz's study of *Soviet Perceptions of the United States* shows, however, that this situation has improved markedly since the establishment of the USA Institute in November 1967. According to the first issue of the Institute publication, *SShA,* a central task for Soviet *amerikanisty* was the "comprehensive, profound, and concrete study of the economics and politics of the United

[1] See, for example, Urie Bronfenbrenner, "The Mirror Image in Soviet-American Relations: A Social Psychologist's Report," *Journal of Social Issues* (Ann Arbor, MI), 1961, pp. 45–57.

[2] The expression is Philip E. Mosely's. See his essay "The Growth of Russian Studies," in Harold H. Fisher, Ed., *American Research on Russia,* Bloomington, IN, Indiana University Press, 1959, p. 1.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

States of America." Schwartz's careful study suggests that although the results of contemporary Soviet research on America are uneven and these writings still employ Marxist-Leninist ideology and imagery, they present an increasingly sophisticated and realistic picture of the United States.

Schwartz discerns a number of fundamental changes in Soviet scholarly perceptions. Perhaps the most far-reaching is the view that "the United States is a declining threat to the basic security interests of the USSR" (p. 157). To the extent that this view is acknowledged in other treatments of Soviet perceptions, it is usually considered to reflect not a change in Soviet thinking about the political outlook of American decision-makers, but only a conviction that a change in the "correlation of forces" has compelled the US to adopt the less threatening policy of détente.[3] Such an interpretation is consistent with the phenomenon noted by students of misperception for actors to exaggerate the degree of their own influence in shaping the behavior of others when the behavior corresponds to their own desires.[4] But Schwartz argues persuasively that a more profound revision has taken place in traditional Soviet perspectives on the predatory nature of capitalist society. No longer are the majority of American corporations regarded as having a vested interest in continued international tension and a prolonged arms race (pp. 19–23). Moreover, Schwartz points out, no longer are common "class interests" assumed to explain policy positions among an increasingly heterogeneous "'ruling class'" (p. 38). "The underlying 'motive forces' of American foreign policy are recognized to be more differentiated than originally assumed" (p. 156). Schwartz also maintains that Soviet Americanists view the US traumas of the 1960's, especially the calamitous war in Vietnam, as in large part accounting for the weakening of the ideological base of US foreign policy and the Nixon administration's decision to move from an "era of confrontation to an era of negotiations" with the Soviet Union (p. 28).

More surprising, given the legacy of Soviet disavowals of any responsibility for international tension, is Schwartz's finding that some Soviet scholars now even acknowledge the role of *mutual* misperceptions as an obstacle to better US-Soviet relations. Schwartz cites, for example, one analyst's recognition that "decades of enmity and confrontation created in the West *as well as in the East* tenacious stereotyped views of the other side" (p. 155, Schwartz's emphasis). In addition, he notes Georgiy Arbatov's view that anti-Communist sentiments in the West were, in part, a reaction to Soviet intellectual dogmatism (p. 156). More generally, he discerns an awareness on the part of Soviet Americanists "that the image of the USSR held in the United States . . . is directly affected by Soviet behavior" (p. 144).

The contributors to *SShA*, to be sure, vary considerably in their objectivity and political sophistication. Furthermore, there appear to remain certain aspects of American politics and society which confuse even the most astute Soviet Americanists. Schwartz observes, for instance, that Soviet analysts seem unable to comprehend the principles of limited government and the rule of law or the concern Americans express regarding the morality of public leaders (pp. 46–47). This difficulty may help explain Soviet interpretations of the Watergate affair and President Richard M. Nixon's resignation as the outcome of a conspiracy by the "enemies of détente." The disdain or disregard of the constitutional issues involved in such interpretations may likewise reflect the more general tendency of Soviet analysts to project characteristics of the Soviet political environment upon the American scene.[5]

The overall impression conveyed by Schwartz of a cadre of better informed and less dogmatic Soviet Americanists unfortunately is not reinforced by *Russia and the United States*, the work of two senior Soviet scholars, Nikolai Sivachev and Nikolai Yakovlev. Their account of Russian-American relations since 1776, written for an American audience, indicates that the relatively subtle Soviet perceptions of the United States noted by Schwartz may not be widely shared. One reads, for example, that the Soviet-Nazi nonaggression pact was a brilliant anti-fascist stratagem which "wrecked both the immediate plans of Axis powers and the anti-Soviet calculations of the Munichites" (p. 123); that the US made a minimal contribution to the Allied effort in World War II, including the war with Japan, where "the use of the atomic bomb was of no significance" (p. 209); and that the exemplary "efforts of the USSR in the matter of ensuring interna-

[3] See Stephen Gibert, *Soviet Images of America*, New York, NY, Crane, Russak & Co., 1977, p. 142; and R. Judson Mitchell, "A New Brezhnev Doctrine: The Restructuring of International Relations," *World Politics* (Princeton, NJ), April 1978, pp. 366–90.

[4] See, for example, Robert Jervis, *Perception and Misperception in International Politics*, Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 1976, p. 343.

[5] This notion of projection is developed in Paul Hollander, *Soviet and American Society*, New York, NY, Oxford University Press, 1973, pp. 26–29. See also Schwartz, p. 88.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tional peace were crowned with success" in the Cuban missile crisis (p. 244). These are a sample of the kind of historical interpretations that encourage some analysts in the West to contend that Soviet research on American history is of value primarily to psychologists interested in the phenomena of selective inattention and paranoia.[6] Most conspicuous by its absence in this Soviet volume is the slightest recognition of Soviet (or Russian) responsibility for any problem in the course of American relations with Russia and the Soviet Union since 1776. The two authors even attempt to debunk an interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine as an American response to Russian expansionism and claim that "it must be admitted that the Monroe Doctrine resulted above all from the expansionist activity of the American bourgeoisie and plantation owners clashing with the English bourgeoisie. . ." (p. 8).

As previously noted, prior to World War II the caliber of American scholarship on and the accuracy of American perceptions of the Soviet Union also left much to be desired. A good selection of the writings of some of the more perceptive early interpreters of the Soviet Union is included in Eugene Anschel's anthology of *American Appraisals of Soviet Russia, 1917–1977*. The volume is organized around the theme of continuity and change, with a special emphasis on the antecedents of the Soviet system and the effects of the industrializing process on the Soviet regime. Although the brevity of most of the entries and an excessive number of topics detract from the focus of the volume, the format that Anschel adopts succeeds in illustrating both the evolution of American thinking about Soviet Russia and the continuity and change in many dimensions of Soviet society.

The contributors to *Detente or Debacle*, edited by Fred Warner Neal for the Committee on East-West Accord, are more inclined to emphasize the changes rather than the continuity in Soviet society since Yosif Stalin's death. They are particularly critical of the failure of American perceptions to keep pace with these changes and worry lest cold war attitudes and misperceptions stand in the way of improved US-Soviet relations. The articles, for the most part, are of high quality, although their journalistic style and emphasis on policy advocacy may diminish their interest to scholars. Particularly noteworthy are Sidney Drell's excellent discussion of criteria for assessing US and Soviet arms control policy and Stephen Cohen's useful summary of the nature of Soviet politics and its implications for US-Soviet relations.

A much more diverse collection of recent Western perceptions of the Soviet Union is provided in *Perceptions: Relations Between the United States and the Soviet Union*. This study, commissioned by the Committee on Foreign Relations of the US Senate, consists of 79 brief essays on 15 topics designed to reveal important Soviet attitudes, objectives, and capabilities, as well as US policy responses. The essays respond to specific questions posed by the Committee and generally do not present much in the way of new research findings. However, the structure of the volume facilitates a useful scholarly dialogue on a large number of narrowly defined topics.

THE CONTRASTING images of Soviet scholarship suggested in the two studies by Schwartz and Sivachev-Yakovlev and the very different appraisals of Soviet attitudes and intentions discussed by contributors to the three other books under review highlight the difficulty of accurately assessing Soviet perspectives. They also indicate a number of more general problems with research in the area of Soviet perceptions.

Perhaps the most obvious shortcoming is the absence of any systematic study of Soviet perceptions which is not severely restricted in terms of the issues examined or the sources surveyed. For example, there exists no published study for the post-Khrushchev period that is comparable in breadth to William Zimmerman's penetrating but dated analysis of *Soviet Perspectives on International Relations*.[7]

More recent studies of Soviet perspectives also tend to be negligent about specifying the procedures used to collect and sort out Soviet views or the extent to which the views have changed over time. Neither Stephen Gibert's recent study of *Soviet Images of America* nor Schwartz's superior analysis provides a conceptual framework or even explicit criteria for sorting out Soviet pronouncements and assessing their relative importance. Because no data on frequency of expression of various viewpoints are provided, an opportunity to assess the representativeness of the views cited is lost. The failure to pay careful attention to the time periods under analysis likewise contributes to a form of selective

[6] A rationale for this perspective is given by Robert Allen in the introduction to Leo Okinshevich's bibliography on *U.S. History and Historiography in Post-War Soviet Writings, 1945–1970*, Santa Barbara, CA, ABC Clio Press, 1976, p. xiv. The precedents for historical misrepresentation apparent in the Sivachev-Yakovlev volume are discussed at length in John Keep and Liliana Brisby, Eds., *Contemporary History in the Soviet Mirror*, New York, NY, Praeger, 1964.

[7] William Zimmerman, *Soviet Perspectives on International Relations, 1956–1967*, Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 1969.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

inattention reflected in the stance of the American Soviet expert who, when questioned about the possibility of significant change taking place in the Soviet Union, responded: "It won't happen—but if it does, I'll be sure to miss it."[8]

An additonal problem is the lack of attention generally given to the function(s) that particular Soviet statements are intended to perform and the audience to which they are addressed. Some Soviet political analysts themselves acknowledge, for example, that public pronouncements can play a dual role. According to Alexander Bovin, "The verbal expression of policy . . . either reflects real political interests and intentions, or, conversely, is called upon to conceal these interests and intentions."[9] There is reason to believe that Soviet public statements also perform a variety of more specific mobilization, socialization, and legitimation functions.[10] Statements may thus be made which bear little correspondence to actual Soviet perceptions.

Although there is no simple means to avoid this problem, difficulties can be minimized if account is taken of the context within which statements are made, the constancy over time of views expressed, and the consistency of perceptions among various actors and across different publishing outlets.[11] A highly useful study, for example, would be the systematic comparison of Soviet views on strategic doctrine and arms control policy expressed in *International Affairs, SShA,* and *Mirovaya ekonomika i mezhdunarodnyye otnosheniya*—sources sometimes discounted as propaganda mills for Western audiences—with perceptions discerned in recently declassified volumes of *Voennaya mysl'*. In fact, one of the more astute students of Soviet military policy, who has examined both classified and public Soviet writings, suggests that there may not be much discrepancy between the two in terms of the views expressed.[12] Significantly different perspectives, on the other hand, may well exist among representatives of research institutes and party-government organizations having different functional roles. For example, Philip Stewart and Elizabeth Kirk report a sharp contrast in positive orientation toward international security and arms control issues for the 1969–76 period between former Soviet Defense Minister Andrey Grechko and Foreign Minister Andrey Gromyko.[13]

Finally, there is a compelling need in research on Soviet perceptions to address the issue of the correspondence or lack of correspondence between Soviet perceptions and actual Soviet behavior. As one astute observer notes, this approach would theoretically be the optimal test of inferences drawn from public statements.[14] Too often in practice, however, the "test" takes the form of selectively quoting Soviet sources to bolster an interpretation based upon prior conceptions of Soviet behavior.[15] What is needed instead is a comparison of independent indicators of perceptions and behavior.

THERE IS little evidence in the books reviewed here or in the larger body of research on US and Soviet perceptions with which this reviewer is familiar that either Soviet or American analysts are yet willing or able to remove their perceptual blinders or to agree on what constitutes "the facts." Nevertheless, the apparent growth in the number of relatively astute observers of the American scene in the Soviet Union is an encouraging sign that even long-held misperceptions are subject to change and correction. It is to be hoped that as Soviet (and American) specialists become more sensitive to alternative explanations and images, the amount of information and time necessary for such learning to occur will diminish.

[8] Cited by Alexander Dallin, "Biases and Blunders in American Studies on the USSR," *Slavic Review* (Columbus, OH), September 1973, p. 561.

[9] *Izvestiya* (Moscow), Oct. 30, 1973, p. 4, cited by Schwartz, p. 6.

[10] These purposes are discussed in Paul Marantz, "American and Soviet Perceptions of Each Other's World Role: Some Methodological Considerations," paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association, Toronto, Mar. 22, 1979, pp. 2–3.

[11] This is the approach adopted by Philip Stewart and Elizabeth Kirk in probably the most ambitious and promising study of Soviet perceptions now under way. For a preliminary report on their project, see "Understanding Soviet Elite Perceptions of East-West Relations: A New Approach and Preliminary Findings," paper presented at the Conference on Kremlinology, Michigan State University, East Lansing, MI, May 11–12, 1979.

[12] See Raymond Garthoff, "Mutual Deterrence and Strategic Arms Control in Soviet Policy," *International Security* (Cambridge, MA), Summer 1978, pp. 112–47.

[13] Stewart and Kirk, pp. 22–23.

[14] Marantz, p. 12.

[15] Alexander Dallin (loc. cit., p. 566) suggests that quotation mongering is an addiction American Soviet specialists have acquired from their Soviet counterparts.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

GDR Foreign Policy

By John M. Starrels

JONATHAN STEELE. *Inside East Germany*. New York, NY, Urizen Books, 1977.

JÜRGEN RADDE. *Die aussenpolitische Führungselite der DDR* (The Foreign Policy Leadership Elite of the GDR). Köln, Verlag Wissenschaft und Politik, 1976.

ANITA DASBACH-MALLINCKRODT. *Wer macht die Aussenpolitik der DDR?* (Who Makes the Foreign Policy of the GDR?). Düsseldorf, Droste Verlag, 1972.

MELVIN CROAN. *East Germany: The Soviet Connection*. Beverly Hills, CA, and London, Sage Publications, 1976.

N. EDWINA MORETON. *East Germany and the Warsaw Alliance: The Politics of Detente*. Boulder, CO, Westview Press, 1978.

PETER C. LUDZ. *Die DDR zwischen Ost und West* (The GDR Between East and West). München, C.H. Beck, 1977.

HERMANN WEBER. *Die SED nach Ulbricht* (The SED After Ulbricht). Hannover, Fackelträger Verlag, 1974.

HANS SIEGFRIED LAMM and SIEGFRIED KUPPER. *DDR und Dritte Welt* (The GDR and the Third World). München and Wien, R. Oldenbourg, 1976.

LYMAN H. LEGTERS, Ed. *The German Democratic Republic*. Boulder, CO, Westview Press, 1978.

THE CONTEMPORARY situation of East Germany is a good illustration of what it means to have to conduct both a domestic and a foreign policy without the protective garb of the traditional nation-state. Dependent upon Moscow's good graces in a constant search to legitimize its existence, maintain its political status quo and economic stability domestically, and secure the integrity of its territory, the German Democratic Republic (GDR) is confronted with the difficult task of satisfying the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Treaty Organization while simultaneously contending with the nationalism of the Federal Republic of Germany and seeking to establish and further its own "national" goals. In trying to cope with this problem, the GDR may finally decide that the best approach lies beyond Europe. A more active role in the Third World can be justified solely on ideological grounds, but East Germany is also well aware of the potential political and economic benefits to be derived from pursuing such a course.

ACCORDING TO a growing number of analysts of foreign policy, the primacy of the nation-state is under severe, perhaps even fatal, challenge. If one compares present conditions with those of a century ago, sovereignty has indeed eroded. National security and economic policies are increasingly subject to the demands and expectations of other countries, and the ability of national elites to determine the course of their governments' domestic and foreign policies is called into serious question in a world which pays more than mere lip service to the realities of global interdependence. However, the German Democratic Republic is one of several countries in the world today which, for all practical purposes, have never experienced either the advantages or the disadvantages of national sovereignty.

During the first 20 years of its political existence, East Germany scoured the world for diplomatic legitimacy. To be sure, as Jonathan Steele's *Inside East Germany* more than adequately chronicles (indeed, tends to overstress), the GDR has been able to relate its social and political order to durable socialist traditions within the framework of German revolutionary history from the mid-19th century to the beginning of World War II. Yet, the common theme that emerges from the other books under review is the unending quest of East German leaders for international recognition. And even today, while the GDR enjoys full diplomatic relations with every country in the world save Israel,

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Chile, and an assortment of others branded as untouchables in the Soviet lexicon, the regime of Erich Honecker remains uncertain about its national and international roles.

What explains East Germany's persistent search for international acceptance? After three decades of "official" political development (1949-80), a large part of the answer involves the foreign policy cadre who guide the short- and long-term fortunes of the German Democratic Republic. Jürgen Radde's study of the foreign policy elite in the GDR underlines the growing professionalization of that stratum, while emphasizing the continuing importance of social relationships within the apparatus of the ruling Socialist Unity Party (SED) as a whole. Although Radde totally ignores the linkage between these personal relationships and GDR foreign policy—especially the pursuit of international legitimacy—Anita Dasbach-Mallinckrodt's impressive examination of the GDR foreign policy elite easily fills that vacuum. Mallinckrodt's study, which has been unaccountably ignored in the United States, may be the most significant work available on the making of foreign policy in the GDR, or in Communist states more generally. Perhaps the chief value of the book is her unstinting effort to search for connections between the impersonal workings of the East Germany foreign policy apparatus and the career profiles and the foreign policy orientations of the leading figures of the SED. While the East German regime did not give her permission to interview the major foreign policy figures of the GDR, she has shown imagination in constructing some highly plausible opinion profiles of these key figures.

Mallinckrodt also touches upon another reason for the GDR's dogged quest for international recognition. She demonstrates that East Germany's evolution into a functioning nation-state has been closely tied to broad Soviet foreign policy goals. Indeed, although Mallinckrodt does not press this line of argument consistently, it is clear that international acceptance of the GDR has been directly related to Moscow's willingness to advance the fortunes of its junior partner.

WHILE THE GDR has pursued international legitimacy on a global scale, the focal point of its foreign activity has remained in Europe. Therefore, any analysis of East German foreign policy must pay particular heed to the GDR's association with the Soviet bloc in Europe and the GDR's continuing struggle with the neighboring Federal Republic of Germany.

Both Melvin Croan and N. Edwina Moreton underline the importance of relations with the USSR for the East Germans. Croan rightly emphasizes that in the economic arena, East Germany's ability to supply the USSR with high-precision instruments otherwise unavailable in Eastern Europe in return for Soviet raw materials compensates in large measure for the GDR's poverty of natural resources. Moreover, he notes that if the GDR is dependent on the Soviet Union for defense of East German "socialist achievements," the GDR has some leverage over Soviet policy toward Berlin. Unfortunately, however, he merely flirts with, rather than develops, provocative ideas on the range of choices open to the GDR.

Moreton's *East Germany and the Warsaw Alliance* seriously attempts to answer an imposing set of questions about contemporary East German foreign policy in Eastern Europe. Does the GDR have a "national" interest? If it does, what means does it employ to try to achieve its interests and goals? How does the Honecker regime reconcile its participation in the Warsaw Pact with the continual political demands placed upon it by a dynamic and nationalistic West German neighbor? Moreton stresses that growing East German–Soviet rapprochement within the Warsaw Pact now enables General Secretary Erich Honecker and his SED colleagues to pursue East German national interests—principally the "defense" of East Berlin and the maintenance of political authority in the GDR—with a fair amount of freedom. If East Germany's privileged trading relations with the Federal Republic irritate other members of the alliance, the GDR is not being prohibited from expanding its economic relations with Bonn. Thus, rather than being captive of Soviet big-power chauvinism—a frequent Chinese claim—the East Germans may in fact have been able to employ their relative weakness and strategic vulnerability to some advantage in dealing with the USSR.

BUT IF the German Democratic Republic has concentrated on carving out a role for itself in the heart of Europe, will it necessarily do so in the future? Both Peter C. Ludz and Hermann Weber correctly emphasize that the shift of power from Walter Ulbricht to Erich Honecker in 1971 has brought a greater "realism" to East German foreign policy. The GDR no longer champions its special brand of communism in Eastern Europe as it did under Ulbricht, and it can be argued that East Berlin has all but forsaken any hope of "German unity"—a change most obviously reflected in the revised GDR Constitution of 1974, which refers to the GDR as a separate nation-state. But such issues may increasingly

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

be less important in the kind of global political and economic order which now confronts advanced industrial societies as a whole and East Germany in particular.

Indeed, the chances are quite high that East Germany will become a more active, if not assertive, presence in what is loosely labeled the Third World. Actually, as Lamm and Kupper point out in their valuable work on East German activity in the Third World (*DDR und Dritte Welt*), the GDR has always been involved in the affairs of this vast and diverse area. The authors provide some fascinating, if pathetic, anecdotes of how East Germany's immediate postwar generation of leaders wooed Third World rulers in the hope of securing diplomatic recognition. For example, when some GDR pilots obtained landing rights in an Asian country for their malfunctioning aircraft and put the plane down safely, East German diplomats immediately cabled home that a delegation from the GDR had been greeted officially by representatives of the government!

In a more serious vein, however, Lamm and Kupper document East German efforts during the pre-recognition era of the 1950's and 1960's to make the GDR's existence felt in Latin America, Asia, the Middle East, and Africa. Even though the East Germans essentially followed Soviet policy in the Third World, they nonetheless succeeded in making common cause with many of the emerging revolutionary groups in the countries there, especially in the Middle East (Algeria, for example) and Southern Africa.

Lamm and Kupper also offer insight into the precise rationale for East German policy toward the Third World during the period. This has several aspects. First and foremost, the GDR sought political recognition in the Third World to counter West Germany's Hallstein Doctrine, which effectively prevented Western governments, on pain of reprisal by the Federal Republic, from recognizing the GDR. Second, the East German leadership knew that the GDR's lack of natural resources might eventually force it to go outside Eastern Europe for raw materials. Through association with Third World revolutionaries, the leadership hoped that the GDR, over the long term, might secure direct access to many commodities, such as oil, copper, and fruit, which were currently being supplied by its neighbors. Finally, alignment with the Third World might help East Germany differentiate itself from its larger and more powerful German competitor to the west, and thereby assist in establishing a distinctive national identity. Interestingly, while East German propagandists have stressed the traditional elements of "their" German political culture when addressing a West German audience ("this is the home of Bach, Mozart, Einstein, etc."), they have accented the world revolutionary mission of East Germany within the broader anti-imperialist movement in talking to the Third World.

Michael W. Olszewski suggests that in recent years East German activism in the Third World has taken on an added motivational dimension. Writing in Lyman H. Legter's collection of essays on *The German Democratic Republic*, Olszewski argues that Third World policy implicitly promises GDR policymakers a partial release "from an otherwise tightly harnessed policy framework."

There is a good deal of circumstantial evidence available that indicates that the East German leaders do indeed see their Third World policy as affording them such a release. According to Anita Mallinckrodt, also writing in the Legters volume, the GDR by the early 1970's already possessed an imposing technological capacity to broadcast its view of the world scene to others. Radio Berlin International (RBI), she says,

> *has been broadcasting from East Berlin to the world for the past fifteen years. . . . Transmitting fifty-two hours of programming a day in twelve languages, RBI claims it is heard by coal miners in Sweden, students in India, and trade unionists in Australia. Beginning with a ten-minute broadcast in French in 1955, RBI next added Swedish, Danish, Arabic, and German, then Italian, Swahili, Spanish, and Portuguese.* (Legters, p. 229)

Moreover, even though the GDR, in tandem with the Soviet Union, has suffered important setbacks in the Third World—particularly in Indonesia, Egypt, and Somalia—it has nevertheless been persistent in its pursuit of allies.

Perhaps the most obvious and impressive instances of GDR activism in the Third World have been in the Middle East and Africa. In contrast with the pan-German policy of Berlin toward both these regions prior to World War II, however, the GDR's policy toward these areas has not been an independent, much less a singular, one. Rather, the GDR has worked in close association with the Soviet Union and Cuba in attempting to stimulate radical political change in various countries. Still, East German military and administrative tutelage has been conspicuous in South Yemen, Angola, Ethiopia, and Mozambique. And the strident anti-Israeli (and anti-Zionist) posture of the East German leadership has served as a justification for GDR

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

support of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO).

Such activism may in fact prove quite useful to East Berlin as a means of gaining increased leverage with respect to Moscow. To be sure, the GDR operates under many constraints here. The East German role in the Third World remains supplementary rather than decisive. Furthermore, even though the GDR's new forays in Africa and Asia may have produced a positive resonance in East German public opinion,[1] the Honecker regime still has of late been experiencing major economic and social problems at home.

Nevertheless, there is little question that the USSR increasingly requires the kind of support for its foreign policy projects throughout the world that the GDR can provide. In the arena of Eastern Europe, it is true, this requirement has not yet become very significant, for the Brezhnev doctrine underlines the continuing reality of Soviet readiness and ability to move unilaterally in handling recalcitrant allies. But in the larger global environment, the USSR finds itself under compulsion to act more circumspectly. Thus, in areas like the Third World, multilateral support assumes real significance.

In addition, there are a few signs that East Berlin has already benefited positively from its services to Soviet causes in the Third World. For example, despite the sharp increase in the cost of Soviet oil and natural gas sent to the GDR, the East Germans, unlike some other East Europeans, have yet to experience serious financial difficulties in their dealings with the USSR. More than one economic analyst has suggested that Moscow's acquiescence to the galloping East German indebtedness to the Soviet Union has been compensation for the services that the GDR has rendered.[2]

If this analysis is correct, then we can look forward to mounting involvement of the GDR in the Third World. Despite its lack of national sovereignty, the GDR, as a highly organized technological society, possesses all the attributes to carry a major share of the "socialist burden" there.

---

[1] Marlies Menge, "Beat and Borscht: Development Aid of the GDR," *Die Zeit* (Hamburg), Feb. 29, 1980.

[2] See, for example, Michael Keren, "The Return of the Ancien Regime: The GDR in the 1970s," in US Congress, Joint Economic Committee, *East European Economies Post-Helsinki*, Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1977, p. 722.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

A Window on Poland's Social Transformation

By Maurice D. Simon

THE POLISH SOCIOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION. *Polish Sociology 1975–1976: Studies in Methodology, Bibliography of Sociological Works*. Wroclaw, Ossolineum, 1977.

ERIK ALLARDT and WLODZIMIERZ WESOLOWSKI, Eds. *Social Structure and Change: Finland and Poland, Comparative Perspective*. Warsaw, Polish Scientific Publishers, 1978.

M.N. RUTKEVITCH et al., Eds. *Transformations of Social Structure in the USSR and Poland*. Moscow and Warsaw, Institute for Sociological Research, USSR Academy of Sciences, and Institute of Philosophy and Sociology, Polish Academy of Sciences, 1974.

THE POLISH SOCIOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION. *Polish Sociology 1977: Social Structure*. Wroclaw, Ossolineum, 1978.

KAZIMIERZ SLOMCZYNSKI and TADEUSZ KRAUZE, Eds. *Class Structure and Social Mobility in Poland*. White Plains, NY, M.E. Sharpe, Inc., 1978.

WLODZIMIERZ WESOLOWSKI and KAZIMIERZ M. SLOMCZYNSKI. *Investigations on Class Structure and Social Stratification in Poland 1945–1975*. Warsaw, Institute of Philosophy and Sociology, Polish Academy of Sciences, 1977.

N.S. MANSUROV et al., Eds. *Personal Activity in the Socialist Society*. Moscow and Warsaw, Institute for Sociological Research, USSR Academy of Sciences, and Institute of Philosophy and Sociology, Polish Academy of Sciences, 1974.

POLISH ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, THE RESEARCH AND PROGNOSTICS COMMITTEE "POLAND 2000." *Polska 2000: Social Development of Poland in Prognostics Works* (Special Number). Wroclaw, Ossolineum, 1974.

WESTERN ANALYSIS of socioeconomic and political changes in East European countries has tended to suffer from a lack of access to data. The political sensitivity of much of the salient information has often created insurmountable obstacles to its acquisition by Westerners. Still, the past decade has witnessed considerable progress toward the opening up of Eastern Europe to Western social science research. Poland constitutes a good case in point.

Since 1956, Polish sociologists have engaged in wide-scale empirical investigations, pursued serious international collaboration, and maintained a flexibility in both analysis and interpretation of research findings that produces challenging and provocative studies;[1] and in recent years there has been an outpouring of translations of their work. The books under review illustrate how scholarship can be advanced by such an open and genuinely collaborative spirit, and they provide a good sample of the richness and diversity of Polish sociology. At the same time, they demonstrate certain failings and limitations of which Westerners should be aware.

THESE VOLUMES aptly point up three key characteristics of Polish sociology. First, it has been oriented toward social problems, with research focusing largely on the dilemmas and issues generated by the processes of industrialization and modernization. As Jan Szczepanski, one of Poland's most eminent sociologists, puts things, a main thrust of research has been "the identification of deficiencies

[1] For a Western assessment of Polish sociology, see C.G.A. Bryant, "Sociology and Socialism in Poland—A View from the West," *Social Research*, (New York, NY), Spring 1972, pp. 102–33. For Polish discussions, see Wladyslaw Markiewicz, "Sociology in People's Poland," in Jerzy J. Wiatr, Ed., *The State of Sociology in Eastern Europe Today*, Carbondale, IL, Southern Illinois University Press, 1971, pp. 97–137; and J.J. Wiatr, "Sociology-Marxism-Reality," in Peter L. Berger, Ed., *Marxism and Sociology: Views from Eastern Europe*, New York, NY, Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1969, pp. 18–36.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

and backward areas" in social life rooted in the past and/or emerging with socialist development (*Polish Sociology 1975–1976,* p. 14). Second, Polish sociology has shown a keen sensitivity to theoretical and methodological questions of universal importance. While giving central attention to Polish national problems, it has not been unduly parochial in its concerns. Third, Polish sociology displays a distinctive Marxist theoretical emphasis in its preoccupation with class structure, social mobility, and class consciousness. These features bear more detailed examination in the context of the particular books at hand.

The major process that these volumes analyze is the "transformation" of Poland into a socialist society ("socialist construction"). This process, it is emphasized, involves a developmental strategy of planned and guided societal change according to the long-term political goals associated with Marxism. Politics and ideology are said to determine the main economic and social patterns of change. As Witold Morawski asserts,

In Poland, as in any other socialist country, the role of official doctrine has been of decisive importance. In this doctrine industrialization is treated as a means of achieving a future socialist society and is, more or less deliberately, shaped by a series of political decisions. (Allardt and Wesolowski, p. 50)

A wide array of statistical data is presented to describe and measure the magnitude and rate of economic growth and consequent changes in social structure in post–World War II Poland (see especially Allardt and Wesolowski, and Rutkevitch et al. for the broad panorama of change).

In terms of the goals of socialist transformation, the positive accomplishments are, in fact, impressive. These volumes document the formation and growth of the industrial working class and its mobilization for basic industrialization, the emergence of a distinctive socialist intelligentsia and its pivotal role in scientific-technological advancement and economic management, the declining size of the agrarian population because of migration to the cities, the improved (if still unsatisfactory) conditions of rural life, and the progress in agricultural production (which nevertheless continues to fall below current needs and demands). Upward social mobility, the upgrading of the quality of education and the broadening of educational opportunities, the provision of more social welfare benefits and public services, and the widening of access to culture are correctly attributed to "socialist construction" and are depicted in statistical fashion.

Although such descriptions of comprehensive social changes stemming from "socialist construction" are quite informative, they do not break much new ground. Even Western scholars unfamiliar with the specific dimensions of change in socialist Poland would tend to expect or acknowledge that the overall achievements have been considerable—whether or not they expressed strong normative reservations about the degree to which the benefits of development have justified the costs.

Yet it must be stressed that there are significant, challenging, and novel analytical perspectives and findings presented in these studies as well. The sophisticated and systematic treatment of the formation of new socio-occupational divisions and groups, of new patterns of social stratification, and of inter- and intragenerational social mobility deserves special attention. (This is particularly true of *Polish Sociology 1977,* Slomczynski and Krauze, and the empirical investigations reported in Wesolowski and Slomczynski.) Here, we see in sharpest focus some of the key consequences of socialist development—increased social differentiation; disparities in income, education, prestige, and working conditions; and distinctly contrasting opportunities for advancement for members of particular social groups. These problems are at the heart of the social and political tensions contemporary Poland has been experiencing. Industrialization and "socialist construction" have produced a high degree of organized social complexity and an intensification of group identities and claims that place heavy strains upon the political system.[2]

There is a keen awareness of and sensitivity to social inequality in most of the analyses. The thought-provoking contributions of Slomczynski and Wesolowski provide an important illustration of this concern. These writers hypothesize that research increasingly will point to "the division of labor and its imperatives as the reigning force" in "determining the distribution of numerous attributes of social position within a socialist society." In other words, there will be a diminished role for the "classical" Marxist criterion of class position, "namely [property] relations to the means of production," and an enhanced role for socio-occupational

[2]For a useful recent examination of this theme, see Sten Tellenback, "The Logic of Development in Socialist Poland," *Social Forces* (Chapel Hill, NC), December 1978, pp. 436-56. See also Roger E. Kanet, "Political Groupings and Their Role in the Process of Change in Eastern Europe," in Andrew Gyorgy and James A. Kuhlman, Eds., *Innovation in Communist Systems,* Boulder, CO, Westview Press, 1978, pp. 41–58.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

factors (such as vocational qualifications and work productivity) in determining the distribution of material and psychic rewards (*Polish Sociology 1977*, pp. 26–28). This judgment implies that as socialist construction proceeds, meritocratic principles will take precedence over egalitarian principles in shaping the allocation of social rewards. Conceivably, such a change could promote cumulative advantages for members of certain socio-occupational groups who are highly qualified and/or engaged in the most valued productive activities, thus undermining some of the egalitarian objectives of socialism. At present, however, the empirical findings of Slomczynski and Wesolowski indicate that attempts to limit social inequalities have produced a marked "decomposition of social position attributes" or "status inconsistency (incongruence between such attributes of social position as education, income, prestige, and authority). Theoretically, this could produce social discontent among those who consider their efforts to be undervalued (e.g., highly qualified professionals who receive relatively modest incomes as a result of egalitarian wage scales). For reasons that are unconvincing but too complex to summarize here, Slomczynski and Wesolowski (pp. 109–21) do not find this to be the case. In a theoretical and practical sense, however, they present important new insights into the crucial role socio-occupational differentiation may play in the crystallization of inequalities. Their contention that policymakers may be able to reduce tensions stemming from inequalities "by promoting status inconsistencies, at least among some attributes of social position" (pp. 31, 117–19) is intriguing and merits careful examination by Western social scientists.

In addition, the studies by Jan Danecki on income distribution policies, Irena Reszke on the effects of status incongruence, Tadeusz Remer on the relationship between intergenerational mobility and feelings of relative deprivation, Boguslaw Blachnicki on the consciousness of economic equality on the part of industrial employees, Jan Malanowski on interclass relations and perceptions of distance between social classes, Krzysztof Szafnicki on evaluations of individual earnings and family income, Lidia Beskid on income and consumption, and Krzysztof Ostrowski on regional development reflect the serious and extensive research efforts to determine the causes of social inequality and to probe the Polish public's view of its effects (Danecki, Reszke, Remer, and Blachnicki in *Polish Sociology 1977;* Malanowski and Szafnicki in Slomczynski and Krauze; Beskid and Ostrowski in Allardt and Wesolowski). All these articles provide important conceptual and methodological insights, as well as a variety of interesting data on Poland's social and economic development.

Equally significant and useful are the analyses of patterns of social mobility, best exemplified by the work of Krzysztof Zagorski (Allardt and Wesolowski, pp. 147–82; Rutkevitch et al., pp. 317–44; Slomczynski and Krauze, pp. 61–80; *Polish Sociology 1977*, pp. 139–58). Zagorski presents abundant data, including findings from a 1972 Central Statistical Office survey of economically active males and females aged 15–69 (involving more than 70,000 respondents), that help to clarify the influence of economic development, urban-rural residence, education, sex, and family background upon social mobility. His data suggest that social mobility has been an important tool in creating public support for socialism, especially during the period of rapid industrialization in the 1950's. Economic development plus the extension of educational opportunities, along with overtly egalitarian policies of promotion, led to notable collective mobility. More recent trends in the 1960's and 1970's indicate that a stabilization (and even a downturn) in the entry of young workers and peasants into the intelligentsia has taken place (Wesolowski and Slomczynski, pp. 91–92). Furthermore, tendencies toward downward mobility from the intelligentsia into the working class probably mean that there has been a decrease in mobility opportunities.

In combination with real or perceived perceptions of social inequality, this is likely to foster social tensions.[3] Wladyslaw Adamski's analysis of the Polish educational system vividly illustrates how. Especially during the 1950's, the educational system promoted collective social mobility through the preferential selection of working-class and peasant youth for places in postsecondary institutions. Recently, however, the "attempt to introduce a new scale of values, favouring far more the professional mastery that education gives the individual rather than the 'high post' it secures the employee in the social division of labour . . . means that the function of the school as a channel for social mobility might be tapering off in Poland" (Allardt and Wesolowski, p. 244). The result has been the emergence of strong public criticism from some groups that meritocratic selection practices actually *reduce* educa-

[3] For a solid discussion of these issues, see Walter D. Connor, "Social Change and Stability in Eastern Europe," *Problems of Communism* (Washington, DC), November–December 1977, pp. 16–32.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tional and occupational opportunities for young people from peasant and working-class backgrounds. Thus, Poland, seeking to create a system that both operates on meritocratic principles and serves to promote equality of opportunity, adopted a comprehensive reform of its educational system in 1973. It is far too early to evaluate the impact of the reform, but it is very clear that the decline in the rate of collective social mobility has politicized decision-making on education.

So far we have looked essentially at macrostructural changes in Poland, and it is at this level of analysis that Polish sociology has displayed the greatest strength. But Szczepanski has argued that analysis of changes in the microstructure (defined as "small groups, types of families, neighborhoods and labor communities, social circles, types of human relations, informal institutions, patterns of mutual interrelations, etc.") is also essential for measuring the depth of social transformation under socialism.[4] Several of the studies in these volumes have sought to rectify the existing deficiencies at this level of analysis. Most of the contributions to the volume on *Personal Activity in the Socialist Society* are too general to enable one to assess the degree of progress in the fostering of a new socialist personality; however, the discussions of objectives for educational, work, social, cultural, and leisure activities do point up the ends of political socialization. More recent studies by Magdalena Sokolowska on the social position of women, Jerzy Piotrowski on marriage and the family, Waclaw Makarczyk on social networks, and Antonina Kloskowska on cultural participation (Allardt and Wesolowski) contain valuable information and insights which heighten our understanding of the daily lives of citizens of socialist societies. Aldona Jawlowska and Edmund Mokrzycki's attempt to show how elements of presocialist life-styles have persisted in a transformed Polish social structure (*Polish Sociology 1977*, pp. 93–107) deserves special mention.

THE PRECEDING commentary on the books under review tends to convey a very positive picture of contemporary Polish sociology, and it would be misleading to leave such an overall impression. Polish sociology does have its faults. The major one is its failure to explore systematically the relationship between changes in social structure on the one hand and politics on the other.

In a stimulating and candid essay written in 1973, "Past and Present in Polish Sociology," Jerzy J. Wiatr admitted that before 1971 empirical sociological research in Poland had been highly vulnerable to political pressure.[5] During the Gomulka period, the critical independence of many sociologists was compromised by party-government control of financing, employment assignments, access to data, and publication opportunities.

Although conditions for controversial research have greatly improved since 1970, it would appear that the threat and practice of external restrictions continue. Many salient problem areas in Polish social life are still not being fully investigated by the able researchers whom Poland boasts. Sociologists do offer some advice and expertise to political decision-makers and enjoy well-earned public status and prestige, but their talents have not been fully harnessed for exploring current policy dilemmas and social tensions. Wiatr expresses a worthy ideal: "Accepting and approving the *status quo* in so far as it constitutes the negation of the capitalist *status quo ante*, critical sociology should also be able to criticize it from the perspective of the future."[6] It is unfortunate, indeed, that Polish sociologists are obliged to be cautious in their choice of research topics and to weigh their words carefully.

As long as such conditions persist, Polish sociology can have only limited value for social science analysis in the West. The neglect of

CORRECTION

On page 15 of the article, "Dissent in Eastern Europe: A New Coalition?" (*Problems of Communism*, January–February 1980), the sentence beginning at the end of column one and continuing to column two should read:

The Hungarians György Konrád and Iván Szelényi, now émigrés, push their analysis a step further to argue that the intelligentsia—far from serving as a mediator between workers and the political elite—is on the road to becoming the dominant group within the ruling class, the intellectuals' possession of "teleological knowledge" giving them a claim to preeminence in a system of "rational (i.e., non-market) redistribution."

[4] Jan Szczepanski, "Some Characteristics of Contemporary Polish Society," *The Polish Sociological Bulletin* (Warsaw), No. 2, 1964, p. 12. For a discussion of the microstructure of Polish society, see also Szczepanski, *Polish Society*, New York, NY, Random House, pp. 173–92.

[5] Jerzy J. Wiatr, "Past and Present in Polish Sociology," a publication of *Accademia Polacca Delle Scienze* (Rome), Fasc. 64, 1974, pp. 1–23.

[6] Ibid., p. 22.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

political institutions and processes is a crucial weakness. Szczepanski has been in the forefront of Polish efforts to develop a comprehensive theory of socialist society and has delineated the elements needed for working out a "synthetic forecast" of its future (*Polska 2000,* pp. 7–21). But impediments to the realization of this aim have undermined the value of the work presented in the volume on social prognostics. As Szczepanski points out, in a socialist society "the state of the system of central control decides the state of the entire society." The key components of this system are "the Party and its directing organs, the Government, the Parliament, the Council of State, the Planning Commission, the National Councils, the political parties." Yet he admits that "research on the system of central control and the forecasts regarding its composition, functioning principles, and acting efficiency have not been done in any socialist country" (ibid., p. 14). This is an overstatement, for some institutional research has been carried out (primarily on the local level). Nevertheless, most of these analyses appear to be on peripheral topics and/or do not probe deeply enough. As was pointed out earlier, Polish sociologists claim that Marxist doctrine has had a significant influence on developmental decisions, but their work offers few systematic analyses of how and why specific policy choices have been made, although there are some weak indications that more publications on political institutions and their role in processes of social change will appear in the future.

Similarly, there is great need for more extensive and accurate analyses of intergroup competition and representation of diverse interests within Polish society. The increasing social differentiation examined in these volumes must affect political life. For example, Slomczynski and Wesolowski refer to "structural collisions of interests" that lead to "articulated conflicts." More specifically, they state:

Since there is a scarcity of many goods, the system of distribution is bound to produce conflict of interests between various socio-occupational groups to which goods are unevenly distributed. (Polish Sociology 1977, p. 30)

Polish sociologists have entered into some discussion of "nonantagonistic contradictions" and have begun very preliminary and tentative exploration of the relationship between pluralism and politics, but much more work is required. Andrzej Tyszka, in a thoughtful critique of the Polish literature on social prognostics, argues for "following and defining the types of conflicts and questioned economic and social interests; . . . bringing to light the causes of these conflicts; . . . defining those groups that are entangled in conflicts; . . . analyzing methods and outcomes of arbitration of conflicts and tensions" (ibid., p. 48). Presumably, the political context within which Polish sociology operates has inhibited such research. These recent volumes, however, display new candor about such tensions, and it is to be hoped that forthcoming research will focus more directly on such phenomena.

The paucity of sociological publications dealing with public perceptions and evaluations of the socialist political system is also regrettable.[7] This type of research has apparently been conducted by such agencies as the Public Opinion Research Center of Polish Radio and Television and the Institute for Basic Problems of Marxism-Leninism of the Polish United Workers' Party, but if so, exceedingly little is known in the West about the specific findings or even the topics.

In sum, then, the marked qualitative improvement of recent Polish sociological investigations of the transformation of the social structure during socialist construction has given Western observers new insight into the nature of contemporary Poland. Until Polish sociological research delves more deeply into the relationship between politics and changes in social structure, however, its usefulness to Western analysts will remain rather limited.

[7] In a recent chapter in Walter D. Connor and Zvi Gitelman, *Public Opinion in European Socialist Systems,* New York, NY, Praeger Special Studies, 1977, pp. 41–82, Adaline Huszczo mentions only a few studies directly bearing upon public opinion about the polity. In the same volume, Connor, referring to the more recent period, states that in European socialist states, including Poland, there has been a "tightening of control over the institutions and personnel involved in the research, and in the reservation of results of that research to governmental and party bodies that make use of them." In other words, there has been a "politicization" of public opinion research. Ibid., p. 181.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Problems of Communism

SUBSCRIPTIONS

ANNUAL SUBSCRIPTIONS or copies of recent (the last five) issues of Problems of Communism may be obtained by writing to the Superintendent of Documents, US Government Printing Office, Washington, DC 20402 (USA). Subscription blanks for one-year and single-issue requests are provided on the facing page. For further information, see the inside front cover.

CURRENT PRICES: Annual subscriptions, US mailing address, $10.00 each; outside the US, $12.50 each. Single copies, US mailing address, $1.70 each; outside the US, $2.15 each. A 25% discount is allowed on orders for 100 or more subscriptions or single copies mailed to a single address.

ENCLOSE CHECK OR MONEY ORDER, payable to "Superintendent of Documents, USGPO," or if paying by VISA or Master Charge, please indicate credit card number in the space provided on the subscription blank.

Problems of Communism

REPRINTS, MICROFILM, REPRODUCTION

A variety of services ranging from reprints, through microfilm and microcard editions, to reproduction of individual issues or articles are commercially available. Those firms which offer one or more such services and which have come to the Editors' attention are, in alphabetical order:

J. S. Canner & Co.
49-65 Landsdowne Street
Boston, MA 02215

Infordata International, Inc.
175 Delaware Place
Chicago, IL 60611

Johnson Reprint Corporation
111 Fifth Avenue
New York, NY 10003

Pergamon Press, Inc.
Fairview Park
Elmsford, NY 10523

University Microfilms
300 Zeeb Road
Ann Arbor, MI 48106

Annual indices for Volumes IV-to-date appear in the November-December issue (No. 6) for each year. A combined index to the first three volumes is contained in Vol. III, No. 6 (November-December 1954).

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED